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Abstract
The security of public-key cryptography relies on well-studied hard problems, problems
for which we do not have eﬃcient algorithms. Factorization and discrete logarithm are
the two most known and used hard problems. Unfortunately, they can be easily solved
on a quantum computer by Shor’s algorithm. Also, the research area of cryptography
demands for crypto-diversity which says that we should oﬀer a range of hard problems
for public-key cryptography. If one hard problem proves to be easy, we should be able to
provide alternative solutions. Some of the candidates for post-quantum hard problems,
i.e. problems which are believed to be hard even on a quantum computer, are the
Learning Parity with Noise (LPN), the Learning with Errors (LWE) and the Shortest
Vector Problem (SVP). A thorough study of these problems is needed in order to assess
their hardness. In this thesis we focus on the algorithmic study of LPN.
LPN is a hard problem that is attractive, as it is believed to be post-quantum res-
istant and suitable for lightweight devices. In practice, it has been employed in several
encryption schemes and authentication protocols.
At the beginning of this thesis, we take a look at the existing LPN solving algorithms.
We provide the theoretical analysis that assesses their complexity. We compare the the-
oretical results with practice by implementing these algorithms. We study the eﬃciency
of all LPN solving algorithms which allow us to provide secure parameters that can be
used in practice.
We push further the state of the art by improving the existing algorithms with the
help of two new frameworks. In the ﬁrst framework, we split an LPN solving algorithm
into atomic steps. We study their complexity, how they impact the other steps and
we construct an algorithm that optimises their use. Given an LPN instance that is
characterized by the noise level and the secret size, our algorithm provides the steps to
follow in order to solve the instance with optimal complexity. In this way, we can assess
if an LPN instance provides the security we require and we show what are the secure
instances for the applications that rely on LPN.
The second framework handles problems that can be decomposed into steps of equal
complexity. Here, we assume that we have an adversary that has access to a ﬁnite or
inﬁnite number of instances of the same problem. The goal of the adversary is to succeed
in just one instance as soon as possible. Our framework provides the strategy that
achieves this. We characterize an LPN solving algorithm in this framework and show
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that we can improve its complexity in the scenario where the adversary is restricted.
We show that other problems, like password guessing, can be modelled in the same
framework.
Keywords: Learning Parity with Noise, LPN, algorithmic study, cryptography, Walsh
Hadamard transform, BKW, LF1, LF2, covering codes, Gaussian elimination, post-
quantum cryptography, public-key cryptography, password quessing
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Re´sume´
La se´curite´ de la cryptographie a` cle´ publique est base´e sur des proble`mes mathe´matiques
suppose´s diﬃciles a` re´soudre. La factorisation et le logarithme discret sont deux proble`mes
de ce type. Ce sont les plus connus et les plus utilise´s. Malheureusement, ils deviennent
faciles a` re´soudre avec l’algorithme de Shor sur un ordinateur quantique. La recherche en
cryptographie exige e´galement de la crypto-diversite´. Cette dernie`re demande que l’on
oﬀre une varie´te´ de proble`mes diﬃciles a` re´soudre en cryptographie a` cle´ publique. Si un
proble`me se re´ve`le facile a` re´soudre, nous devons eˆtre capable de proposer des solutions
alternatives. Le proble`me Learning Parity with Noise (LPN), le proble`me Learning with
Errors (LWE) et le proble`me Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) sont quelques candidats de
proble`mes mathe´matiques diﬃciles a` re´soudre sur un ordinateur quantique. Une e´tude
approfondie de ces proble`mes est ne´cessaire aﬁn d’e´valuer leur se´curite´. Dans cette the`se,
nous eﬀectuons une e´tude algorithmique approfondie de LPN.
LPN est un proble`me qui est inte´ressant, car on le suppose diﬃcile a` re´soudre sur
un ordinateur quantique. Il est aussi adapte´ pour l’utilisation de la cryptogrpahie sur
des appareils bas-couˆt. En pratique, ce proble`me est utilise´ dans plusieurs syste`mes de
chiﬀrement et protocoles d’authentiﬁcation.
Au de´but de cette the`se, nous e´tudions les algorithmes existants qui re´solvent LPN.
Nous pre´sentons une analyse the´orique qui e´value leur complexite´. Nous comparons les
re´sultats the´oriques avec la pratique. Nous e´tudions l’eﬃcacite´ de tous ces algorithmes
et cela nous permet de fournir des parame`tres qui sont suˆrs et qui peuvent eˆtre utilise´s
en pratique.
Nous poussons l’e´tat de l’art en ame´liorant les algorithmes existants a` l’aide de deux
frameworks. Dans le premier, nous se´parons les algorithmes re´solvant LPN en e´tapes
atomiques. Nous e´tudions la complexite´ de chaque e´tape ainsi que la fac¸on dont ces
e´tapes interagissent. Nous construisons un algorithme qui optimise leur utilisation.
E´tant donne´ une instance LPN, qui est caracte´rise´e par un niveau de bruit et une taille
de secret, notre algorithme fournit les e´tapes a` suivre pour re´soudre l’instance avec une
complexite´ optimale. De cette fac¸on, nous pouvons e´valuer si une instance LPN fournit la
se´curite´ ne´cessaire et nous montrons quelles sont les instances suˆres pour les applications
qui utilisent LPN.
Le second framework traite des proble`mes qui peuvent eˆtre de´compose´s en e´tapes
de meˆme complexite´. Ici, nous supposons que nous avons un adversaire qui a acce`s a`
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un nombre ﬁni ou inﬁni d’instances du meˆme proble`me. Le but de l’adversaire est de
re´soudre une seule instance le plus vite possible. Notre framework fournit la strate´gie qui
permet d’atteindre cet objectif. Nous adaptons un algorithme qui re´sout LPN dans ce
framework et nous montrons que nous pouvons ame´liorer sa complexite´ dans le sce´nario
ou` l’adversaire est restreint en nombre de reque`tes. Nous montrons aussi que d’autres
proble`mes, comme celui demandant de deviner un mot de passe, peuvent eˆtre modele´s
a` l’aide de ce meˆme framework.
Mots clefs: Learning Parity with Noise, LPN, e´tude algorithmique, cryptographie, trans-
forme´e d’Hadamard, BKW, LF1, LF2, code couvrant, e´limination de Gauss-Jordan,
cryptographie post-quantique, cryptographie a` cle´ publique, deviner un mot de passe
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Chapter1
Introduction
The area of cryptography has developed tremendously in the last decades, both in its
deﬁnition and in its use. Nowadays, cryptography is the science of providing primit-
ives/solutions for scenarios in which we deal with adversaries and we want to ensure
properties like conﬁdentiality. Cryptography is ubiquitous, it is a tool that every person
is using. Anyone with access to the Internet beneﬁts from the security that cryptography
oﬀers. It can be about passwords, accessing the bank account or securely storing data
in the cloud. In all these scenarios we use cryptography. Whether it is about ensuring
conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication, non repudiation, unpredictability, cryptography
oﬀers a large palette of primitives.
The most well-known primitive of cryptography is the encryption scheme. An en-
cryption scheme ensures conﬁdentiality, i.e. when a message m is encrypted, only the
legitimate recipient can decrypt and have access to it. In cryptography, we have two
types of encryption: symmetric and public-key. On the symmetric encryption side we
have the block ciphers (e.g. DES [Des77], AES [FIP01]) and the stream ciphers (e.g.
RC4 ). Two main representatives of the public-key encryption are RSA [RSA78] and
ElGamal [Gam85]. These two encryption schemes base their security on two hard prob-
lems: factorization and discrete logarithm, respectively. We believe that these two prob-
lems are hard based on the unsuccessful eﬀorts of the cryptography and mathematics
community to ﬁnd eﬃcient algorithms to solve them. If a new algorithm is able to
solve easily one of these problems, then the corresponding encryption scheme becomes
insecure. RSA and ElGamal are extensively studied and used in practice.
Besides the two aforementioned hard problems, we have several other candidates:
Learning Parity with Noise (LPN), Learning with Errors (LWE) [Reg05], the quadratic
residuosity problem, the shortest vector problem, etc..
One might ask: if we have the factorization and the discrete logarithm problems,
which we believe to be hard, why should we try to analyse new problems?
The ﬁrst and the most important reason is that we need to have crypto diversity.
Assume half of our encryption schemes base their security on factorization and half on
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discrete logarithm. Having only two standard hard problems can simplify the choice
of someone who needs to use an encryption scheme. But, if one discovers how to eas-
ily solve one of these problems, then half of our encryption schemes become insecure.
Cryptography needs to oﬀer a range of hard problems that can be the starting point for
an encryption scheme. In order to create a pool of such problems, we need to carefully
study them in order to assess their hardness. Diﬀerent problems can better ﬁt to dif-
ferent scenarios or platforms. So, having more choices can oﬀer more ﬂexibility and a
better match.
Secondly, both problems are easily solved by a quantum computer with the Shor’s
algorithm [Sho97]. Thus, we cannot count on them in a quantum computer era and
we need to provide alternatives that are post-quantum resistant. While there is yet
no quantum computer capable of solving such problems, progresses are done [VSB+01,
LBYP07, LWL+07, LBC+12, MLL+12, XZL+12, DB14] in this direction and we cannot
know when this will become reality. Hence, we need to propose a standard for post-
quantum cryptography.
This thesis focuses on the analysis of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem,
on the implementation of the LPN solving algorithms existing in the literature and on
improvements to these algorithms.
We study LPN, as it is a good candidate for post-quantum cryptography. It is also a
good candidate for lightweight devices.
Informally, the LPN problem asks to solve a noisy binary system of linear equations
(all the operations are done modulo 2). I.e., given an uniformly distributed secret vector
s ∈ {0, 1}k and an uniformly distributed vector v ∈ {0, 1}k , for which we compute their
inner product 〈s, v〉 = ∑ki=1 sivi, we make public the value of v and c = 〈s, v〉 ⊕ d,
where d ∈ {0, 1} is the noise. The value of d is 1 with probability τ ∈ [0, 12 ]. Given
many such equations, one is asked to recover the value of s. Note that the noise is the
variable that gives hardness to the problem. If we always have d = 0, then s can be
easily recovered with the Gaussian elimination algorithm. Depending on the application
where it is instantiated, the noise level in LPN can be adjusted and oﬀer a degree of
ﬂexibility. An LPN instance is characterized by two parameters: the size of the secret,
k, and the noise level, τ .
The LWE problem is a generalization of LPN, where, instead of working modulo 2
we work in a ring Zq. While there are quantum and classical reductions [Reg05, Pei09,
BLP+13] from a worst-case problem on lattices to LWE that attest the hardness of LWE,
this reduction does not exist for LPN. Thus, the best way to assess its hardness is by
trying to design and improve algorithms that solve it.
Here, we analyse the existing LPN solving algorithms. This allows us to deﬁne the
memory and time complexity needed to solve this problem. While this is a theoretical
work, we validate our analysis by comparing the theoretical results with the practical
ones oﬀered by an implementation. We further improve the complexity of an LPN solving
algorithm. This allows us to asses the hardness of LPN and to propose secure parameters
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for the cryptographic primitives that base their security on it.
For instance, we show that RSA with 2048-bit moduli or ECDH with a secp224r1
curve is equivalent to LPN with 512-bit secret and τ = 0.4.
Thus, this thesis deepens the study of the LPN problem by formally analysing it, by
improving the existing algorithms and by validating our theoretical results with practical
ones.
Outline of the Thesis
We provide the formal deﬁnition of LPN and give an overview of the existing LPN
heuristic solving algorithms in Chapters 2 and 3. All these algorithms are presented in
a uniﬁed framework where an LPN solving algorithm has two phases: a reduction phase
and a solving phase. The reduction phase reduces the size of the secret and the solving
phase recovers the truncated secret. This framework allows us to better compare the
algorithms and to give an intuition on which methods are more eﬃcient. We describe
the algorithms as they were presented in the literature and we bring our improvements
by providing a more detailed analysis and by using better bounds. While most of the
algorithms are generic, we present three algorithms for the case when the secret is sparse,
i.e. it has a small Hamming weight. For all the algorithms we describe, we state their
complexity in terms of number of LPN equations, memory and time.
Our theoretical analysis is compared with the practice in Chapter 4. We implement
the algorithms described in Chapter 3 and study the gap between the theoretical and
the practical results. We discover that the results provided by the implementation are
very close to what the theory dictates. After this comparison, we compare all the LPN
solving algorithms for the case when the secret is sparse. Having validated our heuristic,
we provide the security oﬀered by each algorithm when we vary the size of the secret
and the level of noise. Having these results, the LPN based cryptographic primitives can
instantiate LPN with secure parameters. This also allows us to see what is the best LPN
solving algorithm depending on the noise level.
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on methods that allow us to improve the performance of the
LPN solving algorithms. In Chapter 5, we represent an LPN algorithm as a sequence of
reduction steps followed at the end by a solving step. We maintain the same framework
as in Chapter 3 but we look more into the details on how we can improve the reduction
phase. We construct a graph of all possible reduction steps and search for the chain of
steps that minimizes the time complexity while trying to keep the noise level as low as
possible. For this, we construct an algorithm that allows us to search in an eﬃcient way
the optimal chains. This method automatizes the LPN solving algorithms: given any
LPN instance our algorithm gives us what is the best complexity we can achieve together
with the steps that need to be followed in order to obtain that complexity.
Chapter 6 introduces a framework where we have an adversary that can mount sev-
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eral attacks (e.g. key searches). These attacks can be broken down into steps of equal
complexity. An attacker can stop and resume an attack. The question we answer in
this scenario is what strategy an adversary should adopt such that he succeeds in one
of these attacks as fast of possible. This framework is a general one and can be adopted
to several problems. In this chapter, we focus on LPN and password guessing. With
this framework we improve the complexity of an LPN solving algorithm in which we are
limited in the number of equations.
We conclude and present the future work in Chapter 7.
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Chapter2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce notations, deﬁnitions and results that are used in the next
chapters. In Section 2.1, we present the notations used for describing the LPN problem.
In Section 2.2, we provide the formal deﬁnition of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN)
problem and describe the parameters that characterize an LPN solving algorithm. We
recall some of the Hoeﬀding’s bounds and the Central Limit Theorem in Sections 2.3
and 2.4. These results are used in the analysis of LPN solving algorithms. Section 2.5
gives the deﬁnition of the Walsh Hadamard Transform that we use for our algorithms.
Deﬁnitions for linear codes, perfect and quasi-perfect codes are presented in Section 2.6.
2.1 Notations and Preliminaries
Let 〈·, ·〉 denote the inner product and let ⊕ denote the bitwise XOR. By Zp we denote
the quotient group Z/pZ and we have Z2 = {0, 1}. For a domain D, we denote by
x
U←− D the fact that x is drawn uniformly at random from D. We use small letters
for vectors and capital letters for matrices. We represent a binary vector v of size k as
v = (v1, . . . , vk), where vi is the i
th bit of v. We denote the Hamming weight of a vector
v, i.e. the number of non-zero elements of v, by HW(v).
By Berτ we deﬁne the Bernoulli distribution with parameter τ , i.e. for a random
variable X following Berτ ,
Pr[X = 1] = τ = 1− Pr[X = 0].
The bias of a boolean random variable X is deﬁned as δ = E((−1)X ). Thus, for a
Bernoulli variable, we have δ = 1 − 2τ . By Berkτ we denote the binomial distribution
with parameters k and τ . I.e. Berkτ is the sum of k independent random variables that
follow the Berτ distribution. For a random variable Y following Ber
k
τ , we have
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Pr[Y = i] =
{(k
i
)
τ i(1− τ)k−i for i ≤ k
0 for i > k.
Given X and Y, two discrete distributions over a support Z, we deﬁne by d(X ,Y) the
statistical distance between the two distributions as follows:
d(X ,Y) = 1
2
∑
z∈Z
|X (z) − Y(z)|,
where by |x| we denote the absolute value of the real value x.
2.2 Learning Parity with Noise Problem
LPN is a well-known problem studied in cryptography, coding theory and machine learn-
ing. LPN is believed to be resistant to quantum computers. This makes it a good candid-
ate to the number-theoretic problems (e.g. factorization and discrete logarithm) which
can be solved easily with quantum algorithms. Also, due to its simplicity, it is a nice
candidate for lightweight devices. Among the cryptographic applications where LPN
or LPN variants are deployed, we ﬁrst have the HB family of authentication protocols:
HB [HB01], HB+ [JW05], HB++ [BCD06], HB# [GRS08] and AUTH [KPC+11]. An
LPN-based authentication scheme secure against Man-in-the-Middle attacks was presen-
ted in Crypto 2013 [LM13]. There are also several encryption schemes based on LPN:
Alekhnovich [Ale03] presents two public-key schemes that encrypt one bit at a time.
Later, Gilbert, Robshaw and Seurin [GRS08] introduce LPN-C, a symmetric crypto-
graphic system. Two schemes that improve upon Alekhnovich’s scheme are introduced
by Do¨ttling at al [DMN12] and Damg˚ard and Sunoo [DP12]. In PKC 2014, Kiltz et
al. [KMP14] propose an alternative scheme to [DMN12]. Duc and Vaudenay [DV13]
introduce HELEN, an LPN-based public-key scheme for which they propose concrete
parameters for diﬀerent security levels. There are several PRNG [BFKL93, ACPS09]
based on LPN.
The hardness of this problem was discussed ﬁrst by Kearns in [Kea93]. It is believed to
be hard and is closely related to the long-standing open problem of eﬃciently decoding
random linear codes. Also, LPN is a special case of the Learning With Errors (LWE)
problem [Reg05], where, instead of the ring Zp, we work in Z2. There are quantum and
classical reductions [Reg05, Pei09, BLP+13] from a worst-case problem on lattices to
LWE that attest the hardness of LWE. But these reductions do not work for the LPN
problem and thus, prove nothing about its hardness.
The LPN problem can be seen as a noisy system of linear equations in the binary
domain. More speciﬁcally, we have a secret s and an adversary that has access to an
LPN oracle which provides him tuples of uniformly distributed binary vectors vi and the
inner product between s and vi to which some noise was added. The noise is represented
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by a Bernoulli variable with a probability τ of the noise bit to be 1. In the following,
we assume w.l.o.g. that τ ∈ [0, 12 ], otherwise we can change τ to 1− τ . The goal of the
adversary is to recover the secret s. So, the problem asks to recover a secret vector s
given access to noisy inner products of itself with random vectors. Below, we present
the formal deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (LPN oracle). Let s
U←− Zk2, let τ ∈]0, 12 [ be a constant noise parameter
and let Berτ be the Bernoulli distribution with parameter τ . Denote by Ds,τ the distri-
bution deﬁned as
{(v, c) | v U←− Zk2, c = 〈v, s〉 ⊕ d, d ← Berτ} ∈ Zk+12 .
An LPN oracle OLPNs,τ is an oracle which outputs independent random samples according
to Ds,τ .
2.2.1 Search LPN
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Search LPN). Given access to an LPN oracle OLPNs,τ , ﬁnd the vector
s. We denote by LPNk,τ the LPN instance where the secret has size k and the noise
parameter is τ . Let k′ ≤ k. We say that an algorithm M (n, t,m, θ, k′)-solves the search
LPNk,τ problem if
Pr[MOLPNs,τ (1k) = (s1 . . . sk′) | s U←− Zk2] ≥ θ,
and M runs in time t, uses memory m and asks at most n queries from the LPN oracle.
Note that we consider here the problem of recovering only a part of the secret.
Throughout the literature, this is how the LPN problem is formulated. The reason
for doing so is that the recovery of the ﬁrst k′ bits dominates the overall complexity.
Once we recover part of the secret, the new problem of recovering a shorter secret of
k − k′ bits is easier. We will discuss more about this in Section 3.4.
Easy instances of LPN occur when τ < 1k , as in this case we can assume that we have
k equations with no noise and we can recover the secret with Gaussian elimination. The
other extreme case is when τ = 12 and where we cannot recover the secret s.
An equivalent way to formulate the search LPNk,τ problem is as follows: given access
to a random matrix A ∈ Zn×k2 and a column vector c over Zn2 , such that AsT ⊕ d = c,
ﬁnd the vector s. Here the matrix A corresponds to the matrix that has the vectors v
on its rows, s is the secret vector of size k and c corresponds to the column vector that
contains the noisy inner products. The column vector d is of size n and contains the
corresponding noise bits.
2.2.2 Decision LPN
The LPN problem has also a decisional form. The decisional LPNk,τ asks to distin-
guish between the uniform distribution over Zk+12 and the distribution Ds,τ . A similar
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deﬁnition for an algorithm that solves decisional LPN can be adopted as above.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Decision LPN). Let Uk+1 denote an oracle that outputs binary random
vectors of size k+1. We say that an algorithm M (n, t,m, θ)-solves the decisional LPNk,τ
problem if
| Pr[MOLPNs,τ (1k) = 1]− Pr[MUk+1(1k) = 1] | ≥ θ
and M runs in time t, uses memory m and needs at most n queries.
The search and the decisional LPN problems are polynomially equivalent [KSS10,
BFKL93]. The following lemma expresses this result.
Lemma 2.4 ([KSS10, BFKL93]). If there is an algorithm M that (n, t,m, θ)-solves
the decisional LPNk,τ , then one can build an algorithm M′ that (n′, t′,m′, θ′, k)-solves
the search LPNk,τ problem, where n
′ = O(n · θ−2 log k), t′ = O(t · k · θ−2 log k), m′ =
O(m · θ−2 log k)) and θ′ = θ4 .
We do not present the details of this result as it is outside the scope of this thesis.
We only analyse the solving algorithms for search LPN. From now on, we will refer to
it simply as LPN.
2.3 Hoeﬀding’s Bounds
Our results from Chapter 3 use the following Hoeﬀding bounds in order to formalize the
solving step of an LPN solving algorithm.
Theorem 2.5. [Hoe63] Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be n independent random variables. We
are given that Pr[Xi ∈ [αi, βi]] = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We deﬁne X = X1 + . . . +Xn and
E(X) is the expected value of X. We have that
Pr[X − E(X) ≥ λ] ≤ e−
2λ2∑n
i=1
(βi−αi)2
and
Pr[X − E(X) ≤ −λ] ≤ e−
2λ2∑n
i=1
(βi−αi)2 ,
for any λ > 0.
2.4 Central Limit Theorem
The Central Limit Theorem is used in Chapter 3 as it improves upon the result that
uses the Hoeﬀding bounds.
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Theorem 2.6. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be n independent identically distributed (i.i.d) ran-
dom variables. We deﬁne X = X1 + . . . + Xn, E(X1) as the expected value of X1,
Var(X1) as the variance of X1 and
Zn =
X − nE(X1)√
nVar(X1)
.
Then, as n approaches inﬁnity, Zn converges in distribution to a normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance 1, i.e. Zn
d−−−→
n→∞ N (0, 1). This means that for all t,
Pr[Zn ≤ t] −−−→
n→∞ ϕ(t),
where ϕ(t) = 12 + erf(
t√
2
) and erf(t) = 2√
π
∫ t
0 e
−x2dx is the Gauss error function.
2.5 Walsh Hadamard Transform (WHT)
Our results in Chapters 3-5 make use of the Walsh Hadamard Transform. This transform
helps improving the solving phase of LPN solving algorithms.
Deﬁnition 2.7 (Walsh Hadamard Transform). We write the n-dimensional binary vec-
tor x ∈ {0, 1}n by its components x = (x1, . . . , xn) with xi ∈ {0, 1}. The Walsh Hadam-
ard Transform of a function f : {0, 1}n → C is a function fˆ : {0, 1}n → C deﬁned
as
fˆ(ν) =
∑
x
f(x)(−1)
∑
xiνi .
The complexity to compute the Walsh Hadamard Transform is O(n2n) by running the
fast Hadamard transform algorithm [CT65].
2.6 Linear Codes
While presenting the state of the art in the area of LPN solving algorithms in Chapter 3,
we introduce a technique called covering code reduction. This method uses linear codes.
We present the main results related to linear codes needed to describe the covering code
step. In Chapter 5, we improve this reduction by using perfect and quasi-perfect linear
codes. Their deﬁnition is given below.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (Binary Linear Code). An [n, k] binary linear code C is a linear subspace
of the vector space Zn2 of dimension k. The elements of C are called codewords. The
value n represents the length and k is the dimension of the code.
In the [n, k] binary linear code C, the codewords can be deﬁned as all possible linear
combinations of the rows of a k×n generator matrix G [MS78]. In the systematic form,
the matrix G is of the form G = (Ik|A) where Ik is the k× k identity matrix and A is a
k × (n− k) matrix.
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The Hamming distance between two codewords x and y, is the number of places
where they diﬀer. We denote this by d(x, y). The minimum distance of a linear code
C is the minimum distance between its codewords [MS78]. We denote this by D. I.e.
D = minC d(x, y), where x 
= y and x, y ∈ C. An equivalent result is that D is the
minimum Hamming weight of any non-zero codeword. A code with minimum distance
D can correct
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
errors. A linear code C of length n, dimension k and minimum
distance D will be denoted by [n, k,D].
Deﬁnition 2.9 (Covering Radius). For a code C, the covering radius is ρ = maxv d(v,C),
where d(v,C) denotes the Hamming distance of v from the code C.
Deﬁnition 2.10 (Packing Radius). The packing radius is the largest radius R such that
the balls of this radius centered on all codewords are non-overlapping.
So, the packing radius is R =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
. We further have ρ ≥ ⌊D−12 ⌋.
Deﬁnition 2.11 (Perfect Code). A perfect code is a [n, k,D] code C characterized by
ρ =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
= R.
Examples of perfect codes are: binary Golay code [23, 12, 7], Hamming codes [2k, 2k−
k − 1, 3] and the repetition codes [k, 1, k].
Deﬁnition 2.12 (Quasi-perfect Code). A quasi-perfect code is a [n, k,D] code C char-
acterized by ρ =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
+ 1 = R+ 1.
These two classes of codes will be used in the code reduction presented in Section 5.4.
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Solving Algorithms for LPN
In this chapter, we present the existing LPN solving algorithms in a uniﬁed manner. We
emphasize the main diﬀerences between these algorithms and discuss which improve-
ments they bring. We improve on the previous results. The personal contribution in
this chapter is a joint work with Florian Trame`r and Serge Vaudenay that was pub-
lished in the Journal of Cryptography and Communications [BTV16]. Further improve-
ments on this are a joint work with Serge Vaudenay that was published in ASIAC-
RYPT’16 [BV16b]. The presentation of LF(4) is a joint work with Serge Vaudenay
published as a note on ePrint [BV16a].
Structure of the Chapter. We give an overview of the existing LPN algorithms in
Section 3.1. Following that, in Sections 3.3-3.7, we present step by step the LPN al-
gorithms that have a sub-exponential complexity and require a sub-exponential number
of queries. For each of these algorithms, we provide a new analysis that brings improve-
ments on the complexity or corrects the previous results. In Section 3.8, we present
algorithms that are eﬃcient in the case of a sparse secret. We describe in Section 3.9 an
LPN solving algorithm that works with a polynomial number of queries.
3.1 Previous Work
In the current literature, there are several algorithms to solve the LPN problem. Recall
that in LPN, one is asked to recover a secret given noisy inner products of it with
randomly chosen vectors. A query is composed of the random vectors and the result
of the noisy inner product. Depending on how many queries are given from the LPN
oracle, we can split the solving algorithms into three categories.
With a sub-exponential number of queries, the existing algorithms solve an LPN in-
stance in sub-exponential time. For this category, we have the BKW [BKW00], LF1,
LF2 [LF06], FMICM [FMI+06] and the covering code algorithms [GJL14, ZJW16]. All
these algorithms solve LPNk,τ with a time complexity of 2
O
(
k
log k
)
and require 2
O
(
k
log k
)
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The ﬁrst that appeared, and the best known, is the BKW [BKW00] algorithm. This
algorithm can be described as a Gaussian elimination on blocks of bits (instead on
single bits) where the secret is recovered bit by bit. Improvements of it were presented
in [FMI+06, LF06]. One idea that improves the algorithm is the use of the fast Walsh-
Hadamard transform as we can recover several bits of the secret at once. In their
work [LF06], Levieil and Fouque provide an analysis with the level of security achieved
by diﬀerent LPN instances and propose secure parameters. A more eﬃcient algorithm
to solve LPN was presented at ASIACRYPT’14 [GJL14] and it introduces the use of
covering codes to improve the performance. The same reduction is used also in the paper
from EUROCRYPT’16 [ZJW16] and ASIACRYPT’16 [BV16b] (that will be presented
in Chapter 5).
Using BKW as a black-box, Lyubashevsky [Lyu05] introduces a ”pre-processing”phase
and solves an LPNk,τ instance with a polynomial number of queries n = k
1+η and with
a time complexity of 2O
(
k
log log k
)
. The queries given to BKW have a worse bias of τ ′ =
1
2 − 12
(
1−2τ
4
) 2k
η log k . Thus, this variant requires a polynomial number of queries but has
a worse time complexity. When τ = 1√
k
, we can improve the result of [Lyu05] and
have a complexity of e
1
2
√
k(ln k)2+O(
√
k ln k) [BV15]. More details about this are given in
Section 6.5.
With a linear number of queries, the best algorithms are exponential, i.e. with
n = Θ(k) the secret is recovered in exponential time 2Θ(k) [MMT11, Ste88].
An easy to solve instance of LPN was introduced by Arora and Ge [AG11]. They
show that in the k-wise version where the k-tuples of the noise bits can be expressed as
the solution of a polynomial (e.g. there are no 5 consecutive errors in the sequence of
queries), the problem can be solved in polynomial time. What makes the problem easy
is the fact that an adversary is able to structure the noise.
Another easy instance is when the noise is 0, i.e. τ = 0. In this case, the LPN problem
is solved in polynomial time through Gaussian elimination given n = Θ(k) queries. The
problem becomes hard once noise is added to the inner product. The value of τ can be
either independent or dependent of the value k. Usually, the value of τ is constant and
independent from the value of k. A case where τ is taken as a function of k occurs in
the construction of the encryption schemes [Ale03, DP12]. Intuitively, a larger value of
τ means more noise and makes the problem of search LPN harder. When τ = 12 , the
queries from the LPN oracle are uniformly distributed and we cannot recover the secret.
The value of the noise parameter is a trade-oﬀ between the hardness of the LPNk,τ and
the practical impact on the applications that rely on this problem.
3.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we present the current existing LPN solving algorithms in a uniﬁed frame-
work, where each LPN algorithm is split in two phases: the reduction and the solving
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phase. This characterization allows us to better compare and see what improvements
each algorithm bring.
For these algorithms, we give a better theoretical analysis that brings an improvement
over the work of Levieil and Fouque [LF06] and Guo et. al. [GJL14]. Furthermore, we
analyse three new algorithms for the case where the secret is sparse. Our results show
that for a sparse secret, the BKW family of algorithms is outperformed by an algorithm
that uses Gaussian elimination. Our discussion on LF(4) gives insights on why this
reduction method might not bring improvements over the existing reduction methods.
While improving the existing results, we hope to provide a theoretical analysis that
matches the experimental results. Although this does not prove that LPN is hard, it
gives tighter bounds for the parameters used by the LPN-based cryptographic schemes.
It can also be used to have a tighter complexity analysis of algorithms related to solving
LPN. Our results were actually used in [GJL14] and also for LWE solving [DTV15].
LPN solving algorithms in a nutshell. The common structure of all the afore-
mentioned LPN algorithms is the following: given n queries from the OLPNs,τ oracle, the
algorithm tries to reduce the problem of ﬁnding a secret s of k bits to one where the
secret s′ has only k′ bits, with k′ < k. This is done by applying several reduction tech-
niques. We call this phase the reduction phase. Afterwards, during the solving phase, we
can apply a solving algorithm that recovers the secret s′. We then update the queries
with the recovered bits and restart to fully recover s. For the ease of understanding,
we describe all the aforementioned LPN solving algorithms in this setting, where we
separate the algorithms in two phases.
First, we assume that k = a · b. Thus, we can visualise the k-bit length vectors v as
a blocks of b bits. Recall that we deﬁne δ = 1 − 2τ . We call δ the bias of the error
bit d. We have δ = E((−1)d), with E(·) the expected value. We denote the bias of the
secret bits by δs. As s is a uniformly distributed random vector, at the beginning we
have δs = 0.
3.3 BKW
We start by describing the BKW∗ algorithm. The notation BKW∗ is used as we illustrate
the algorithm as described in [LF06] which is diﬀerent from the original BKW [BKW00].
We explain what is the diﬀerence and why we use this variant later in this Section. The
BKW∗ works in two phases:
Reduction phase. Given n queries from the LPN oracle, we group them in equivalence
classes. Two queries are in the same equivalence class if they have the same value on
a set q1 of b bit positions. These b positions are chosen arbitrarily in {1, . . . , k}. There
are at most 2b such equivalence classes. Once this separation is done, we perform the
following steps for each equivalence class: pick one query at random, the representative
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vector, and xor it to the rest of the queries from the same equivalence class. Discard the
representative vector. This will give vectors with all bits set to 0 on those b positions.
These steps are also illustrated in Algorithm 3.1 (steps 5 - 11). We are left with at least
n− 2b queries where the secret is reduced to k− b eﬀective bits (others being multiplied
by 0 in all queries).
We can repeat the reduction technique a − 1 times on other disjoint position sets
q2, . . . , qa−1 from {1, . . . , k}\q1 and end up with at least n− (a− 1)2b queries where the
secret is reduced to k− (a− 1)b = b bits. The bias of the new queries is δ2a−1 , as shown
by the following Lemma where we use w = 2a−1.
Lemma 3.1 ([LF06, BKW00]). If (v1, c1), . . . , (vw, cw) are the results of w queries from
OLPNs,τ , then the probability that:
〈v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ . . .⊕ vw, s〉 = c1 ⊕ . . .⊕ cw
is equal to 1+δ
w
2 .
It is easy so see that the complexity of performing this reduction step is O(kan).
Algorithm 3.1 BKW∗ Algorithm by [LF06]
1: Input: a set V of n queries (vi, ci) ∈ {0, 1}k+1 from the LPN oracle OLPNs,τ , values a,
b such that k = ab and n ≥ a2b
2: Output: values s1, . . . , sb
3: Partition the positions {1, . . . , k} \ {1, . . . , b} into disjoint q1 ∪ . . . ∪ qa−1 with qi of
size b
4: for i = 1 to a− 1 do  Reduction phase
5: Partition V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ V2b s.t. vectors in Vj have the the same bit values at
positions in qi
6: foreach Vj
7: Choose a random (v∗, c∗) ∈ Vj as a representative vector
8: Replace each (v, c) by (v, c) ⊕ (v∗, c∗), (v, c) ∈ Vj for (v, c) 
= (v∗, c∗)
9: Discard (v∗, c∗) from Vj
10: end foreach
11: V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ V2b
12: end for
13: Discard from V all queries (v, c) such that HW(v) 
= 1
14: Partition V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vb s.t. vectors in Vj have a bit 1 on position j
15: foreach position i  Solving phase
16: si = majority(c), for all (v, c) ∈ Vi
17: end foreach
18: return s1, . . . , sb
After a − 1 iterations, we are left with at least n − (a − 1)2b queries, and a secret of
size of b eﬀective bits at positions 1, . . . , b. The goal is to keep only the queries that
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have Hamming weight 1 (step 13 of Algorithm 3.1). Given n − (a − 1)2b queries and
one bit position j ∈ {1, . . . , k}\{q1 ∪ . . . ∪ qa−1}, only n′ = n−(a−1)2
b
2b
will have a single
non-zero bit on position j and 0 on all the others. These queries represent the input to
the solving phase. The bias does not change since we do not alter the original queries.
The complexity for performing this step for n− (a− 1)2b queries is O(b(n− (a− 1)2b))
as the algorithm just checks if the queries have Hamming weight 1.
The bit c is part of the query also: it gets updated during the xoring operations but
we do not consider this bit in partitioning or when computing the Hamming weight of
a query. Later on, the information stored in this bit will be used to recover bits of the
secret.
Remark 1. Given that we have performed the xor between pairs of queries, we note that
the noise bits are no longer independent. In the analysis of BKW∗, this was overlooked
by Levieil and Fouque [LF06].1 The original BKW [BKW00] algorithm overcomes this
problem in the following manner: each query that has Hamming weight 1 is obtained with
a fresh set of queries. Given a2b queries, the algorithm runs the xoring process and is left
with 2b vectors. From these 2b queries, with a probability of 1−(1−2−b)2b ≈ 1− 1e , where
e = 2.718, there is one with Hamming weight 1 on a given position i. In order to obtain
more such queries the algorithm repeats this process with fresh queries. This means that
for guessing one bit of the secret, the original algorithm requires n = a · 2b · 11−1/e · n′
queries, where n′ denotes the number of queries needed for the solving phase. This is
larger than n = 2bn′ + (a − 1)2b which is the number of queries given by Levieil and
Fouque [LF06]. We implemented and ran BKW∗ as described in Algorithm 3.1 and we
discovered that this dependency does not aﬀect the performance of the algorithm. I.e.,
the number of queries computed by the theory that ignores the dependency of the error
bits matches the practical results. The theoretical and practical results are presented in
the next chapter, in Section 4.2. Given our practical experiments, we keep the “heur-
istic” assumption of independence and the algorithm as described in [LF06] which we
called BKW∗. Thus, we assume from now on the independence of the noise bits and the
independence of the queries.
Another discussion on the independence of the noise bits is presented in [Fit14]. There,
we can see what is the probability to have a collision, i.e. two queries that share an error
bit, among the queries formed during the xoring steps.
We can repeat the algorithm a times, with the same queries, to recover all the k bits.
The total time complexity for the reduction phase is O(ka2n), as we perform the steps
described above a times (instead of O(kan) as given in [LF06]). However, by making the
selection of a and b adaptive with ab near to the remaining number of bits to recover,
we can show that the total complexity is dominated by the one of recovering the ﬁrst
block. So, we can typically concentrate on the algorithm to recover a single block. We
provide a more complete analysis in Section 3.4.
1Deﬁnition 2 of [LF06] assumes independence of samples but Lemma 2 of [LF06] shows the reduction
without proving independence.
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Solving phase. The BKW solving method recovers the 1-bit secret by applying the
majority rule. The queries from the reduction phase are of the form c′j = si ⊕ d′j,
d′j ← Ber(1−δ2a−1 )/2 and si being the ith bit of the secret s. Given that the probability
for the noise bit to be set to 1 is smaller than 12 , in more than half of the cases, these
queries will be si. Thus, we decide that the value of si is given by the majority rule
(steps 14-16 of Algorithm 3.1). By applying the Hoeﬀding bounds [Hoe63], we ﬁnd how
many queries are needed, such that the probability of guessing incorrectly one bit of the
secret is bounded by some constant θ, with 0 < θ < 1.
The time complexity of performing the majority rule is linear in the number of queries.
Complexity analysis. With their analysis, Levieil and Fouque [LF06] obtain the
following result:
Theorem 3.2 (Th. 1 from [LF06]). For k = a · b, the BKW∗ algorithm heuristically
(n = 20 · ln(4k) · 2b · δ−2a , t = O(kan),m = kn, θ = 12 , b)-solves the LPN problem.
New Analysis on BKW∗. We improve the number of queries needed for the majority
rule. Recall that the queries are of the form c′j = si⊕d′j , d′j ← Ber(1−δ′)/2. The majority
of these queries will most likely be c′j = si. It is intuitive to see that the majority rule
fails when more than half of the noise bits are 1 for a given bit. Any wrong guess of a
bit gives a wrong value of the k-bit secret s. In order to bound the probability of such
a scenario, we could use the Hoeﬀding bounds [Hoe63] with Xj = dj (See Section 2.3).
We have Pr[Xj = 1] =
1−δ′
2 . For X =
∑n′
j=1Xj, we have E(X) =
(1−δ′)n′
2 and we apply
Theorem 2.5 with λ = δn
′
2 , αj = 0 and βj = 1 and we obtain
Pr[incorrect guess on si] = Pr
[
X ≥ n
′
2
]
≤ e−n
′δ′2
2 .
As discussed in Remark 1, the assumption of independence is heuristic.
Using the above results for every bit 1, . . . , b, we can bound by a constant θ, the
probability that we guess incorrectly a block of s, with 0 < θ < 1. Using the union
bound, we get that n′ = 2δ′−2 ln( bθ ). Given that n
′ = n−(a−1)2
b
2b
and that δ′ = δ2
a−1
, we
obtain that we need n = 2b+1δ−2a ln( bθ ) + (a − 1)2b queries in total. This is the result
presented by Bogos et al. [BTV16]. It was further improved with the use of Central
Limit Theorem (CLT) in ASIACRYPT’16 [BV16b]. With Xj = dj and X =
∑n′
j=1Xj
we have that E(X1) =
1−δ′
2 and Var(X1) = E(X
2
1 ) − E(X1)2 = 1−δ
′2
4 . If we apply
Theorem 2.6, we obtain
Pr[incorrect guess on si] = Pr
[
X ≥ n
′
2
]
≈ 1− ϕ
( √
n′δ′√
1− δ′2
)
.
and that n′ ≥ 1−δ′2
δ′2
(
ϕ−1
(
1− θb
))2
. With this new bound, we obtain the following
result.
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Table 3.1: BKW∗ query complexity
(log2) - our theory (Th. 3.3)
τ
k
32 48 64 80 100
0.01 9.71 11.69 14.84 17.67 20.80
0.10 14.73 19.02 23.19 27.32 32.43
0.20 18.70 23.93 30.11 33.97 39.09
0.25 20.81 26.05 32.23 37.33 43.30
0.40 27.33 35.56 42.80 47.91 55.02
Table 3.2: BKW∗ query complexity
(log2) - original theory (Th. 3.2)
τ
k
32 48 64 80 100
0.01 14.56 16.60 19.68 22.59 25.64
0.10 19.75 23.87 27.95 32.00 37.06
0.20 23.50 28.61 34.69 38.64 43.70
0.25 25.60 30.72 36.79 41.85 47.90
0.40 31.89 40.00 47.37 52.43 59.48
Theorem 3.3. For k ≤ a·b, the BKW∗ algorithm heuristically (n = 2b 1−δ2
a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− θb
) )2
+
(a− 1)2b, t = O(kan),m = kn, θ, b)-solves the LPN problem.2
We note that we obtained the above result using the union bound. One could make
use of the independence of the noise bits and obtain n = 2b 1−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
(1− θ) 1b
))2
+
(a− 1)2b, but this would bring a very small improvement.
In terms of query complexity, we compare our theoretical results (i.e. Theorem 3.3)
with the ones from [LF06] (i.e. Theorem 3.2) in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. We provide the
log2(n) values for k varying from 32 to 100 and we take diﬀerent Bernoulli noise para-
meters that vary from 0.01 to 0.4. Overall, our theoretical results bring an improvement
of a factor 20 over the results of [LF06].
We note that our BKW∗ algorithm, for which we have stated the above theorem,
follows the steps from Algorithm 3.1 for k = a · b. For k < a · b the algorithm is a bit
diﬀerent. In this case, we have a − 1 blocks of size b and an incomplete block of size
smaller than b. During the reduction phase, we ﬁrst partition the incomplete block and
then apply (a − 2) reduction steps for the complete blocks. We ﬁnally have b bits to
recover. Other than this small change, the algorithm remains the same.
3.4 LF1
During the solving phase, the BKW algorithm recovers the value of the secret bit by
bit. Given that we are interested only in queries with Hamming weight 1, many queries
are discarded at the end of the reduction phase. As ﬁrst noted in [LF06], this can be
improved by using a Walsh-Hadamard transform instead of the majority rule. This
2The term (a− 1)2b is not included in Theorem 3.2 (Theorem 1 from [LF06]). This factor represents
the number of queries lost during the reduction phase.
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improvement of BKW is denoted in [LF06] by LF1. Again, we present the algorithm in
pseudo-code in Algorithm 3.2. As in BKW∗, we can concentrate on the complexity to
recover the ﬁrst block.
Reduction phase. The reduction phase for LF1 follows the same steps as in BKW∗ in
obtaining new queries as 2a−1 xors of initial queries in order to reduce the secret to size
b. At this step, the algorithm does not discard queries anymore but proceeds directly
with the solving phase (see Steps 3-11 of Algorithm 3.2). We now have n′ = n−(a−1)2b
queries after this phase.
Solving phase. The solving phase consists in applying a Walsh-Hadamard transform
in order to recover b bits of the secret at once (Steps 13-15 in Algorithm 3.2). We can
recover the b-bit secret by computing the Walsh-Hadamard transform of the function
f(x) =
∑
i 1v′i=x(−1)c
′
i , where (v′i, c
′
i) are the queries after the reduction phase. Writing
the LPN instance as A′sT⊕d′ = c′, whereA′ contains the v′i vectors, the Walsh-Hadamard
transform is
fˆ(ν) =
∑
x
(−1)〈ν,x〉f(x) =
∑
x
(−1)〈ν,x〉
∑
i
1v′i=x(−1)
c′i
=
∑
i
(−1)〈v′i,ν〉+c′i = n′ − 2HW(A′νT + c′).
For ν = s, the correct secret, we have fˆ(s) = n′ − 2 · HW(d′), where d′ represents
the noise vector after the reduction phase. We know that most of the noise bits are set
to 0. So, fˆ(s) is large and we suppose it is the largest value in the table of fˆ . Thus,
we have to look at the maximum value of the Walsh-Hadamard transform in order to
recover the value of s. A naive implementation of a Walsh-Hadamard transform would
give a complexity of 22b since we apply it on a space of size 2b. Since we apply a fast
Walsh-Hadamard transform, we get a time complexity of b2b [CT65].
Complexity analysis. The following theorem states the complexity of LF1:
Theorem 3.4 (Th. 2 from [LF06]). For k = a · b and a > 1, the LF1 algorithm heurist-
ically (n = (8b + 200)δ−2a + (a− 1)2b, t = O(kan + b2b),m = kn + b2b, θ = 12 , b)-solves
the LPN problem.3
BKW∗ vs. LF1. We can see that compared to BKW∗, LF1 brings a signiﬁcant improve-
ment in the number of queries needed. As expected, the factor 2b disappeared as we did
not discard any query at the end of the reduction phase. There is an increase in the
3The term b2b in the time complexity is missing in [LF06]. While in general kan is the dominant
term, in the special case where a = 1 (thus we apply no reduction step) a complexity of O(kan) would
be wrong since, in this case, we apply the Walsh-Hadamard transform on the whole secret and the term
k2k dominates the ﬁnal complexity.
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Algorithm 3.2 LF1 Algorithm
1: Input: a set V of n queries (vi, ci) ∈ {0, 1}k+1 from the LPN oracle, values a, b such
that k = ab
2: Output: values s1, . . . , sb
3: Partition the positions {1, . . . , k} \ {1, . . . , b} into disjoint q1 ∪ . . . ∪ qa−1 with qi of
size b
4: for i = 1 to a− 1 do  Reduction phase
5: Partition V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ V2b s.t. vectors in Vj have the the same bit values at
positions in qi
6: foreach Vj
7: Choose a random (v∗, c∗) ∈ Vj as a representative vector
8: Replace each (v, c) by (v, c) ⊕ (v∗, c∗), (v, c) ∈ Vj for (v, c) 
= (v∗, c∗)
9: Discard (v∗, c∗) from Vj
10: end foreach
11: V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ V2b
12: end for
13: f(x) =
∑
(v,c)∈V 1v1,...,b=x(−1)c  Solving phase
14: fˆ(ν) =
∑
x(−1)〈ν,x〉f(x)  Walsh transform of f(x)
15: (s1, . . . , sb) = arg max(fˆ(ν))
16: return s1, . . . , sb
time and memory complexity because of the fast Walsh-Hadamard transform, but these
terms are not the dominant ones.
New Analysis on LF1. We improve the analysis done on the number of queries needed
for the Walsh transform. The failure probability for LF1 is bounded by the probability
that there is another vector ν 
= s such that that fˆ(ν) > fˆ(s). This is equivalent to
HW(A′νT + c′) ≤ HW(A′sT + c′). Recall that A′sT + c′ = d′. We deﬁne x = s+ν so that
A′νT + c′ = A′xT + d′. As A′ is uniformly distributed, independent from d′, and x is
ﬁxed and non-zero, A′xT + d′ is uniformly distributed, so we can rewrite the inequality
as HW(y) ≤ HW(d′), for a random y.
Using again the Hoeﬀding’s bounds, we need to have n′ = 8 ln(2
k′
θ )δ
′−2 [BTV16]
queries in order to bound the probability of guessing wrongly the k′-bit secret by θ. We
can improve further by applying directly the Central Limit Theorem. Let X1,X2, . . . ,
Xn′ be i.i.d random independent variables with Xj = yj − d′j, Pr(Xj ∈ [−1, 1]) = 1
and X =
∑n′
i=0Xi. We have E(X1) =
δ′
2 and Var(X1) =
2−δ′2
4 . Using Theorem 2.6 we
obtain:
Pr[X ≤ 0] ≈ ϕ
(√
n′E(X1)√
Var(X1)
)
.
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We can bound the probability of incorrectly guessing one block of s by θ to have
Pr[incorrect guess on one block] ≈ 1− (1− Pr[X ≤ 0])2k
′−1 ≤ θ
and obtain that we need to have n′ ≥ 2−δ′2
δ′2 ϕ
−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2k
′−1
)
. We can derive the
approximation of Selc¸uk [Sel08] that n′ ≥ 4 ln(2k
′
θ )δ
′−2.
The total number of queries will be n = n′ + (a− 1)2b and we have δ′ = δ2a−1 , k′ = b.
Complexity of theWHT(k′) is O(k′2k′ log2 n′+12 +k′n′) as we use the fast Walsh Hadamard
Transform4,5. Similar to BKW, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3.5. For k ≤ a·b and n′ = 2−δ2
a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2b−1
))2
, the LF1 algorithm
heuristically (n = n′+(a−1)2b, t = O(kan+b2b log2 n′+12 +bn′),m = kn+b2b, θ, b)-solves
the LPN problem.
By comparing the term (8b+ 200)δ−2
a
in Theorem 3.4 with our value of
2−δ2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2b−1
))2
, one might check that our term is roughly a factor 4
smaller than that of [LF06] for practical values of a and b. For example, for a LPN768,0.01
instance (with a = 11, b = 70), our analysis requires 267 queries for the solving phase
while the Levieil and Fouque analysis requires 269 queries.
Recovery of the ﬁrst block dominates the complexity. For BKW∗ and LF1 we
stated their complexity in terms of recovering one block of the secret. We show how
the cost of solving one block of the secret dominates the total cost of recovering s. The
main intuition is that after recovering a ﬁrst block of k′ secret bits, we can apply a
simple back substitution mechanism and consider solving a LPNk−k′,τ problem. The
same strategy is applied by [ACF+15, DTV15] when solving LWE. Note that this is
simply a generalisation of the classic Gaussian elimination procedure for solving linear
systems, where we work over blocks of bits.
Speciﬁcally, let k1 = k and ki = ki−1 − k′i−1 for i > 1 and k′i−1 < ki−1. Now, suppose
we were able to (ni, ti,mi, θi, k
′
i)-solve an LPNki,τ instance (meaning we recover a block
of size k′i from the secret of size ki with probability θi, in time ti and with memory mi).
One can see that for ki+1 < ki we need less queries to solve the new instance (the number
of queries is dependent on the size ki+1 and on the noise level). With a smaller secret,
the time complexity will decrease. Having a shorter secret and less queries, the memory
needed is also smaller. Then, we can (n, t,m, θ, k)-solve the problem LPNk,τ (i.e recover s
completely), with n = max(n1, n2, . . .), θ = θ1+θ2+ . . ., t = t1+k
′
1n1+ t2+k
′
2n2 . . . (the
4The second term k′n′ illustrates the cost of constructing the function f . In cases where n′ > 2k
′
this
is the dominant term and it should not be ignored. This was missing in several works [GJL14, BTV16].
For the instance LPN592,0.125 from Guo et al. [GJL14] this makes a big diﬀerence as k
′ = 64 and n′ = 269;
the complexity of WHT with the second term is 275 vs 270 [GJL14]. Given that is must be repeated 213
(as 35 bits of the secret are guessed), the cost of WHT is 288.
5Normally, the values fˆ(ν) have an order of magnitude of
√
n′ so we have 1
2
log2 n
′ bits.
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terms k′ini are due to query updates by back substitution) and m = max(m1,m2, . . .).
Finally, by taking θi = 3
−i, we obtain θ ≤ 12 and thus recover the full secret s with over
50% probability.
It is easily veriﬁed that for all the algorithms we consider, we have n = n1, m = m1,
and t is dominated by t1. We provide an example on a concrete LPN instance in Ap-
pendix A.1.
3.5 LF2
LF2 is a heuristic algorithm, also introduced in [LF06], that applies the same Walsh-
Hadamard transform as LF1, but has a diﬀerent reduction phase. We provide the
pseudocode for LF2 in Algorithm 3.3.
Algorithm 3.3 LF2 Algorithm
1: Input: a set V of n queries (vi, ci) ∈ {0, 1}k+1 from the LPN oracle, values a, b such
that k = ab
2: Output: values s1, . . . , sb
3: Partition the positions {1, . . . , k} \ {1, . . . , b} into disjoint q1 ∪ . . . ∪ qa−1 with qi of
size b
4: for i = 1 to a− 1 do  Reduction phase
5: Partition V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ V2b s.t. vectors in Vj have the the same bit values at
positions in qi
6: foreach Vj
7: V ′j = ∅
8: foreach pair (v, c), (v′, c′) ∈ Vj, (v, c) 
= (v′, c′)
9: V ′i = V
′
i ∪ (v ⊕ v′, c⊕ c′)
10: end foreach
11: end foreach
12: V = V ′1 ∪ . . . ∪ V ′2b
13: end for
14: f(x) =
∑
(v,c)∈V 1v1,...,b=x(−1)c  Solving phase
15: fˆ(ν) =
∑
x(−1)〈ν,x〉f(x)  compute the Walsh transform of f(x)
16: (s1, . . . , sb) = arg max(fˆ(ν))
17: return s1, . . . , sb
Reduction phase. Similarly to BKW∗ and LF1, the n queries are grouped into equi-
valence classes. Two queries are in the same equivalence class if they have the same
value on a window of b bits. In each equivalence class, we perform the xor of all the
pairs from that class. Thus, we do not choose one representative vector that is discarded
afterwards.
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Solving phase. This phase works like in LF1, i.e. we use the Walsh-Hadamard trans-
form and ﬁnd its maximum in order to recover a block of the secret s.
New Analysis on LF2. There is no formal result for LF2 stated in [LF06]. Using
the new bounds for LF1, we can state the number of queries needed for the solving
phase. For the reduction phase, we can analyse how the number of queries ﬂuctuate.
When we do the xor of all the pairs from each class, the expected new number of
queries is E(
∑
i<j 1vi matches vj on the b-bit block) =
n(n−1)
2b+1
which improves previous
results [BTV16]6. When n ≈ 1 + 2b+1, the number of queries are maintained. For
n > 1 + 2b+1, the number of queries will increase.
With this analysis, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.6. For k ≤ a·b, n′ = 2−δ2
a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2b−1
))2
and n = 1+2b+1 ≥ n′,
the LF2 algorithm heuristically (n, t = O(kan + b2b log2 n′+12 + bn′),m = kn + b2b, θ, b)-
solves the LPN problem.
One can observe that we may allow n to be smaller than 1 + 2b+1. Given that the
solving phase may require less than 1 + 2b+1, we could start with less queries, decrease
the number of queries during the reduction and end up with the exact number of queries
needed for the solving phase.
In a scenario where the attacker has access to a restricted number of queries, this
heuristic algorithm helps in increasing the number of queries. With LF2, the attacker
might produce enough queries to recover the secret s.
3.6 Covering Code Algorithm
The new algorithm [GJL14] that was presented at ASIACRYPT’14 (and received the best
paper award), introduces a new type of reduction. There is a diﬀerence between [GJL14]
and what was presented at the ASIACRYPT conference. We concentrate here on [GJL14]
and on the suggestions we provided to the authors.
Reduction phase. The ﬁrst step of this algorithm is to transform the LPN instance
where the secret s is randomly chosen to an instance where the secret has now a Bernoulli
distribution. This method was described in [Kir11, ACPS09, BL12].
Given n queries from the LPN oracle: (v¯1, c1), (v¯2, c2), . . . , (v¯n, cn), select k linearly
independent vectors v¯i1 , . . . , v¯ik . Construct the k × k target matrix M that has on
its columns the aforementioned vectors, i.e. M = [v¯Ti1 v¯
T
i2
. . . v¯Tik ]. Compute (M
T )−1
the inverse of MT , where MT is the transpose of M . We can rewrite the k queries
corresponding to the selected vectors as MT sT + d′, where d′ is the k-bit column vector
6In Bogos et al. [BTV16], the approximation for the number of queries was
n
2b
(
n
2b
−1
)
2
, which is less
favourable.
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d′ = (di1 , di2 , . . . , dik)
T . We denote c′ = MT sT + d′. For any v¯j that is not used in
matrix M do the following computation:
v¯j(M
T )−1c′ + cj = 〈v¯j(MT )−1, d′〉+ dj .
We discard the matrix M . From the initial set of queries, we have obtained a new
set where the secret value is d′. This can be seen as a reduction to a sparse secret.
The complexity of this transform is O(k3 + nk2) by the schoolbook matrix inversion
algorithm. This can be improved as follows: for a ﬁxed χ, one can split the matrix
(MT )−1 in a′ =  kχ parts
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
M1
M2
. . .
Ma′
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ of χ rows. By pre-computing v¯Mi for all v¯ ∈ {0, 1}χ,
the operation of performing v¯j(M
T )−1 takes O(ka′). The pre-computation takes O(2χ)
and is negligible if the memory required by the BKW reduction is bigger. With this
pre-computation the complexity is O(nka′).
Afterwards, the algorithm follows the usual BKW reduction steps where the size of
the secret is reduced to k′ by the xoring operation. Again, the vector of k bits is seen as
being split into blocks of size b. The BKW reduction is applied a times. Thus, we have
k′ = k − ab.
The secret s of k′ bits is split into 2 parts: one part denoted s2 of k′′ bits and the
other part, denoted s1, of k
′ − k′′ bits. The next step in the reduction is to guess value
of s1 by making an assumption on its Hamming weight: HW(s1) ≤ w0. The remaining
queries are of the form (vi, ci = 〈vi, s2〉 ⊕ di), where vi, s2 ∈ {0, 1}k′′ and di ∈ Ber 1−δ2a
2
.
Thus, the problem is reduced to a secret of k′′ bits.
At this point, the algorithm approximates the vi vectors to the nearest codeword gi
in a [k′′, ] linear code where k′′ is the size and  is the dimension. By observing that gi
can be written as gi = g
′
iG, where G is the generating matrix of the code, we can write
the equations in the form
ci = 〈vi, s2〉 ⊕ di = 〈g′iG, s2〉 ⊕ 〈vi − gi, s2〉 ⊕ di = 〈g′i, s′2〉 ⊕ d′i
with s′2 = s2G
T and d′i = 〈vi − gi, s2〉 ⊕ di, where g′i, s′2 have length . If the code has
a covering radius of ρ, vi − gi is a random vector of weight bounded by ρ, while s2 is a
vector of some small weight bounded by w1, with some probability. So, 〈vi − gi, s2〉 is
biased and we can analyse d′i in place of di.
In [GJL14], the authors approximate the bias of 〈vi− gi, s2〉 to δ′ =
(
1− 2 ρk′′
)w1 , as if
all bits were independent. As discussed later, this approximation is far from good.
No query is lost during this covering code operation and now the secret is reduced to
 bits. We now have n′ = n− k − a2b queries at the end of the reduction phase.
Solving phase. The solving phase of this algorithm follows the same steps as LF1, i.e.
it employs a fast Walsh-Hadamard transform. One should notice that the solving phase
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recovers  linear relations between the bits of the secret and not actual bits of the secret.
Complexity analysis. Recall that in the algorithm two assumptions are made re-
garding the Hamming weight of the secret: that s2 has a Hamming weight bounded
by w1 and that s1 has a Hamming weight bounded by w0. This holds with probability
Pr(w0, k
′ − k′′) · Pr(w1, k′′) where
Pr(w,m) =
w∑
i=0
(1− τ)m−iτ i
(
m
i
)
. (3.1)
The total complexity is given by the complexity of one iteration to which we add the
number of times we have to repeat the iteration. We state below the result from [GJL14]:
Theorem 3.7 (Th 1. from [GJL14]). 7
Let n be the number of samples required and a, a′, b, w0, w1, , k′, k′′ be the algorithm
parameters. For the LPNk,τ instance, the number of bit operations required for a suc-
cessful run of the new attack is equal to
t =
tsparse reduction + tbkw reduction + tguess + tcovering code + tWalsh transform
Pr(w0, k′ − k′′) Pr(w1, k′′) ,
where
• tsparse reduction = nka′ is the cost of reducing the LPN instance to a sparse secret
• tbkw reduction = (k + 1)an is the cost of the BKW reduction steps
• tguess = n′
∑w0
i=0
(k′−k′′
i
)
i is the cost of guessing k′ − k′′ bits and n′ = n − k − a2b
represents the number of queries at the end of the reduction phase
• tcovering code = (k′′− )(2n′+2
) is the cost of the covering code reduction and n′ is
again the number of queries
• tWalsh transform = 2

∑w0
i=0
(k′−k′′
i
)
is the cost of applying the fast Walsh-Hadamard
transform for every guess of k′ − k′′ bits
under the condition that n− a2b > 1
δ2a+1 ·δ′2 , where δ = 1− 2τ and δ
′ =
(
1− 2 ρk′′
)w1 and
ρ is the smallest integer, s.t.
∑ρ
i=0
(k′′
i
)
> 2k
′′−
.
The condition n− a2b > 1
δ2a+1 ·δ′2 proposed in [GJL14] imposes a lower bound on the
number of queries needed in the solving phase for the fast Walsh-Hadamard transform.
In our analysis, we will see that this is underestimated: the Central Limit Theorem
dictates a larger number of queries.
7This theorem includes imprecisions. It is updated in Theorem 3.8.
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New Analysis on Covering Code. We describe the shortcomings of the covering
code algorithm when computing the bias introduced by the covering code method. We
present a solution to this that was adopted also by the authors of this algorithm [GJL14].
Recall that the algorithm ﬁrst reduces the size of the secret to k′′ bits by running
BKW reduction steps. Then it approximates the vi vector to the nearest codeword gi
in a [k′′, ] linear code with G as generator matrix. The noisy inner products can be
rewritten as
ci = 〈g′iG, s2〉 ⊕ 〈vi − gi, s2〉 ⊕ di = 〈g′i, s2GT 〉 ⊕ d′i = 〈g′i, s′2〉 ⊕ d′i,
where gi is such that gi = g
′
iG, s
′
2 = s2G
T and d′i = 〈gi − vi, s2〉 ⊕ di.
Given that the code has a covering radius of ρ and that the Hamming weight of s2
is bounded by w1, the bias of 〈gi − vi, s2〉 is computed as δ′ =
(
1− 2 ρk′′
)w1 in ASIAC-
RYPT’14 [GJL14], where k′′ is the size of s2. We stress that this approximation is far
from good.
Indeed, with the [3, 1] repetition code given as an example in their paper [GJL14], the
xor of two error bits is unbiased. Even worse: the xor of the three bits has a negative
bias. So, when using the code obtained by 25 concatenations of this repetition code and
w1 = 6, with some probability of 36%, we have at least two error bits falling in the same
concatenation and the bias makes this approach fail.
We can do the same computation with the concatenation of ﬁve [23, 12] Golay codes
with w1 = 15, as suggested in [GJL14]. With probability 0.21%, the bias is zero or
negative so the algorithm fails. With probability 8.3%, the bias is too low.
In any case, we cannot assume the error bits to be independent. When the code
has optimal covering radius ρ, we can actually ﬁnd an explicit formula for the bias of
〈vi − gi, s2〉 assuming that s2 has weight w1:
Pr[〈vi − gi, s2〉 = 1|HW(s2) = w1] = 1
S(k′′, ρ)
∑
i≤ρ,i odd
(w1
i
)
S(k′′ −w1, ρ− i) (3.2)
where S(k′′, ρ) is the number of k′′-bit strings with weight at most ρ.
To solve LPN512,0.125, the authors of ASIACRYPT’14 [GJL14] propose the following
parameters
a = 6 a′ = 9 b = 63  = 64 k′′ = 124 w0 = 2 w1 = 16
and obtain n = 266.3 and a complexity of 279.92. With these parameters, the pa-
per [GJL14] approximated the bias to
(
1− 2 ρk′′
)w1 = 2−5.91 (with ρ = 14). With our
exact formula, the bias should rather be of 2−7.05. So, n should be multiplied by 4.82
(the square of the ratio).
Also, we stress that all this assumes the construction of a code with optimal radius
coverage, such as the Golay codes, or the repetition codes of odd length and dimension 1.
But these codes do not exist for all [k′′, ]. If we use concatenations of repetition codes,
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given as an example in [GJL14], the formula for the bias changes. Given  concatenations
of the [ki, 1] repetition code, with k1 + · · · + k
 = k′′, ki ≈ k′′
 and 1 ≤ i ≤ , we would
have to split the secret s2 in chunks of k1, . . . , k
 bits. We take w11 + · · · + w1
 = w1
where w1i is the weight of s2 on the i
th chunk. In this case the bias for each repetition
code is
δi = 1− 2× 1
S(ki, ρi)
∑
j≤ρi,j odd
(
w1i
j
)
S(ki − w1i, ρi − j), (3.3)
where ρi = ki2 .
The ﬁnal bias is
δ′ = δ1 · · · δ
. (3.4)
We emphasize that the value of n is underestimated in [GJL14]. Indeed, with n′ =
bias−2, the probability that argmax(fˆ(ν)) = s′2 is too low in LF1. To have a constant
probability of success θ, our analysis says that we should multiply n′ by 4 ln(2

θ ) if we
apply the Hoeﬀding’s bound. We use below Central Limit Theorem to deﬁne the value
of n′. For LPN512,0.125 with the parameters presented above and θ = 13 , this is 181.
When presenting their algorithm at ASIACRYPT’14, the authors of [GJL14] updated
their computation by using our suggested formulas for the bias and the number of queries.
In order to obtain a complexity smaller than 280, they further improved their algorithm
by the following observation: instead of assuming that the secret s2 has a Hamming
weight smaller or equal to w1, the algorithm takes now into account all the Hamming
weights that would give a good bias for the covering code reduction. I.e., the algorithm
takes into account all the Hamming weights w for which δ′ > set, where set is a preset
bias. The probability of a good secret changes from Pr(w1, k
′′) to Pr(HW) that we deﬁne
below. They further adapted the algorithm by using the LF2 reduction steps. With these
changes, they suggest the following parameters for LPN512,0.125:
a = 5 b = 62  = 60 k′′ = 180 w0 = 2 set = 2−14.18
Using two [90, 30] linear codes, they obtain that n = 263.6 = 3 · 2b queries are needed,
the memory used is of m = 272.6 bits and the time complexity is t = 279.7. Thus, this
algorithm gives better performance than LF2 and shows that this LPN instance does not
oﬀer a security of 80 bits.
With all the above observations we update Theorem 3.7 as follows.
Theorem 3.8. Let a, a′, b, w0, w1, , k′, k′′, set be the algorithm parameters. The covering
code
(n = 2−δ
2a+1 2set
δ2a+1 2set
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2−1
))2
+ a2b ,t,m = kn+ 2k
′′−
 + 2
, θ, )-solves the
LPN problem 8, where δ = 1 − 2τ and set is a preset bias. The code chosen for the
8This n corresponds to covering code reduction using LF1. For LF2 reduction steps we need to have
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covering code reduction step can be expressed as the concatenation of one or more linear
codes. The time t complexity can be expressed as
t =
tsparse reduction + tbkw reduction + tguess + tcovering code + tWalsh transform
Pr(w0, k′ − k′′) Pr(HW) ,
where
• tsparse reduction = nka′ is the cost of reducing the LPN instance to a sparse secret
• tbkw reduction = (k + 1)an is the cost of the BKW reduction steps
• tguess = n′
∑w0
i=0
(
k′−k′′
i
)
i is the cost of guessing k′ − k′′ bits and n′ = n − k − a2b
represents the number of queries at the end of the reduction phase
• tcovering code = (k′′− )(2n′+2
) is the cost of the covering code reduction and n′ is
again the number of queries
• tWalsh transform =
(
2

log2(n−a2b)+1
2 + (n− a2b)
)∑w0
i=0
(k′−k′′
i
)
is the cost of apply-
ing the fast Walsh-Hadamard transform for every guess of k′ − k′′ bits
• Pr(HW) =∑wi(1− τ)k′′−wiτwi(k′′wi) where wi is chosen such that the bias δ′ (com-
puted following (3.3) and (3.4)), which depends on wi and the covering radius ρ of
the chosen code, is larger than set
3.7 LF(4)
The algorithm that was presented at EUROCRYPT’16 [ZJW16], introduces a new type
of reduction that is denoted LF(4). The authors also claim to improve the complexity
of the existing reduction steps through precomputation. We focus here on the structure
of the algorithm of [ZJW16] and discuss its issues.
Reduction phase. Given an LPN instance, where the secret has size k, the ﬁrst step
of the reduction phase is to do a sample selection. It keeps from the LPN oracle only the
samples that have 0 bits on an entire given window of c bits. In this way, we obtain an
LPN instance where the secret has size k − c. This step is called sample selection. This
idea is present also in the BKW algorithm. The next step is to change the distribution
of the secret from uniform to a binomial distribution. The same steps as in Section 3.6
are used in order to change to a secret that follows the noise distribution. This step is
entitled Gaussian elimination.
With the new secret, the algorithm is further reducing the size of the secret by xoring
pairs of vectors that have the same value on a window of b bits. This can be done by
applying the BKW reduction step (LF1), LF2 or a new method which is named LF(4)
n = 1 + 2b+1+ k ≥ 2−δ2
a+1
	2set
δ2
a+1
	2set
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2−1
))2
.
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based on Wagner’s algorithm [Wag02]. This new method ﬁnds four vectors from a list
which, when they are xored, give a zero vector. By performing this step (either with
LF1, LF2 or LF(4) ) t times, we end up with an LPNk−c−t∗b,η′ instance, where η′ = η2
t
for
LF1 and LF2 and η′ = η4t for LF(4). The use of the xoring is named collision procedure
in [ZJW16].
Using the fact that the distribution of the secret is the same as the one of the initial
noise, the algorithm is further guessing k1 bits of the secret. More precisely, it tries
all possible values of the k1 bit vector that have a Hamming weight smaller than w1.
The probability that the secret has a Hamming weight smaller than w1 is given in (3.1).
Thus, to make the algorithm succeed, we must run it several times. Afterwards, it is
applying the covering code reduction to further reduce to a LPN
,η′ instance where we
use a [k2, ] code and k2 = k − c− t · b− k1.
Solving phase. The solving phase consists in applying the Walsh transform on the
remaining  bits. Given that the algorithm is guessing k1 bits of the secret, the Walsh
transform has to be instantiated
∑w1
i=0
(
k1
i
)
times.
Complexity analysis. We state below the result from [ZJW16].
Theorem 3.9 ([ZJW16]). Let N be the initial number of queries from the LPN oracle
and c, f, t, a, u, w1, , k1, k2 be the parameters of the algorithm. In order to solve a LPNk,τ
instance the overall time complexity of the algorithm is
C = C0 +
PC11 + C1 + C2 + C3 +C4 + C5
Pr(w1, k1)
,
where Pr(w1, k1) is computed as in (3.1) and
• C0 = N = 2cn is the sample selection complexity and n represents the number of
queries after the sample reduction
• C1 = (n− k+ c)(a+ (k− c)/u) is the cost of Gaussian elimination, where a and
u are two parameters that are used in the optimization of this step
• PC11 = (2s − s − 1)(k − c)a is the cost to update the queries after the Gaussian
elimination
• C2 =
∑t
i=1k−c+1−ibf (n−k−c− i2b) is the cost for collision procedure when using
LF1 as reduction method and f is a parameter used in the pre-computation of the
collision procedure
• C2 =
∑t
i=1k−c+1−ibf n[i] is the cost for collision procedure when using LF2 as
reduction method, where n[i] = n[i − 1] − 2b and n[0] represents the number of
queries before the reduction
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• C2 =
∑t
i=1(k−c+1−ibf n[i] + (2bn[i])1/3) is the cost for collision procedure when
using LF(4) as reduction method, where n[i] =
(n[i−1]
4
)
2−b and n[0] represents the
number of queries before the reduction 9
• C3 = m
∑w1
i=1
(
k1
i
)
is the cost of the partial secret guessing and m is the cost of
performing the xor
• C4 = mh is the cost of the covering code reduction method
• C5 = 2

∑w1
i=0
(k1
i
)
is the cost of applying the Walsh transform for every guess of
the secret
Revised Analysis on LF(4). We re-evaluate the work by Zhang et al. [ZJW16]. While
this new algorithm claims to improve all the previous results, we have discovered issues
in its analysis. We review the LF(4) reduction method and ﬁnd that this method is
misleading.
The authors of the EUROCRYPT’16 paper [ZJW16] introduce a new reduction tech-
nique that they call LF(4) which is based on Wagner’s algorithm [Wag02]. As afore-
mentioned, this reduction method ﬁnds four vectors from a list which, when they are
xored, give a zero. They use an information theoretic estimate on the required number
of vectors for a solution to exist and the complexity results from Wagner.
If we have n vectors of b bits, information theory says we need n ≈ (4! · 2b) 14 for one
collision. For this n, there is an algorithm of complexity n
2
2 ≈
√
6 ·2b/2 to ﬁnd a solution
(make a list of XOR of two strings then look for a collision). Wagner’s algorithm works
with the better time complexity of 2b/3 but needs a larger n ≈ 2b/3 because it looks
for solutions such that the XOR of the ﬁrst two vectors starts with b3 zero bits. For
this, it makes a list of XOR of two vectors colliding on their ﬁrst b/3 bits then look for
collisions of their XOR on the remaining bits. What the authors of [ZJW16] use is a
data complexity of 2b/4 and a time complexity of 2b/3 by invoking Wagner. So, they mix
up the two algorithms: they take the best data complexity of the two and the best time
complexity of the two without realising that this applies to two diﬀerent ones. We will
now exemplify this.
For their algorithm, they need more than one solution so instead of having a complex-
ity of 2b/3, they will have 2b/3n
1/3
sol with Wagner’s algorithm, where nsol represents the
number of solutions for LF(4). So, for nsol collisions Wagner’s algorithms will require
n ≈ n
1
3
sol2
b
3 and have a complexity of 2b/3n
1/3
sol . For the information theory algorithm, n
becomes n = (4! · nsol2b) 14 and the algorithm has a complexity of
√
6 · n
1
2
sol2
b/2.
The results from [ZJW16] show that for an LPN512,1/8 for n ≈ nsol = 253.5 and b = 156
the complexity is 272.8. By ﬁxing the number of queries we want to have at the end and
the length on the segment we want to ﬁnd collisions, i.e. nsol and b, the Wagner algorithm
would require n ≈ 270 and would have a complexity of about 270. For the information
theory algorithm, we would have n ≈ 253.5 and a complexity of about 2106.
9This part is incorrect as commented below
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They claim that their results are conﬁrmed by simulations, but the results they provide
miss the time complexity of the simulations.
There are also inconsistencies in the data complexity and the complexity of the Gaus-
sian elimination step, but this analysis is outside the scope of this thesis. Details about
this can be found in ePrint [BV16a]. What we are interested in is analysing the eﬃciency
of the new reduction or solving steps.
The conclusion regarding LF(4) is that it does not bring improvements. The compu-
tations with the correct LF(4) give worse results than LF1 and LF2. This is because an
LF(4) with Wagner’s algorithm means 2 LF2 consecutive reductions and the LF(4) with
the information theory algorithm approach brings no improvement.
3.8 Other LPN Solving Algorithms
Most LPN-based encryption schemes use τ as a function of k, e.g. τ = 1√
k
[Ale03, DP12].
The bigger the value of k, the lower the level of noise. For k = 768, we have τ ≈ 0.036.
For such a value, we say that the noise is sparse. Given that these LPN instances are
used in practice, we study how we can construct other algorithms that take advantage
of this extra information.
The ﬁrst two algorithms presented in this section bring new ideas for the solving
phase. The third one provides a method to recover the whole secret and does not need
any reduction phase.
We maintain the notations used until now: n′ queries remain after the reduction phase,
the bias is δ′ and the block size is k′.
For these solving algorithms, we assume that the secret is sparse. Even if the secret
is not sparse, we can just assume that the noise is sparse. We can transform an LPN
instance to an instance of LPN where the secret is actually a vector of noise bits by the
method presented in [Kir11]. The details of this transform were given in Section 3.6 for
the covering codes algorithm.
We denote by δs the bias of the secret, i.e. Pr[si = 1] =
1−δs
2 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We
can take δs = δ.
The assumption we make is that the Hamming weight of the k′-bit length secret s
is in a given range. On average, we have that HW(s) = k′(1−δs2 ), so an appropriate
range is
[
0, k′(1−δs2 ) +
σ
2
√
k′
]
, where σ is constant. We denote k′(1−δs2 ) by EHW and
σ
2
√
k′ by dev. Thus, we are searching in the range [0, EHW + dev]. We can bound
the probability that the secret has a Hamming weight outside the range by using the
Hoeﬀding bound [Hoe63].
Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xk′ be independent random variables that correspond to the secret
bits, i.e. Pr[Xi = 1] =
1−δs
2 and Pr[Xi ∈ [0, 1]] = 1. We have E(X) = 1−δs2 k′. Using
Theorem 2.5, we get that
Pr[HW(s) not in range] = Pr
[
HW(s)− (1− δs)
2
k′ ≥ σ
√
k′
4
]
≤ e−σ
2
2 .
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If we want to bound by θ/2 the probability that HW(s) is not in the correct range for
one block, we obtain that σ =
√
2 ln(2θ ).
3.8.1 Exhaustive Search on Sparse Secret
We have S =
∑EHW+dev
i=0
(k′
i
)
vectors ν with Hamming weight in our range. One ﬁrst idea
would be to perform an exhaustive search on the sparse secret. We denote this algorithm
by Search1. For every such value ν, we compute HW(Aν
T + c) (See Algorithm 3.4). In
order to compute the Hamming weight, we have to compute the multiplication between A
and all ν which have a Hamming weight in the correct range. This operation would take
O(Sn′k′) time but we can save a k′ factor by the following observation done in [BLP11]:
computing AνT , with HW(ν) = i means xoring i columns of A. If we have the values of
AνT for all ν where HW(ν) = i then we can compute Aν ′T for HW(ν ′) = i+1 by adding
one extra column to the previous results.
We use here a similar reasoning done for the Walsh-Hadamard transform. When ν = s,
the value of HW(AsT + c) is equal to HW(d) and we assume that this is the smallest
value as we have more noise bits set to 0 than 1. Thus, going through all possible values
of ν and keeping the minimum will give us the value of the secret. The time complexity
of Search1 is the complexity of computing the Hamming weight, i.e. O(Sn
′).
Algorithm 3.4 Search1 - solving phase
1: Input: a matrix A and vector c s.t. As+ d = c from the reduction phase, values k′,
EHW, dev
2: Output: value s
3: Set minHW = k
′
4: Set s = ⊥
5: for each ν s.t. HW(ν) ∈ [0, EHW + dev] do
6: Compute h = HW(Aν + c)
7: if h < minHW then
8: minHW = h
9: s = ν
10: end if
11: end for
12: return s
Besides Search1, which requires a matrix multiplication for each trial, we also dis-
covered that a Walsh transform can be used for a sparse secret. We call this algorithm
Search2. The advantage is that a Walsh transform is faster than a naive exhaustive search
and thus, improves the time complexity. We thus compute the fast Walsh-Hadamard
transform and search the maximum of fˆ only for those S values with Hamming weight
in the correct range (See Algorithm 3.5). Given that we apply a Walsh transform, we
get that the complexity of this solving algorithm is O(k′2k′ log2(n′)+12 ). So, it is more
interesting than Search1 when Sn
′ > k′2k′ log2(n
′)+1
2 .
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Algorithm 3.5 Search2 - solving phase
1: Input: a matrix A and vector c s.t. As+ d = c from the reduction phase, values k′,
EHW, dev
2: Output: value s
3: f(x) =
∑
(ai)∈A 1ai1,...,ik′=x(−1)ci
4: fˆ(ν) =
∑
u(−1)νuf(w)  Walsh transform of f(x)
5: (sp1 , . . . , spb) = arg max(fˆ(ν))
6: where HW(sp1 , . . . , spb) ∈ [0, EHW + dev]
7: return s
For both algorithms, the failure probability is given by the scenario where there ex-
ists another sparse value ν 
= s such that HW(AνT + c) ≤ HW(AsT + c). We ap-
ply a similar analysis with the one done for WHT, where now we have S vectors in
total. We obtain that we need n′ = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S−1
))2
. Another fail-
ure scenario, that we take into account into our analysis, occurs when the secret has
a Hamming weight outside our range. Thus, we can say that with σ =
√
2 ln(2θ ) and
n = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S−1
))2
+ (a − 1)2b, the probability of failure is smaller
than θ.
Complexity analysis. Taking n = n′ + (a − 1)2b, k′ = b, δ′ = δ2a−1 and δs = δ, we
obtain the following theorems for Search1 and Search2:
Theorem 3.10. Let S =
∑EHW+dev
i=0
(b
i
)
where EHW = b(
1−δs
2 ) and dev =
σ
2
√
b and
let n′ = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S−1
))2
. For k ≤ a · b and a secret s with bias δs,
the Search1 algorithm heuristically (n = n
′ + (a − 1)2b, t = O(kan + n′S),m = kn +
b
( b
EHW+dev
)
, θ, b)-solves the LPN problem.
Theorem 3.11. Let S =
∑EHW+dev
i=0
(
b
i
)
where EHW = b(
1−δs
2 ) and dev =
σ
2
√
b and let
n′ = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S−1
))2
. For k ≤ a · b and a secret s with bias δs, the
Search2 algorithm heuristically (n = n
′ + (a− 1)2b, t = O(kan+ b2b log2 n′+12 + bn′),m =
kn, θ, b)-solves the LPN problem.
Here, we take the probability, that any of the two failure scenarios to happen, to be
each θ/2. A search for the optimal values such that their sum is θ, brings a very little
improvement to our results. We expect to require less queries for exhaustive search
compared to LF1. As the asymptotic time complexity of Search2 is the same as LF1 and
the number of queries is smaller, we expect to see that this algorithm runs faster than
LF1.
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3.8.2 Meet in the Middle on Sparse Secret (MITM)
While MITM is a widely used technique for analysing block ciphers, stream ciphers
and hash functions [GJNS14, NS16, Sas13, SKS+13, WSK+12, SWS+12, Iso11, IS12,
CNV13, GLRW10, DSP07, BR10], we try to use it for LPN and we use a mask in order
to remove the eﬀect of the noise. The idea of MITM is used also for solving the LWE
problem [AFFP14, BG14, APS15].
Given that AsT+d = c, we split s into s1 and s2 and rewrite the equation as A1s
T
1 +d =
A2s
T
2 +c. With this split, we try to construct a meet-in-the-middle attack by looking for
A2s
T
2 + c close to A1s
T
1 . The secret s has size k
′ and we split it into s1 of size k1 and s2
of size k2 such that k1 + k2 = k
′. We consider that both s1 and s2 are sparse. Thus the
Hamming weight of si lies in the range
[
0, ki(
1−δs
2 ) +
σ′
2
√
ki
]
. We denote ki(
1−δs
2 )+
σ′
2
√
ki
by maxHW(ki). In order to bound the probability that both estimates are correct, we
use the same bound shown in Section 3.8.1 and obtain that σ′ =
√
2 ln(4θ ).
For our MITM attack, we have a pre-computation phase. We compute and store A1s
T
1
for all S1 =
∑maxHW(k1)
i=0
(k1
i
)
possible values for s1. We do the same for s2, i.e compute
A2s
T
2 + c for all S2 =
∑maxHW(k2)
i=0
(k2
i
)
vectors s2. The pre-computation phase takes
(S1 + S2)n
′ steps in total. Afterwards, we pick ξ bit positions and hope that the noise
d has only values of 0 on these positions. If this is true, then we could build a mask μ
that has Hamming weight ξ such that d ∧ μ = 0. The probability for this to happen is
(1+δ
′
2 )
ξ = e
−ξ ln 2
1+δ′ .
We build our meet-in-the-middle attack by constructing a hash table where we store,
for all s2 values, A2s
T
2 + c at position h((A2s
T
2 + c) ∧ μ). We have S2 vectors s2, so
we expect to have S22
−ξ vectors on each position of the hash table. For all S1 values
of s1, we check for collisions, i.e. h((A1s
T
1 ) ∧ μ) = h((A2sT2 + c) ∧ μ). If this happens,
we check if A1s
T
1 xored with A2s
T
2 + c gives a vector d with a small Hamming weight.
Remember that with the pre-computed values we can compute d with only one xor
operation. If the resulting vector has a Hamming weight in our range, then we believe
we have found the correct s1 and s2 values and we can recover the value of s. Given that
A1s
T
1 +A2s
T
2 + d = c, we expect to have (A2s
T
2 + c)∧μ = A1sT1 ∧μ only when d∧μ = 0.
The condition d ∧ μ = 0 holds with a probability of (1+δ′2 )ξ so we have to repeat our
algorithm ( 21+δ′ )
ξ times in order to be sure that our condition is fulﬁlled. The steps of
the meet-in-the-middle algorithm are illustrated in Algorithm 3.6.
As for exhaustive search, we have two scenarios that could result in a failure. One
scenario is when s1 or s2 have a Hamming weight outside the range. The second
one happens when there is another vector ν 
= s such that HW(A1νT1 + A2νT2 + c) ≤
HW(A1s
T
1 +A2s
T
2 + c) and (A1ν
T
1 +A2ν
T
2 + c) ∧ μ = 0.
Complexity analysis. The time complexity of constructing the MITM attack is (S1+
S2)n
′+((S1+S2)ξ+S1S22−ξn′)·( 21+δ′ )ξ. We include here the cost of the pre-computation
phase and the actual MITM cost. We obtain that the time complexity is O((S1+S2)n′+
(S1 + S2)ξ(
2
1+δ′ )
ξ + S1S2n
′( 11+δ′ )
ξ). Taking again n′ = n− (a− 1)2b, k′ = b, δ′ = δ2a−1 ,
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Algorithm 3.6 MITM Algorithm - solving phase
1: Input: a matrix A and vector c s.t. As+ d = c from the reduction phase, values k′,
δ′, maxHW(·), ξ, hash function h
2: Output: the value s
3: Split s in s1 and s2 and A into A1 and A2  si ∈ {0, 1}ki s.t. k1 + k2 = k′
4: such that A1s
T
1 + d+A2s
T
2 = c
5: for j = 1 to ( 21+δ′ )
ξ do
6: Construct mask μ s.t. HW(μ) = ξ
7: for each ν2 s.t. HW(ν2) ∈ [0,maxHW(k2)] do
8: Store A2ν
T
2 + c at position h((A2ν
T
2 + c) ∧ μ)
9: end for
10: for each ν1 s.t. HW(ν1) ∈ [0,maxHW(k1)] do
11: if h((A1ν
T
1 ) ∧ μ) = h((A2νT2 + c) ∧ μ) then
12: if Hw(A1ν
T
1 +A2ν
T
2 + c) ∈ [0,maxHW(k′)] then
13: Construct s from ν1 and ν2
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: return s
δs = δ, we obtain the following result for MITM.
Theorem 3.12. Let n′ = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S1S2−1
))2
. Take k1 and k2 values
such that b = k1 + k2. Let Sj =
∑maxHW(kj)
i=0
(kj
i
)
where maxHW(kj) = kj(
1−δs
2 ) +
σ′
2
√
kj
for j ∈ {1, 2}. For k ≤ a ·b and a secret s with bias δs, the MITM algorithm heuristically
(n = n′+(a− 1)2b, t = O(kan+(S1+S2)n′+(S1+S2)ξ( 2
1+δ2a−1
)ξ +S1S2n
′( 1
1+δ2a−1
)ξ),
m = kn+ S2 + (S1 + S2)n
′, θ, b)-solves the LPN problem.
3.8.3 Gaussian Elimination
In the case of a sparse noise, one may try to recover the secret s by using Gaussian
elimination. It is well known that LPN with noise 0, i.e. τ = 0, is an easy problem.
This idea was used in [CTIN09] in order to mount a passive attack on HB and HB+
protocols. If we are given Θ(k) queries for which the noise is 0, one can just run Gaussian
elimination and in O(k3) recover the secret s. For a LPNk,τ instance, the event of having
no noise for k queries happens with a probability pnonoise = (1− τ)k.
We design the following algorithm for solving LPN: ﬁrst, we have no reduction phase.
For each k new queries, we assume that the noise is 0. We recover an ν through Gaussian
elimination. We must test if this value is the correct secret by computing the Hamming
weight of A′νT + c′, where A′ is the matrix that contains n′ fresh queries and c′ is the
vector containing the corresponding noisy inner products. We expect to have a Hamming
weight in the range [0, (1−δ2 )n
′ + σ
√
n′
2 ], where σ is a constant.
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If we want to bound by θ/2 the probability that the Hamming weight of the noise is
not in the correct range, for the correct secret, we obtain that σ = ϕ−1(1−θ/2)√1− δ2.
For a ν 
= s, we use the Central Limit Theorem to bound that HW(A′νT + c′) is
in the correct range. Let X1, . . . ,Xn′ be the i.i.d random variables that correspond to
Xi = 〈vi, ν〉⊕ ci. Let X = X1+ . . .+Xn′ . We have E(X1) = 12 and Var(X1) = 14 . Using
Theorem 2.6, we obtain
Pr[failure] = Pr[∃νs.t. HW(A′νT + c′) in correct range]
=
(
1−
(
1− Pr[X ≤ (1− δ
2
)n′ +
σ
√
n′
2
]
)2k−1)
=
(
1−
(
1− ϕ(σ − δ
√
n′)
)2k−1)
If we bound this probability of failure by θ/2 we obtain that we need at least n′ =(
σ − ϕ−1(1− (1− θ/2)
1
2k−1 )
)2
δ−2 queries besides the k that are used for the Gaussian
elimination.
As aforementioned, with a probability of pnonoise = (1− τ)k, the Gaussian elimination
will give the correct secret. Thus, we have to repeat our algorithm 1pnonoise times.
Complexity analysis. The computation of the Hamming weight has a cost ofO(n′k2).
Given that we run the Gaussian elimination and the veriﬁcation step 1pnonoise times, we
obtain the following theorem for this algorithm:
Theorem 3.13. Let n′ =
(
σ − ϕ−1(1 − (1 − θ/2)
1
2k−1 )
)2
δ−2. The Gaussian elimin-
ation algorithm (n = k+2
(1−τ)k + n
′, t = O
(
n′k2+k3
(1−τ)k
)
,m = k2 + n′k, θ, k)-solves the LPN
problem.10
Remark 2. Notice that this algorithm recovers the whole secret at once and the only
assumption we make is that the noise is sparse. We do not need to run the transform
such that we have a sparse secret and there are no queries lost during the reduction
phase.
Remark 3. In the extreme case where (1− τ)k > θ, the Gaussian elimination algorithm
can just assume that k queries have noise 0 and retrieve the secret s without verifying
that this is the correct secret.
3.9 Solving LPN with a Polynomial Number of Samples
So far, all the algorithms presented here require access to a subexponential number of
LPN queries. In real applications, e.g. passive attack on LPN-based encryption schemes,
10Given that we receive uniformly distributed vectors from the LPN oracle, from n + 2 vectors v we
expect to have n linearly independent ones.
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an adversary has a limited access to these queries. Thus, it is of interest to see what
is the complexity of solving LPN when n, the initial number of queries, is polynomial.
Lyubashevsky presented in [Lyu05] a subexponential algorithm for solving LPN when
n = k1+, for  > 0. We present in this Section the main results from [Lyu05] and later
in this thesis (in Chapter 6) we will prove that one can do better.
Pre-reduction phase. The aim of this phase is to construct enough LPN-like samples
from the n = k1+ LPN initial queries. The new queries are going to be given as input
to the BKW algorithm, i.e. following the reduction and solving phase.
A way to increase the number of queries is to construct w combinations of them. At
the end, we would have
(n
w
)
new queries. The following results show that by choosing a
correct w, in the end, we have enough samples and that they behave like the LPN ones.
The following Lemma shows that if we make random combinations of the vi vectors,
the new vectors are also uniformly distributed.
Lemma 3.14 (Lemma 1 from [Lyu05]). Let X ⊆ {0, 1}k1+	 such that |X| > 22k and
let Y = {0, 1}k. Let H be the universal family of hash functions from X to Y , where
H = {hv |v = (v1, . . . , vk1+	), vi ∈ {0, 1}k}, and where hv(x) = x1v1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ xk1+	vk1+	.
If hv is chosen uniformly at random from H, then, with probability at least 1 − 2− k4 ,
d(hv(x), U) ≤ 2− k4 where x is chosen uniformly at random from X and U is the uniform
distribution over Y .
Once it is proven that H is a universal family of hash functions, one can use the
Leftover Hash Lemma and prove Lemma 3.14. For this algorithm, X is chosen to be
X = {x ∈ {0, 1}k1+	 |HW (x) =  2k log2 k}. Thus, the new queries are a combination
of w =  2k log2 k  initial queries. The new noisy inner products have a noise of τ
′ ≤
1
2 − 12
(
1−2τ
4
) 2k
	 log2 k .
At the end of this phase, the algorithm gives the new queries to the BKW algorithm.
Reduction phase. This phase follows the same steps that are done in the BKW
algorithm.
Solving phase. It uses the majority rule as in BKW.
Complexity analysis. We state the main result from [Lyu05].
Theorem 3.15 (Th. 1 from [Lyu05]). Let n = k1+ be the number of samples from the
LPN oracle and let w =  2k log2 k with  > 0. For τ <
1
2 − 2−(log2 k
σ) for any constant
σ < 1, the algorithm (n, t = 2
O( k
log2 log2 k
)
,m = k
(n
w
)
, θ, b)-solves the LPN problem.
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Chapter4
Comparing the LPN Solving Algorithms
Having provided a tighter analysis of the LPN solving algorithms, in this chapter, we
provide a comparison between the theory and practice with respect to the performance
of these algorithms. The personal contribution in this chapter is a joint work with
Florian Trame`r and Serge Vaudenay that was published in Journal of Cryptography and
Communications [BTV16].
Structure of the Chapter. We present the environment and the libraries we used
for the implementation in Section 4.2. We also give the comparison between the theory
and the practice for the algorithms described in Sections 3.3 - 3.8. We compare the
performance of all these algorithms and show what are the secure parameters that LPN
should be instantiated with in Section 4.3.
4.1 Our Contribution
Having a better analysis of the LPN solving algorithms described in the previous chapter,
we provide experimental results and compare them with the practice. For this, we imple-
ment all the algorithms that we describe. Our motivation is to study the gap between
theory and practice. We discover that our practical results are very close to our theoret-
ical results. Besides comparing theory with practice for each algorithm, we compare all
the algorithms for a family of LPN instances where the secret is sparse and establish that
the Gaussian elimination is the best algorithm for this case. As we validate our theory,
we can propose secure parameters for diﬀerent LPN instances, where we vary the size of
the secret and the noise level. We see that depending on the noise level, we have several
algorithms that are the most eﬃcient. For a sparse noise the Gaussian elimination is
the best. For a a constant noise level, the covering code and the LF2 provide the best
results.
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4.2 Comparing Theory with Practice
In this section, we compare the theoretical analysis with implementation results of all
the LPN solving algorithms described in Sections 3.3 - 3.8.
We implemented the BKW, LF1 and LF2 algorithms as they are presented in [LF06]
and in pseudocode in Algorithms 3.1-3.3. The implementation was done in C on a Intel
Xeon 3.33Ghz CPU. We used a custom bit library to store and handle bit vectors. Using
the OpenMP library1, we have also parallelized certain crucial parts of the algorithms.
The xor-ing in the reduction phases as well as the majority phases for instance, are
easily distributed onto multiple threads to speed up the computation. Furthermore, we
implemented the exhaustive search and MITM algorithms described in Section 3.8. The
various matrix operations performed for the sparse LPN solving algorithms are done
with the M4RI library 2. Regarding the memory model used, we implemented the one
described in [LF06] in order to accommodate the LF2 algorithm. The source code of our
implementation can be found at http://lasec.epfl.ch/lpn/lpn_source_code.zip.
We ran all the algorithms for diﬀerent LPN instances, where the size of the secret
varies from 48 to 100 bits and the Bernoulli parameter τ takes diﬀerent values from
0.01 to 0.4. A value of τ = 0.1 for a small k as the one we are able to test means
that very few, if none, of the queries have the noise bits set on 1. For this sparse case,
an exhaustive search is the optimal strategy. Also, τ = 0.4 might also seem to be an
extreme case. Still, we provide the query complexity for these extreme cases to fully
observe the behaviour of the LPN solving algorithms.
For each LPN instance, we try to ﬁnd the theoretical number of oracle queries required
to get a 50% probability of recovering the full secret while optimizing the time complexity.
This means that in half of our instances, we recover the secret correctly. In the other
half of the cases, it may happen that one or more bits are guessed wrong. We thus
take θ = 13 as the probability of failure for the ﬁrst block. We choose a and b that
would minimize the time complexity and we apply this split in our theoretical bounds
in order to compute the theoretical number of initial queries. We apply the same split
in practice and try to minimize the number of initial queries such that we maintain a
50% probability of success. We thus experimented with diﬀerent values for the original
number of oracle samples, and ran multiple instances of the algorithms to approximate
the success probability. One can observe that in our practical and theoretical results the
a, b parameters are the same and the comparison is consistent. We were limited by the
power of our experimental environment and thus, we were not able to provide results for
instances that require more than 230 queries.
4.2.1 BKW∗
The implementation results for BKW∗ are presented in Table 4.1. Each entry in the table
is of the form log2(n)(a), where n is the number of oracle queries that were required to
1http://openmp.org/wp
2http://m4ri.sagemath.org/
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Table 4.1: BKW∗ query complexity - prac-
tice (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 11.85(6) 15.01(6) 17.68(7) 20.78(7)
0.10 19.99(4) 23.13(4) 27.30(4)
0.20 23.84(3)
0.25 25.95(3)
0.40
Table 4.2: BKW∗ query complexity - the-
ory (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 11.69(6) 14.84(6) 17.69(7) 20.80(7)
0.10 19.02(4) 23.19(4) 27.32(4) 32.43(4)
0.20 23.94(3) 30.11(3) 33.97(4) 39.09(4)
0.25 26.05(3) 32.23(3) 37.33(3) 43.30(4)
0.40 35.56(2) 42.81(3) 47.91(3) 55.02(3)
obtain a 50% success rate for the full recovery of the secret. The parameter a is the
algorithm parameter denoting the number of blocks into which the vectors were split.
We take b = ka. By maintaining the value of a, we can easily compute the number
of queries and the time & memory complexity. In Table 4.2, we present the theoretical
results for BKW∗ obtained by using Theorem 3.3. We can see that our theoretical and
practical results are very close. We are a bit too optimistic with the theory for the small
values of k, i.e. k = 48 and k = 60 where we require a bit less number of queries. For
larger values, our theory requires more queries than the practice.
If we take the example of LPN100,0.01, we need 2
20.78 queries and our theoretical analysis
gives a value of 220.80. These two values are very close. We emphasize again that for
both the theory and the practice, we use the split that optimizes the time complexity
and from this optimal split we derive the number of queries.
Remark 4. For the BKW∗ algorithm, we tried to optimize the average ﬁnal bias of the
queries, i.e. obtaining a better value than δ2
a−1
. Recall that at the beginning of the
reduction phase, we order the queries in equivalence classes and then choose a represent-
ative vector that is xored with the rest of queries from the same class. One variation of
this reduction operation would be to change several times the representative vector. The
incentive for doing so is the following: one representative vector that has error vector
set on 1 aﬀects the bias δ of all queries, while by choosing several representative vectors
this situation may be improved; more than half of them will have error bit on 0. We
implemented this new approach, but we found that it does not bring any signiﬁcant im-
provement. Another change that was tested was about the majority rule applied during
the solving phase. Queries have a worst case bias of δ2
a−1
(See Lemma 3.1), but some
have a larger bias. So, we could apply a weighted majority rule. This would decrease the
number of queries needed for the solving phase. We implemented the idea and discovered
that the complexity advantage is very small.
Remark 5. In our implementation, we try to optimize the way we split our blocks during
the reduction phase. The optimal split might give an a that does not divide k. For the
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Table 4.3: LF1 query complexity - practice
(log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 9.78(7) 11.29(8) 13.32(8) 14.99(8)
0.10 13.20(4) 15.52(5) 17.98(5) 21.38(5)
0.20 16.30(4) 18.03(4) 21.04(4) 25.18(4)
0.25 16.20(3) 20.70(4) 22.24(4) 25.93(4)
0.40 23.49(3) 23.97(3)
Table 4.4: LF1 query complexity - theory
(log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 9.90(7) 12.24(8) 13.44(8) 15.94(8)
0.10 13.69(4) 16.12(5) 18.24(5) 22.02(5)
0.20 16.75(4) 18.34(4) 21.66(4) 26.59(4)
0.25 17.01(3) 21.36(4) 22.60(4) 26.64(4)
0.40 23.84(3) 24.82(3) 28.13(3) 35.00(3)
theoretical analysis, we always assume that k can be written as k = a·b. When comparing
the theory with practice, the results for the theoretical values give an upper bound as we
take b = ka and we actually give exact results for a secret of size aka ≥ k. This
observation holds for all the algorithms we implemented.
4.2.2 LF1
Below, we present the experimental and theoretical results for the LF1 algorithm. As a
ﬁrst observation we can see that, for all instances, this algorithm is a clear optimization
over the original BKW∗ algorithm. As before, each entry is of the form log2(n)(a), where
n and a are selected to obtain a 50% success rate for the full recovery of the secret and
b = ka.
Table 4.4 shows our theoretical results for LF1 using Theorem 3.5. When we compare
the experimental and the practical results for LF1 (See Table 4.3 and Table 4.4), we can
see that the gap between them is of a factor up to 2.
Remark 6. Recall that in LF1, like in all LPN solving algorithms, we perform the
reduction phase by splitting the queries into a blocks of size b. When this split is not
possible, we consider that we have a− 1 blocks of size b and a last block shorter of size
b′ with b′ < b. By LF1∗, we denote the same LPN solving algorithm that makes use of
the Walsh transform but where the split of the blocks is done diﬀerent. We allow now
to have a last block larger than the rest. The gain for this strategy may be the following:
given that we recover a larger block of the key, we run our solving phase fewer times.
Although the complexity of the transform is bigger as we work with a bigger block, the
reduction phase has to be applied fewer times. From our experiments, we discover there
seems to be no diﬀerence between the performance of the two algorithms.
4.2.3 LF2
We tested the LF2 heuristic on the same instances as for BKW∗ and LF1. The results are
summarized in Table 4.5. To illustrate the performance of the heuristic, we concentrate
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Table 4.5: LF2 query complexity - practice (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 8.97(7) 10.24(7) 12.41(8) 13.15(8)
0.10 12.60(4) 15.12(5) 16.90(5) 20.65(5)
0.20 15.40(3) 16.94(4) 20.47(4) 24.88(4)
0.25 15.92(3) 20.61(4) 21.00(4) 25.40(4)
0.40 19.74(2) 23.52(3)
on a particular instance, LPN100,0.1 with a = 5, b = 20. As derived in [LF06], the LF1
algorithm for this parameter set should require less than (8 · b + 200) · δ−2a ≈ 218.77
queries for a solving phase and (a− 1) · 2b+ (8 · b+200) · δ−2a ≈ 222.13 queries overall to
achieve a success probability of 50%. Using our theoretical analysis, the LF1 algorithm
for this parameter set requires to have ≈ 222.05 queries overall and 215.91 queries for the
solving phase. Our experimental results for LF1 were a bit lower than our theoretical
ones: 221.38 oracle samples were suﬃcient. If we use the LF2 heuristic starting with
1+2 ∗ 2b ≈ 221 samples, we get about the same amount of vectors for the solving phase.
In this case, there are no queries lost during reduction. We thus have much more queries
than should actually be required for a successful solving phase and correctly solve the
problem with success probability close to 100%. So we can try to start with less. By
starting oﬀ with 220.65 queries and thus loosing some queries in each reduction round, we
also solved the LPN problem in slightly over 50% of the cases. The gain in total query
complexity for LF2 is thus noticeable but not extremely important.
As another example, consider the parameter set k = 768, τ = 0.05 proposed at the
end of [LF06]. The values for a, b which minimize the query complexity are a = 9, b = 86
(a · b = 774 > k). Solving the problem with LF1 should thus require about 285.66 vectors
for the solving phase and 289.13 oracle samples overall. Using LF2, as 1 + 2 ∗ 2b ≈ 287
oracle samples would be suﬃcient, we obtain a reduction by a factor ≈ 4.
Even though LF2 introduces linear dependencies between queries, this does not seem
to have any noticeable impact on the success probability in recovering the secret value.
Remark 7. A general observation for all these three algorithms, shown also by our
results, is that the bias has a big impact on the number of queries and the complexity.
Recall that the bias has value δ2
a−1
at the end of the reduction phase. We can see from
our tables that the lower the value of τ , i.e. larger value of δ = 1− 2τ , the higher a can
be chosen to solve the LPN instance. Also, for a constant τ , the higher the size of the
secret, the higher a can be chosen.
Remark 8. The LF2 algorithm is a variation of LF1 that oﬀers a diﬀerent heuristic
technique to decrease the number of initial queries. The same trick could be used for
BKW∗, exhaustive search and MITM.
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While the same analysis can be applied for exhaustive search and MITM as for LF2,
BKW∗ is a special case. We denote by BKW2 this variation of BKW where we use the re-
duction phase from LF2. Recall that for BKW∗, we need to have n = 2b 1−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− θb
))2
+
(a− 1)2b queries and here the dominant term is 2b 1−δ2
a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− θb
) )2
. Thus, we need
to start with 2 · 2b+ , where  > 1 and increase such that at the end of the last iteration
of the reduction, we get the required number of queries. This improves the initial number
of queries and we have a gain of a factor a for the time complexity. For an LPN48,0.1
instance, our implementation of BKW2 requires n = 213.82 initial queries and increases
it, during the reduction phase, up to 219.51, the amount of queries needed for the solving
phase. Thus, there is an improvement from 219.99 (See Table 4.1) to 213.82 and the time
complexity is better. While this is an improvement over BKW∗, it still performs worse
than LF1 and LF2.
4.2.4 Exhaustive Search
Recall that for exhaustive search, we have two variants. The results for Search1 are
displayed in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. For Search1 we observe that the gap between
theory and practice is of a factor smaller than 4. In terms of number of queries, Search1
brings a small improvement compared to LF1. We will see in the next section the
complete comparison between all the implemented algorithms.
Remark 9. One may observe a larger diﬀerence for the LPN48,0.4 and LPN64,0.25 in-
stances. For example for LPN48,0.4 we have n = 2
19.74 (practice) vs. n = 224.00 (theory).
For this case, the implementation requires n = 219.74 initial queries compared with the
theory that requires n = 224.00 queries. Here, we have a = 2 and b = 24 and the term
(a − 1)2b dominates the query complexity. The discrepancy comes from the worst-case
analysis of the reduction phase where we say that at each reduction step we discard 2b
queries. With this reasoning, we predict to lose 224 queries. If we analyse more closely,
we discover that actually in the average-case, we discard only 2b · [1− (1− 1
2b
)n]
queries
(this is the number of expected non-empty equivalence classes). Thus, with only 219.74
initial queries, we run the reduction phase and discard 219.70 queries, instead of 224. We
are left with 214.45, queries which are suﬃcient for the solving phase. We note that for
large LPN instances, this diﬀerence between worst-case and average-case analysis for the
number of deleted queries during reduction rounds becomes negligible.
The results for Search2 are displayed in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9.
We notice that for both Search1 and Search2 the instances LPN48,0.01 and LPN68,0.01
have a very low number of queries. This is due to the following observation: for n ≤ 68
linearly independent queries and τ = 0.01 we have that the noise bits are all 0 with a
probability larger than 50%. Thus, for k ≤ 64 we hope that the k queries we receive from
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Table 4.6: Search1 query complexity -
practice (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 5.70(1) 6.12(1) 13.25(8) 14.93(8)
0.10 13.15(4) 16.44(4) 17.93(5) 21.34(5)
0.20 15.54(3) 17.99(4) 21.02(4) 25.15(4)
0.25 16.18(3) 19.88(3)
0.40 19.74(2)
Table 4.7: Search1 query complexity - the-
ory (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 5.70(1) 6.12(1) 13.28(8) 15.90(8)
0.10 13.69(4) 17.59(4) 18.20(5) 22.02(5)
0.20 17.02(3) 18.31(4) 21.66(4) 26.59(4)
0.25 17.10(3) 23.00(3) 28.00(3) 26.64(4)
0.40 24.00(2) 24.91(3) 28.15(3) 35.00(3)
Table 4.8: Search2 query complexity -
practice (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 5.70(1) 6.12(1) 13.25(8) 14.93(8)
0.10 13.15(4) 15.36(5) 17.93(5) 21.34(5)
0.20 16.09(4) 17.99(4) 21.02(4) 25.15(4)
0.25 16.18(3) 20.63(4)
0.40 23.50(2)
Table 4.9: Search2 query complexity - the-
ory (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 5.70(1) 6.12(1) 13.11(8) 15.87(8)
0.10 13.66(4) 15.87(5) 18.17(5) 22.02(5)
0.20 16.58(4) 18.27(4) 21.65(4) 26.59(4)
0.25 17.10(3) 21.26(4) 22.54(4) 26.64(4)
0.40 23.86(3) 24.82(3) 28.13(3) 35.00(3)
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Table 4.10: MITM query complexity -
practice (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 5.70(1) 6.12(1) 13.25(8) 14.93(8)
0.10 13.15(4) 16.47(4)
0.20 15.54(3)
0.25
0.40
Table 4.11: MITM query complexity - the-
ory (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 5.70(1) 6.12(1) 13.28(8) 15.90(8)
0.10 13.67(4) 17.59(4) 18.20(5) 22.01(5)
0.20 17.02(3) 18.30(4) 21.66(4) 26.59(4)
0.25 17.11(3) 23.01(3) 28.00(3) 26.64(4)
0.40 24.00(2) 32.85(2) 28.14(3) 35.00(3)
the oracle have all the noise set to 0. With k noiseless and linearly independent queries,
we can just recover s with Gaussian elimination. This is an application of Remark 3
from Chapter 3.
4.2.5 MITM
In the case of MITM, the experimental and theoretical results are illustrated in Table 4.10
and Table 4.11. There is a very small diﬀerence between MITM and exhaustive search
algorithms for a sparse secret: in practice, MITM requires just dozens of queries less
than Search1 and Search2 for the same a and b parameters.
4.2.6 Gaussian Elimination
In the Gaussian elimination algorithm, the only assumption we need to make is that we
have a sparse noise. We do not run any reduction technique and the noise is not aﬀected.
As the algorithm depends on the probability to have a 0 noise on k linearly independent
vectors, the complexity decays very quickly once we are outside the sparse noise scenario.
We present in Table 4.12 the theoretical results obtained for this algorithm.
In the next section, we will show the eﬀectiveness of this simple idea in the sparse case
scenario and compare it to the other LPN solving algorithms.
Again for LPN48,0.01 and LPN64,0.01 we apply Remark 3.
4.2.7 Covering Codes
The covering code requires the existence of a code with the optimal coverage. For each
instance one has to ﬁnd an optimal code that minimizes the query and time complexity.
Unlike the previous algorithms, this algorithm cannot be truly automatized. In practice,
we could test only the cases that were suggested in [GJL14]. Thus, we are not able to
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Table 4.12: Gaussian elimination query complexity - theory (log2)
τ
k
48 64 80 100
0.01 5.70 6.12 8.23 8.73
0.10 12.96 15.78 18.52 21.87
0.20 21.09 26.65 32.11 38.87
0.25 25.57 32.61 39.56 48.18
0.40 41.01 53.21 65.31 80.37
compare the theoretical and practical values. Nevertheless, we will give theoretical values
for diﬀerent practical parameters in the next section.
4.3 Complexity Analysis of the LPN Solving Algorithms
We have compared our theoretical bounds with our practical results and we saw that
there is a small diﬀerence between the two. Our theoretical analysis also gives tighter
bounds compared with the results from [LF06]. We now extend our theoretical res-
ults and compare the asymptotic performance of all the LPN algorithms for practical
parameters used by the LPN-based constructions. We consider the family of LPNk, 1√
k
instances proposed by some encryption schemes [Ale03, DP12]. Although the covering
code cannot be automatized, as for each instance we have to try diﬀerent codes with
diﬀerent sizes and dimensions, we provide results also for this algorithm. When dealing
with the covering code reduction, we always assume the existence of an ideal code and
compute the bias introduced by this step. We do not consider here concatenation of
ideal codes and we will see that we obtain a worse result for the LPN512,0.125 instance
compared with the result from [GJL14], although the diﬀerence is small. In the covering
code algorithm, we also stick with the BKW reduction steps and do not use the LF2 re-
duction. As aforementioned, the LF2 reduction brings a small improvement to the ﬁnal
complexity. This does not aﬀect the comparison between all the LPN solving algorithms.
We analyse the time complexity of each algorithm, by which we mean the number of
bit operations the algorithm performs while solving an LPN problem. For each algorithm,
we consider values of k for which the parameters (a, b) minimising the time complexity
are such that k = a · b. For the LF2 algorithm, we select the initial number of queries
such that we are left with at least n′ = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2b−1
))2
queries after
the reduction phase. Recall that by Search1, we denote the standard exhaustive search
algorithm and Search2 is making use of a Walsh-Hadamard transform. The results are
illustrated in Figure 4.1. We recall the time complexity and the initial number of queries
for each algorithm in Table 4.13, where S represents the number of sparse secrets with
S < 2b. For MITM, the values S1 (resp. S2) represent the number of possible values
47
020
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
L
og
ar
it
h
m
ic
ti
m
e
co
m
p
le
x
it
y
lo
g
2
(t
)
Key size k
k
log2(k)
+ c1
BKW
Search1
LF1
Search2
LF2
MITM
Gauss
Covering codes
lower bound
Figure 4.1: Time Complexity of LPN Algorithms on instances LPNk, 1√
k
for the ﬁrst (resp. second) half of the secret, n′ represents the number of queries left
after the reduction phase and ξ represents the Hamming weight of the mask used. In
the case of the covering codes algorithm, all a, b, a′, k′, k′′, l, w0, set are parameters of the
algorithm. Recall that θ is 13 .
We can bound the logarithmic complexity of all these algorithms by klog2(k)
+ c1 and
c3 log2(k) +
√
k
ln(2) + c2 (denoted in Figure 4.1 by lower bound). The lower bound is
given by the asymptotic complexity of the Gaussian elimination that can be expressed
as c log2 k +
√
k
ln(2) when τ =
1√
k
.
The complexity of BKW can be written as mink=ab(poly · 2b · δ−2a) and for the other
algorithms (except the Gaussian elimination), the formula is mink=ab(poly · (2b+ δ−2a)),
where poly denotes a polynomial factor. By searching for the optimal a, b values, we
have two cases:
• for a > 1, we ﬁnd a ∼ log2 k(log2 k)2 ln 1δ and b =
k
a and obtain that 2
b dominates
δ−2
a
. For δ = 1− 2√
k
we obtain the complexity poly · 2 klog2(k) .
• for a = 1, we have that for
– BKW the complexity is poly · 2k
– LF1, LF2,Search2 the complexity is poly+ k2
k
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– Search1, MITM the complexity is poly · Sr and poly · S2r′ , respectively, where
we deﬁne Sr to be #{v ∈ {0, 1}k | HW (v) ≤ r}. We need to bound the value
of Sr. By induction we can show that Sr ≤ kk−r−1 · k
r
r! . For τ ≈ 1√k , we have
that r ≈ (1 + σ2 )
√
k and r′ ≈ (12 + σ2√2)
√
k. We obtain that the complexity
for both algorithms is poly · 2γ
√
k log2 k+O(
√
k), where γ is a constant. This is
not better than 2
k
log2(k) for k < 200 000, but asymptotically this gives a better
complexity.
For Gaussian elimination, the complexity is poly
(1−τ)k which is poly · 2
√
k for τ = 1√
k
.
Table 4.13: Query & Time complexity for LPN solving algorithms for recovering the ﬁrst
b bits
LPN algorithm Query complexity(n) and Time complexity(t)
BKW
n = 2b 1−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− θb
) )2
+ (a− 1)2b
t = kan
LF1
n = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2b−1
))2
+ (a− 1)2b
t = kan+ b2b log2(n−(a−1)2
b)+1
2 + b(n − (a− 1)2b)
LF2
n = 1 + 2b+1 ≥ 2−δ2
a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2b−1
))2
t = kan+ b2b log2(n−(a−1)2
b)+1
2 + b(n − (a− 1)2b)
Search1
n = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S−1
))2
+ (a− 1)2b
t = kan+ S(n− (a− 1)2b)
Search2
n = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S−1
))2
+ (a− 1)2b
t = kan+ b2b
log2(n−(a−1)2b)+1
2 + b(n − (a− 1)2b)
MITM
n = 2−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ/2) 1S1S2−1
))2
+ (a− 1)2b
t = kan+ (S1 + S2)n
′ + (S1 + S2)ξ( 2
1+δ2a−1
)ξ + S1S2n
′( 1
1+δ2a−1
)ξ
Gauss
n = k+2
(1−τ)k +
(
σ − ϕ−1(1− (1− θ/2)
1
2k−1 )
)2
δ−2
t =
(
n− k+2
(1−τ)k
)
k2+k3
(1−τ)k
Covering codes
n = 2−δ
2a+1 2set
δ2a+1 2set
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2−1
))2
+ a2b
t = nka′ + comp+ compsolving, where
comp = (k + 1)an+ (n− a2b)∑w0i=0 (k′−k′′i )i+ (k′′ − )(2(n − a2b) + 2
)
compsolving =
(
2
 log2(n−a2
b)+1
2 + (n− a2b)
)∑w0
i=0
(k′−k′′
i
)
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We see in Figure 4.1 that in some cases, increasing the value of k may result in a
decrease in time complexity. The reason for this is that we are considering LPN instances
where the noise parameter τ takes value 1√
k
. Thus, as k grows, the noise is reduced,
which leads to an interesting trade-oﬀ between the complexity of the solving phase
and the complexity of the reduction phase of the various algorithms. This behaviour
does not seem to occur for the BKW algorithm. In this case, the query complexity
n = 2b 1−δ
2a
δ2a
(
ϕ−1
(
1− θb
) )2
+ (a − 1)2b is largely dominated by the ﬁrst term, which
grows exponentially not only in terms of the noise parameter, but also in terms of the
block size b.
Remark 10 (LF1 vs. Search2). As shown in Figure 4.1, the overall complexity of the
LF1 and Search2 algorithms is quasi identical. From Theorems 3.5 and 3.11, we deduce
that for the same parameters (a, b), the Search2 algorithm should perform better as long
as S < 2b−1. This is indeed the case for the instances we consider here, although the
diﬀerence in complexity is extremely small.
We can see clearly that for the LPNk, 1√
k
family of instances, the Gaussian elimination
outperforms all the other algorithms for k > 500. For no k < 1000, the LPNk, 1√
k
oﬀers
an 80 bit security. This requirement is achieved for k = 1090.
Selecting secure parameters. We remind that for each algorithm we considered,
our analysis made use of a heuristic assumption of query and noise independence after
reduction. In order to propose security parameters, we simply consider the algorithm
which performs best under this assumption.
By taking all the eight algorithms described in this work, Tables 4.14-4.21 display
the logarithmic time complexity for various LPN parameters. For instance, the LF2
algorithm requires 279 steps to solve a LPN384,0.25 instance.
We recall here the result from [GJL14]: an instance LPN512,0.125 oﬀers a security of
79.7. We obtain a value of 82. The diﬀerence comes mainly from the use of LF2 reduction
in [GJL14] and from a search of optimal concatenation of linear codes.
When comparing all the algorithms, we have to keep in mind that the Gaussian
elimination recovers the whole secret, while for the rest of the algorithms, we give the
complexity to recover a block of the secret. Still, this does not aﬀect our comparison as
we have proven in Section 3.4 that the complexity of recovering the ﬁrst block dominates
the total complexity.
We highlight in red the best values obtained for diﬀerent LPN instances. We observe
the following behaviour: for a sparse case scenario, i.e. τ = 0.05 for k ≥ 576 or τ =
1√
k
< 0.05, the Gaussian elimination oﬀers the best performance. Once we are outside
the sparse case scenario, we have that LF2 and the covering code algorithms are the best
ones. The covering code proves to be better than LF2 for a level of noise of 0.125. While
the performance of the covering code reduction highly depends on the sparseness of the
noise, LF2 has a more general reduction phase and is more eﬃcient for noise parameters
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of 0.25 and 0.4. Also, for a τ > 0.05 the covering code is better than the Gaussian
elimination.
Thus, for diﬀerent scenarios, there are diﬀerent algorithms that prove to be eﬃcient.
This comparison clearly shows that for the family of instances LPNk, 1√
k
neither the BKW,
nor its variants are the best ones. One should use the Gaussian elimination algorithm.
Table 4.14: Bit security of LPN against BKW
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
68 88 97 106 114 122 139 197
0.05 66 88 98 108 117 126 145 215
0.125 78 104 116 127 137 148 170 252
0.25 93 123 136 149 162 175 201 294
0.4 114 147 163 179 195 212 243 346
Table 4.15: Bit security of LPN against LF1
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
50 63 71 79 84 88 102 145
0.05 50 62 71 79 87 95 102 160
0.125 56 72 78 89 98 107 125 176
0.25 65 83 89 100 110 121 143 199
0.4 76 93 104 117 130 142 168 230
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Table 4.16: Bit security of LPN against LF2
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
47 59 67 75 79 84 98 141
0.05 47 59 67 75 83 91 98 156
0.125 53 69 75 85 95 104 122 173
0.25 63 79 87 98 108 119 140 197
0.4 75 90 102 115 128 140 165 228
Table 4.17: Bit security of LPN against Search1
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
54 69 74 79 87 95 104 147
0.05 51 69 76 81 87 95 111 160
0.125 64 80 89 100 110 121 135 199
0.25 80 108 119 130 142 152 175 258
0.4 107 140 156 171 187 203 235 335
Table 4.18: Bit security of LPN against Search2
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
50 63 71 79 83 88 102 145
0.05 50 62 71 79 87 95 102 160
0.125 56 72 78 88 98 107 125 176
0.25 65 83 89 100 110 121 143 199
0.4 76 93 104 117 130 142 168 230
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Table 4.19: Bit security of LPN against MITM
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
55 69 75 79 87 95 108 151
0.05 51 69 78 82 87 95 111 160
0.125 64 80 89 100 110 121 138 199
0.25 81 108 120 132 143 155 177 261
0.4 107 140 156 172 188 204 235 336
Table 4.20: Bit security of LPN against Gaussian elimination
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
49 56 59 62 64 67 71 85
0.05 44 56 61 66 72 77 87 127
0.125 75 102 115 127 140 153 179 279
0.25 133 188 215 242 269 296 350 565
0.4 218 314 362 410 457 505 600 979
Table 4.21: Bit security of LPN against Covering codes
τ
k
256 384 448 512 576 640 768 1280
1√
k
44 55 60 66 69 74 86 123
0.05 42 54 60 64 73 78 88 132
0.125 53 68 75 82 90 96 109 162
0.25 69 87 96 106 115 125 139 203
0.4 94 110 123 136 149 161 179 281
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As we have shown, there still remains a small gap between the theoretical and practical
results for the algorithms we analysed. It thus seems reasonable to take a safety margin
when selecting parameters to achieve a certain level of security.
Based on this analysis, we could recommend the LPN instances LPN512,0.25, LPN640,0.125,
LPN1280,0.05 or LPN1280, 1√
1280
to achieve 80 bit security for diﬀerent noise levels.
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Chapter5
Optimizations on LPN Solving
Algorithms
In this chapter, we explain how to automatize the process of ﬁnding optimal LPN solving
algorithms. The previous work from the LPN literature, presented in Chapters 3 and 4,
does not explain how to choose the parameters and what is the best use of the existing
tools, i.e. reduction methods, for optimising the total complexity of solving LPN. The
personal contribution in this chapter is a joint work with Serge Vaudenay that was
published in [BV16b].
Structure of the Chapter. In Section 5.2, we describe the main tools used to solve
LPN, i.e. the reduction techniques and the most eﬃcient solving technique. We carefully
analyse the complexity of each step. Section 5.3 studies the failure probability of the
entire algorithm and validates the use of the average bias in the analysis. Section 5.4
introduces the bias computation for perfect and quasi-perfect codes. We provide an
algorithm to ﬁnd good codes. The algorithm that searches the optimal strategy to solve
LPN is presented in Sections 5.5 and 5.6. We illustrate and compare our results in
Section 5.7.
5.1 Our Contribution
As a ﬁrst contribution, we analyze the existing LPN algorithms and study the operations
that are used in order to reduce the size of the secret.
Second, we improve the theory behind the covering code reduction and show the link
with perfect and quasi-perfect codes. Using the average bias of covering codes allows
us to use arbitrary codes and even random ones. Using the algorithm to construct
optimal concatenated codes based on a pool of elementary ones allows us to improve
complexities (In [GJL14], only a hypothetical code was assumed to be close to a perfect
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code; in [ZJW16], only the concatenation of perfect codes are used).
Third, we optimize the order and the parameters used by the operations that reduce
the size of the secret such that we minimize the time complexity required. We design
a “meta-algorithm” that combines the reduction steps and ﬁnds the optimal strategy to
solve LPN. We automatize the process of ﬁnding LPN solving algorithms, i.e. given a
random LPN instance, our algorithm provides the description of the steps that optimize
the time complexity. In our formalization, we call such algorithms “optimal chains”. We
perform a security analysis of LPN based on the results obtained by our algorithm and
compare our results with the existing ones. We discover that we improve the complexity
compared with the results from [BTV16, LF06, ZJW16] and [GJL14].
5.2 Reduction and Solving Techniques
Recall that the LPN solving algorithms have a common structure: given an LPNk,τ
instance with a secret s, they reduce the original LPN problem to a new LPN problem
where the secret s′ is of size k′ ≤ k by applying several reduction techniques. Then,
they recover s′ using a solving method. The queries are updated and the process is
repeated until the whole secret s is recovered. As before, we compute the complexity
of the algorithm such that the probability of success is at least 50%. We present here
the list of reduction and solving techniques used in the existing LPN solving algorithms.
The reduction methods were presented in the previous chapters as steps in diﬀerent LPN
solving algorithms. For a clear comparison, we gather and list here all these methods.
In a further section, we combine the reduction techniques such that we ﬁnd the optimal
reduction phases for solving diﬀerent LPN instances.
We assume, for all the reduction steps, that we start with n queries, that the size of
the secret is k, the bias of the secret bits is δs and the bias of the noise bits is δ. After
applying a reduction step, we will end up with n′ queries, size k′ and biases δ′ and δ′s.
Note that δs averages over all secrets although the algorithm runs with one target secret.
As it will be clear below, the complexity of all reduction steps only depends on k, n,
and the parameters of the steps but not on the biases. Actually, only the probability of
success is concerned with biases. We see in Section 5.3 that the probability of success of
the overall algorithm is not aﬀected by this approach. Actually, we will give a formula
to compute a value which approximates the average probability of success over the key
based on the average bias.
We have the following reduction steps:
• sparse-secret changes the secret distribution (this reduction step was described also
in Section 3.6). In the formal deﬁnition of LPN, we take the secret s to be a random
row vector of size k. When other reduction steps or the solving phase depends on
the distribution of s, one can transform an LPN instance with a random s to a
new one where s has the same distribution as the initial noise, i.e. s ← Berkτ .
1http://des.cse.nsysu.edu.tw/asiacrypt2014/doc/1-1_SolvingLPNUsingCoveringCodes.pdf
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The reduction performs the following steps: from the n queries select k of them:
(vi1 , ci1), . . . , (vik , cik) where the row vectors vij , with 1 ≤ j ≤ k, are linearly
independent. Construct the matrix M as M = [vTi1 · · · vTik ] and rewrite the k
queries as sM + d′ = c′, where d′ = (di1 , . . . , dik). With the rest of n − k queries
we do the following:
c′j = 〈vj(MT )−1, c′〉 ⊕ cj = 〈vj(MT )−1, d′〉 ⊕ dj = 〈v′j , d′〉 ⊕ dj .
We have n−k new queries (v′j , c′j) where the secret is now d′. In Guo et al. [GJL14],
the authors use an algorithm which is inappropriately called “the four Russians
algorithm” [ADKF70]. This way, the complexity should be of
O
(
minχ∈N
(
kn′ kχ+ k3 + kχ2χ
))
.1 Instead, the Bernstein algorithm [Ber]
works in O
(
n′k2
log2 k−log2 log2 k + k
2
)
. We use the best of the two, depending on the
parameters. Thus, we have:
sparse-secret : k′ = k; n′ = n− k; δ′ = δ; δ′s = δ
Complexity: O
(
minχ∈N
(
n′k2
log2 k−log2 log2 k + k
2, kn′ kχ+ k3 + kχ2χ
))
• partition-reduce(b) is used by the BKW algorithm (See Section 3.3). Recall that the
queries received from the oracle are of the form (v, 〈v, s〉⊕d). In this reduction, the
v vectors are sorted in equivalence classes according to their values on a block of b
bits. These b positions are chosen randomly. Two queries in the same equivalence
class have the same values on the b positions. In each equivalence class, we choose
a representative vector and xor it with the rest of the queries. This will give
vectors with only 0 on this window of b bits. Afterwards, the representative vector
is dropped. This operation reduces the secret to k− b eﬀective bits (since b bits of
the secret are always xored with zero). The new bias is δ2 as the new queries are
xor of two initial ones and the number of queries is reduced by 2b (as there are 2b
equivalence classes).
partition-reduce(b) : k′ = k − b; n′ = n− 2b; δ′ = δ2; δ′s = δs
Complexity: O(kn)
The next reduction, xor -reduce(b), is always better than partition-reduce(b). Never-
theless, we keep this operation in our analysis for backward compatibility with
existing algorithms (e.g. to ﬁll our Table 5.4 with the algorithms from [GJL14]).
• xor -reduce(b) was ﬁrst used by the LF2 algorithm (See Section 3.5). The queries are
grouped in equivalence classes according to the values on b random positions. In
each equivalence class, we perform the xoring of every pair of queries. The size of
the secret is reduced by b bits and the new bias is δ2. The expected new number
of queries is n(n−1)
2b+1
. For n ≈ 1 + 2b+1, the number of queries are maintained, i.e.
n′ = n.
1but the k3 + kχ2χ terms is missing in [GJL14].
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xor -reduce(b) : k′ = k − b; n′ = n(n−1)
2b+1
; δ′ = δ2; δ′s = δs
Complexity: O(k ·max(n, n′))
• drop-reduce(b) is a reduction used only by the BKW algorithm (See Section 3.3). It
consists in dropping all the queries that are not 0 on a window of b bits. Again,
these b positions are chosen randomly. In average, we expect that half of the
queries are 0 on a given position. For b bits, we expect to have n
2b
queries that are
0 on this window. The bias is unaﬀected and the secret is reduced by b bits.
drop-reduce(b) : k′ = k − b; n′ = n
2b
; δ′ = δ; δ′s = δs
Complexity: O(n)
The complexity of n(1 + 12 + . . . +
1
2b−1 ) = O(n) comes from the fact that we do
not need to check all the b bits: once we ﬁnd a 1 we can stop and just drop the
corresponding query.
• code-reduce(k, k′, params) is a method used by the covering code algorithm presented
in ASIACRYPT’14 [GJL14] (this reduction step was described also in Section 3.6).
In order to reduce the size of the secret, one uses a linear code [k, k′] (which is
deﬁned by params) and approximates the vi vectors to the nearest codeword gi.
We assume that decoding is done in linear time for the code considered. (For the
considered codes, decoding is indeed based on table look-ups.) The noisy inner
product becomes:
〈vi, s〉 ⊕ di = 〈g′iG, s〉 ⊕ 〈vi − gi, s〉 ⊕ di
= 〈g′i, sGT 〉 ⊕ 〈vi − gi, s〉 ⊕ di
= 〈g′i, s′〉 ⊕ d′i,
where G is the generator matrix of the code, gi = g
′
iG, s
′ = sGT ∈ {0, 1}k′ and
d′i = 〈vi − gi, s〉 ⊕ di. We denote by bc = E((−1)〈vi−gi,s〉) the bias of 〈vi − gi, s〉.
We will see in Section 5.4 how to construct a [k, k′] linear code making bc as large
as possible.
Here, bc averages the bias over the secret although s is ﬁxed by sparse-secret . It
gives the correct average bias δ over the distribution of the key. We will see that
it allows to approximate the expected probability of success of the algorithm.
By this transform, no query is lost.
code-reduce(k, k′, params) : k′; n′ = n; δ′ = δ · bc
δ′s depends on δs and G
Complexity: O(kn)
The way δ′s is computed is a bit more complicated than for the other types of
reductions. However, δs only plays a role in the code-reduce reduction, and we will
not consider algorithms that use more than one code-reduce reduction.
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It is easy to notice that with each reduction operation the number of queries decreases
or the bias is getting smaller. In general, for solving LPN, one tries to lose as few queries
as possible while maintaining a large bias. We will study in Chapter 5.5 what is a good
combination of these reductions.
After applying the reduction steps, we assume we are left with an LPNk′,δ′ instance
where we have n′ queries. The original BKW algorithm was using a ﬁnal solving technique
based on majority decoding. Since the LF1 algorithm, we use a better solving technique
based on the Walsh Hadamard Transform (WHT).
WHT recovers a block of the secret by computing the fast Walsh Hadamard trans-
form on the function f(x) =
∑
i 1vi=x(−1)〈vi,s〉⊕di (this analysis was presented also in
Section 3.4). The Walsh-Hadamard transform is
fˆ(ν) =
∑
x
(−1)〈ν,x〉f(x) =
∑
i
(−1)〈vi,s+ν〉⊕di .
For ν = s, we have fˆ(s) =
∑
i(−1)di . For a positive bias, we know that most of the
noise bits are set to 0. It is the opposite when the bias is negative. So, |fˆ(s)| is large and
we suppose it is the largest value in the table of fˆ . Using the Central Limit Theorem
we obtain
n′ ≥ (2δ′−2 − 1) ·
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2k
′−1
))2
. (5.1)
WHT(k′);
Requires n′ ≥ (2δ′−2 − 1) ·
(
ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2k
′−1
))2
Complexity: O(k′2k′ log2 n′+12 + k′n′)
As we can see in the formulas of each possible step, the computations of k′, n′, and
of the complexity do not depend on the secret weight. Furthermore, the computation
of biases is always linear. So, the correct average bias (over the distribution of the key
made by the sparse-secret transform) is computed. Only the computation of the success
probability is non-linear, but we discuss about this in the next section. As it only matters
in WHT, we will see in Section 5.3 that the approximation is justiﬁed.
5.3 On Approximating the Probability of Success
Approximating n by using Central Limit Theorem. In order to approximate
the number of queries needed to solve the LPN instance, we consider when the Walsh
Hadamard Transform fails to give the correct secret. We ﬁrst assume that the bias is
positive. We have a failure when for another s¯ 
= s, we have that fˆ(s¯) > fˆ(s). Following
the analysis from Section 3.4, we let y = A′s¯T + c′T and d′ = A′sT + c′T . We have
fˆ(s¯) =
∑
i(−1)yi = n′− 2 ·HW(y) and similarly, fˆ(s) = n′− 2 ·HW(d′). So, fˆ(s¯) > fˆ(s)
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translates to HW(y) ≤ HW(d′). Therefore
Pr[fˆ(s¯) > fˆ(s)] = Pr
[
n′∑
i=1
(yi − d′i) ≤ 0
]
.
For each s¯, we take y as a uniformly distributed random vector and we let δ′(s) be the
bias introduce with a ﬁxed s for d′i (we recall that our analysis computes δ
′ = E(δ′(s))
over the distribution of s). Let X1, . . . ,Xn′ be random variable corresponding to Xi =
yi − d′i. Since E(yi) = 12 , E(d′i) = 12 − δ
′(s)
2 and yi and d
′
i are independent, we have
that E(Xi) =
δ′(s)
2 and Var(Xi) =
2−δ′(s)2
4 . By using the Central Limit Theorem (See
Theorem 2.6) we obtain that
Pr[X1 + . . .+Xn′ ≤ 0] ≈ ϕ (Z(s)) with Z(s) = − δ
′(s)√
2− δ′(s)2
√
n′
where ϕ can be calculated by ϕ(x) = 12 +
1
2erf(
x√
2
) and erf is the Gauss error function.
For δ′(s) < 0, the same analysis with fˆ(s¯) < fˆ(s) gives the same result. Applying the
reasoning for any s′ 
= s, we obtain that the failure probability is
p(s) = 1− (1− ϕ(Z(s)))2k
′−1 , if δ′(s) > 0
and p(s) = 1− 1
2k′
, if δ′(s) ≤ 0.
We deduce the following (for θ < 12)
p(s) ≤ θ ⇔
√
n′ ≥ −
√
2δ′(s)−2 − 1ϕ−1
(
1− (1− θ)
1
2k
′−1
)
and δ′(s) > 0 .
As a condition for our WHT step, we adopt the inequality in which we replace δ′(s) by
δ′. We give a heuristic argument below to show that it implies that E(p(s)) ≤ θ, which
is what we want.
Note that if we use the approximation ϕ (Z) ≈ − 1
Z
√
2π
e−
Z2
2 for Z → −∞, we obtain
the condition n′ ≥ 2(2δ′−2 − 1) ln(2k
′−1
θ ). So, our analysis brings an improvement of
factor two over the Hoeﬀding bound method used by Bogos et al. [BTV16] that requires
n′ ≥ 8δ′−2 ln(2k
′
θ ).
On the validity of using the bias average. The above computation is correct when
using δ′(s) but we use δ′ = E(δ′(s)) instead. If no code-reduce step is used, δ′(s) does
not depend on s and we do have δ′(s) = δ′. However, when a code-reduce is used, the
bias depends on the secret which is obtained after the sparse-secret step. For simplicity,
we let s denote this secret. The bias δ′(s) is actually of form δ′(s) = δ2
x
bc(s) where x
is the number of xor -reduce and partition-reduce steps and bc(s) is the bias introduced by
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code-reduce depending on s. The values of δ′(s), Z(s), and p(s) are already deﬁned above.
We deﬁne Z = − δ′√
2−δ′2
√
n′ and p = 1− (1−ϕ(Z))2k′−1. Clearly, E(p(s)) is the average
failure probability over the distribution of the secret obtained after sparse-secret .
Our method ensures that δ′ = E(δ′(s)) over the distribution of s. Since δ′ is typically
small (after a few xor -reduce steps, δ2
x
is indeed very small), we can consider Z(s) as a
linear function of δ′(s) and have E(Z(s)) ≈ Z. This is conﬁrmed by experiment. We
make the heuristic approximation that
E
(
1− (1− ϕ(Z(s)))2k
′−1
)
≈ 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 ≈ 1− (1− ϕ(Z))2k
′−1
So, E(p(s)) ≈ p.2
We did some experiments based on some examples in order to validate our heuristic
assumption. Our results show indeed that E(Z(s)) ≈ Z. There is a small gap between
E(p(s)) and p but this does not aﬀect our results. Actually, we are in a phase transition
region so any tiny change in the value of n′ makes E(p(s)) change a lot. We include
these results in Appendix A.2. Thus, ensuring that p ≤ θ with the above analysis based
on the average bias ensures that the expected failure probability is bounded by θ.
Both the choice of the codes and the secret have a big inﬂuence on our approximation.
We believe that choosing larger codes can give us the best results. Splitting the reduction
code-reduce in several small codes can give a smaller bias (as a multiplication of several
biases) and in the worst case can give a negative or a 0 bias. In Appendix A.3 we prove
that for a repetition codes [k, 1], with k odd, for a secret with even Hamming weight,
we always introduce a bias of 0. A larger code would eliminate such scenarios and could
give a better bias.
5.4 Bias of the Code Reduction
In this section, we present how to compute the bias introduced by a code-reduce. Recall
that the reduction code-reduce(k, k′) introduces a new noise:
〈vi, s〉 ⊕ di = 〈g′i, s′〉 ⊕ 〈vi − gi, s〉 ⊕ di,
where gi = g
′
iG is the nearest codeword of vi and s
′ = sGT . Note that gi is not necessarily
unique, specially if the code is not perfect. We take gi = Decode(vi) obtained from an
arbitrary decoding algorithm. Then the noise bc can be computed by the following
formula:
2Note that Zhang et al. [ZJW16] implicitly does the same assumption as they use the average bias as
well.
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bc = E((−1)〈vi−gi,s〉) =
∑
e∈{0,1}k
Pr[vi − gi = e]E((−1)〈e,s〉)
=
k∑
w=0
∑
e∈{0,1}k ,
HW(e)=w
Pr[vi − gi = e]δws = E
(
δHW(vi−gi)s
)
for a δs-sparse secret. (We recall that the sparse-secret reduction step randomizes the
secret.) So, the probability space is over the distribution of vi and the distribution of
s. Later, we consider bc(s) = E((−1)〈vi−gi,s〉) over the distribution over vi only. (In the
work of Guo et al. [GJL14], only bc(s) is considered. In Zhang et al. [ZJW16], our bc was
also considered.) In the last expression of bc, we see that the ambiguity in decoding does
not aﬀect bc as long as the Hamming distance HW(vi − Decode(vi)) is not ambiguous.
This is a big advantage of averaging in bc as it allows to use non-perfect codes. From this
formula, we can see that the decoding algorithm vi → gi making HW(vi − gi) minimal
makes bc maximal. In this case, we obtain
bc = E
(
δd(vi,C)s
)
, (5.2)
where C is the code and d(vi, C) denotes the Hamming distance of vi from C.
We recall that for a perfect code C the covering radius is ρ =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
and for quasi-
perfect code, we have ρ =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
+ 1, where D is the minimum distance of C (See
Section 2.6).
Theorem 5.1. We consider a [k, k′,D] linear code C, where k is the length, k′ is the
dimension, and D is the minimum distance. For any integer r and any positive bias δs,
we have
bc ≤ 2k′−k
r∑
w=0
(
k
w
)
(δws − δr+1s ) + δr+1s
where bc is a function of δs deﬁned by (5.2). Equality for any δs such that 0 < δs < 1
implies that C is perfect or quasi-perfect. In that case, the equality is reached when
taking the packing radius r = R =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
.
By taking r as the largest integer such that
∑r
w=0
(
k
w
)
≤ 2k−k′ (which is the packing
radius R =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
for perfect and quasi-perfect codes), we can see that if a perfect [k, k′]
code exists, it makes bc maximal. Otherwise, if a quasi-perfect [k, k′] code exists, it
makes bc maximal.
Proof. Let decode be an optimal deterministic decoding algorithm. The formula gives
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us that
bc = 2−k
∑
g∈C
∑
v∈decode−1(g)
δHW(v−g)s .
We deﬁne decode−1w (g) = {v ∈ decode−1(g);HW(v− g) = w} and decode−1>r(g) the union
of all decode−1w (g) for w > r. For all r, we have∑
v∈decode−1(g)
δHW(v−g)s
=
r∑
w=0
(
k
w
)
δws +
r∑
w=0
(
#decode−1w (g)−
(
k
w
))
δws +
∑
w>r
δws #decode
−1
w (g)
≤
r∑
w=0
(
k
w
)
δws +
r∑
w=0
(
#decode−1w (g)−
(
k
w
))
δws + δ
r+1
s #decode
−1
>r(g)
≤
r∑
w=0
(
k
w
)
δws + δ
r+1
s
(
#decode−1(g) −
r∑
w=0
(
k
w
))
where we used δws ≤ δr+1s for w > r, #decode−1w (g) ≤
(
k
w
)
and δws ≥ δr+1s for w ≤ r.
We further have equality if and only if the ball centered on g of radius r is included
in decode−1(g) and the ball of radius r + 1 contains decode−1(g). By summing over all
g ∈ C, we obtain the result.
So, the equality case implies that the packing radius is at least r and the covering
radius is at most r + 1. Hence, the code is perfect or quasi-perfect. Conversely, if the
code is perfect or quasi-perfect and r is the packing radius, we do have equality.
So, for quasi-perfect codes, we can compute
bc = 2k
′−k
R∑
w=0
(
k
w
)
(δws − δR+1s ) + δR+1s (5.3)
with R =
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
. For perfect codes, the formula simpliﬁes to
bc = 2k
′−k
R∑
w=0
(
k
w
)
δws . (5.4)
5.4.1 Bias of a Repetition Code
Given a [k, 1] repetition code, the optimal decoding algorithm is the majority decoding.
We have D = k, k′ = 1, R =
⌊
k−1
2
⌋
. For k odd, the code is perfect so ρ = R. For k
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even, the code is quasi-perfect so ρ = R+ 1. Using (5.3) and (5.4), we obtain
bc =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∑ k−1
2
w=0
1
2k−1
(
k
w
)
δws if k is odd
∑ k
2
−1
w=0
1
2k−1
(k
w
)
δws +
1
2k
( k
k/2
)
δ
k
2
s if k is even
We give below the biases obtained for some [k, 1] repetition codes.
[k, 1] bias
[2, 1] 12δs +
1
2
[3, 1] 34δs +
1
4
[4, 1] 38δ
2
s +
1
2δs +
1
8
[5, 1] 58δ
2
s +
5
16δs +
1
16
[6, 1] 516δ
3
s +
15
32δ
2
s +
3
16δs +
1
32
[7, 1] 3564δ
3
s +
21
64δ
2
s +
7
64δs +
1
64
[8, 1] 35128δ
4
s +
7
16δ
3
s +
7
32δ
2
s +
1
16δs +
1
128
[9, 1] 63128δ
4
s +
21
64δ
3
s +
9
64δ
2
s +
9
256δs +
1
256
[10, 1] 63256δ
5
s +
105
256δ
4
s +
15
64δ
3
s +
45
512δ
2
s +
5
256δs +
1
512
5.4.2 Bias of a Perfect Code
In previous works [GJL14, ZJW16], the authors assume a perfect code. In this case,∑R
w=0
(
k
w
)
= 2k−k
′
and we can use (5.4) to compute bc. There are not so many binary
linear codes which are perfect. Except the repetition codes with odd length, the only
ones are the trivial codes [k, k, 1] with R = ρ = 0 and bc = 1, the Hamming codes
[2
 − 1, 2
 −  − 1, 3] for  ≥ 2 with R = ρ = 1, and the Golay code [23, 12, 7] with
R = ρ = 3.
For the Hamming codes, we have
bc = 2−

1∑
w=0
(
2
 − 1
w
)
δws =
1 + (2
 − 1)δs
2

.
For the Golay code, we obtain
bc = 2−11
3∑
w=0
(
23
w
)
δws =
1 + 23δs + 253δ
2
s + 1771δ
3
s
211
.
Previously [BTV16, GJL14], the value bcw of bc(s) for any s of Hamming weight w
was approximated to
bcw = 1− 2 1
S(k, ρ)
∑
i≤ρ,
i odd
(
w
i
)
S(k −w, ρ − i),
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where w is the Hamming weight of the k-bit secret and S(k′, ρ) is the number of k′-bit
strings with weight at most ρ. Intuitively, the formula counts the number of vi− gi that
produce an odd number of xor with the 1’s of the secret (See 3.2 and [BTV16, GJL14]).
So, Guo et al. [GJL14] assumes a ﬁxed value for the weight w of the secret and considers
the probability that w is not correct. If w is lower, the actual bias is larger but if w is
larger, the computed bias is overestimated and the algorithm fails.
For instance, with a [3, 1] repetition code, the correct bias is bc = 34δs +
1
4 following
our formula. With a ﬁxed w, it is of bcw = 1 − w2 [BTV16, GJL14]. The probability of
w to be correct is
(
k
w
)
τw(1− τ)k−w. We take the example of τ = 13 so that δs = 13 .
w bcw Pr[w] Pr[w], τ =
1
3
0 1 (1− τ)3 0.2963
1 12 3τ(1− τ)2 0.4444
2 0 3τ2(1− τ) 0.2222
3 −12 τ3 0.0370
So, by taking w = 1, we have δ = bcw =
1
2 but the probability of failure is about
1
4 . Our
approach uses the average bias δ = bc = 12 .
5.4.3 Using Quasi-Perfect Codes
If C ′ is a [k − 1, k′,D] perfect code with k′ > 1 and if there exists some codewords of
odd length, we can extend C ′, i.e., add a parity bit and obtain a [k, k′] code C. Clearly,
the packing radius of C is at least
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
and the covering radius is at most
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
+1.
For k′ > 1, there is up to one possible length for making a perfect code of dimension
k′. So, C is a quasi-perfect code, its packing radius is
⌊
D−1
2
⌋
and its covering radius is⌊
D−1
2
⌋
+ 1.
If C ′ is a [k + 1, k′,D] perfect code with k′ > 1, we can puncture it, i.e., remove one
coordinate by removing one column from the generating matrix. If we chose to remove
a column which does not modify the rank k′, we obtain a [k, k′] code C. Clearly, the
packing radius of C is at least
⌊
D−1
2
⌋− 1 and the covering radius is at most ⌊D−12 ⌋. For
k′ > 1, there is up to one possible length for making a perfect code of dimension k′.
So, C is a quasi-perfect code, its packing radius is
⌊
D−1
2
⌋− 1 and its covering radius is⌊
D−1
2
⌋
.
Hence, we can use extended Hamming codes [2
, 2
 − − 1] with packing radius 1 for
 ≥ 3, punctured Hamming codes [2
 − 2, 2
 −  − 1] with packing radius 0 for  ≥ 3,
the extended Golay code [24, 12] with packing radius 3, and the punctured Golay code
[22, 12] with packing radius 2.
There actually exist many constructions for quasi-perfect linear binary codes. We list
a few in Table 5.1. We took codes listed in the existing literature [CKJS85, Table 1],
[PW72, p. 122], [GS85, p. 47], [EM05, Table 1], [CHLL97, p. 313], and [BBDF08, Table I].
In Table 5.1, k, k′, D, and R denote the length, the dimension, the minimum distance,
and the packing radius, respectively.
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Table 5.1: Perfect and Quasi-Perfect Binary Linear Codes
name type [k, k′, D] R comment ref.
P [k, k, 1], k ≥ 1 0 [∗, . . . , ∗]
r P [k,1, k], k odd k−1
2
repetition code
H P [2 − 1, 2 − 
− 1, 3], 
 ≥ 3, 1 Hamming code
G P [23, 12, 7] 3 Golay code
QP [k, k − 1, 1] 0 [∗, . . . , ∗, 0]
r QP [k,1, k], k even k
2
− 1 repetition code
eG QP [24, 12, 8] 3 extended Golay code
pG QP [22, 12, 6] 2 punctured Golay code
eH QP [2, 2 − 
− 1, 4], 
 ≥ 2 1 extended Hamming code
QP [2 − 1, 2 − 
, 1], 
 ≥ 2, 0 Hamming with an extra word
pH QP [2 − 2, 2 − 
− 1, 2], 
 ≥ 2 0 punctured Hamming
HxH QP [2 ∗ (2 − 1), 2 ∗ (2 − 
− 1)], 
 ≥ 2 1 Hamming × Hamming [CKJS85]
upack QP [2 − 2, 2 − 
− 2, 3], 
 ≥ 3 1 uniformly packed [CKJS85]
2BCH QP [2 − 1, (2 − 1)− (2 ∗ 
)], 
 ≥ 3 2 2-e.c. BCH [CKJS85]
Z QP [2 + 1, (2 + 1)− (2 ∗ 
)], 
 > 3 even 2 Zetterberg [CKJS85]
rGop QP [2 − 2, (2 − 2)− (2 ∗ 
)], 
 > 3 even 2 red. Goppa [CKJS85]
iGop QP [2, (2)− (2 ∗ 
)], 
 > 2 odd 2 irred. Goppa [CKJS85]
Mclas QP [2 − 1, (2 − 1)− 2 ∗ 
], 
 > 2 odd 2 Mclas [CKJS85]
S QP [5, 2], [9, 5], [10, 5], [11, 6] 1 Slepian [PW72]
S QP [11, 4] 2 Slepian [PW72]
FP QP [15, 9], [21, 14], [22, 15], [23, 16] 1 Fontaine-Peterson [PW72]
W QP [19, 10], [20, 11], [20, 13], [23, 14] 2 Wagner [PW72]
P QP [21, 12] 2 Prange [PW72]
FP QP [25, 12] 3 Fontaine-Peterson [PW72]
W QP [25, 15], [26, 16], [27, 17], [28, 18],
[29, 19], [30, 20], [31, 20]
1 Wagner [PW72]
GS QP [13, 7], [19, 12] 1 GS85 [GS85]
BBD QP [7, 3, 3], [9, 4, 4], [10, 6, 3], [11, 7, 3],
[12, 7, 3], [12, 8, 3], [13, 8, 3], [13, 9, 3],
[14, 9, 3], [15, 10, 3], [16, 10, 3],
[17, 11, 4], [17, 12, 3], [18, 12, 4],
[18, 13, 3], [19, 13, 3], [19, 14, 3],
[20, 14, 4]
1 BBD08 [BBDF08]
BBD QP [22, 13, 5] 2 BBD08 [BBDF08]
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5.4.4 Finding the Optimal Concatenated Code
The linear code [k, k′] is typically instantiated by a concatenation of elementary codes
for practical purposes. By “concatenation” of m codes C1, . . . , Cm, we mean the code
formed by all gi,1‖ · · · ‖gi,m obtained by concatenating any set of gi,j ∈ Cj. Decoding
v1‖ · · · ‖vm is based on decoding each vi,j in Cj independently. If all Cj are small,
this is done by a table lookup. So, concatenated codes are easy to implement and
to decode. For [k, k′] we have the concatenation of [k1, k′1], . . . , [km, k
′
m] codes, where
k1 + · · · + km = k and k′1 + · · · + k′m = k′. Let vij , gij , s′j denote the jth part of vi, gi, s′
respectively, corresponding to the concatenated [kj , k
′
j ] code. The bias of 〈vij−gij, sj〉 in
the code [kj , k
′
j ] is denoted by bcj . As 〈vi− gi, s〉 is the xor of all 〈vij − gij , sj〉, the total
bias introduced by this operation is computed as bc =
∏m
j=1 bcj and the combination
params = ([k1, k
′
1], . . . , [km, k
′
m]) is chosen such that it gives the highest bias.
The way these params are computed is the following: we start by computing the biases
for all elementary codes. I.e. we compute the biases for all codes from Table 5.1. We may
add random codes that we found interesting. (For these, we use (5.2) to compute bc.)3
Next, for each [i, j] code, we check to see if there is a combination of [i−n, j−m],[n,m]
codes that give a better bias, where [n,m] is either a repetition code, a Golay code or
a Hamming code. We illustrate below the algorithm to ﬁnd the optimal concatenated
code. This algorithm was independently proposed by Zhang et al. [ZJW16] (with perfect
codes only).
Algorithm 5.1 Finding the optimal params and bias
1: Input: k
2: Output: table for the optimal bias for each [i, j] code, 1 ≤ j < i ≤ k
3: initialize all bias(i, j) = 0
4: initialize bias(1, 1) = 1
5: initialize the bias for all elementary codes
6: for all j : 2 to k do
7: for all i : j + 1 to k do
8: for all elementary code [n,m] do
9: if |bias(i− n, j −m) · bias(n,m)| > |bias(i, j)| then
10: bias(i, j) = bias(i− n, j −m) · bias(n,m)
11: params(i, j) = params(i− n, j −m) ∪ params(n,m)
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
Using O(k) elementary codes, this procedure takes O(k3) time and we can store all
params for any combination [i, j], 1 ≤ j < i ≤ k with O(k2) memory.
3The random codes that we used are provided in Appendix A.4 of the thesis.
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5.5 The Graph of Reduction Steps
Having in mind the reduction methods described in Section 5.2, we formalize an LPN
solving algorithm in terms of ﬁnding the best chain in a graph. The intuition is the
following: in an LPN solving algorithm, we can see each reduction step as an edge
from a (k, log2 n) instance to a new instance (k
′, log2 n′) where the secret is smaller,
k′ ≤ k, we have more or less queries and the noise has a diﬀerent bias. For example,
a xor -reduce(b) reduction turns an (k, log2 n) instance with bias δ into (k
′, log2 n′) with
bias δ′ where k′ = k − b, n′ = n(n−1)
2b+1
and δ′ = δ2. By this representation, the reduction
phase represents a chain in which each edge is a reduction type moving from LPN with
parameters (k, n) to LPN with parameters (k′, n′) and that ends with an instance (ki, ni)
used to recover the ki-bit length secret by a solving method. The chain terminates by
the fast Walsh-Hadamard solving method.
We formalize the reduction phase as a chain of reduction steps in a graph G = (V,E).
The set of vertices V is composed of V = {1, . . . , k}×L where L is a set of real numbers.
For instance, we could take L = R or L = N. For eﬃciency reasons, we could even
take L = {0, . . . , η} for some bound η. Every vertex saves the size of the secret and the
logarithmic number of queries; i.e. a vertex (k, log2 n) means that we are in an instance
where the size of the secret is k and the number of queries available is n. An edge from one
vertex to another is given by a reduction step. An edge from (k, log2 n) to a (k
′, log2 n′)
has a label indicating the type of reduction and its parameters (e.g. xor -reduce(k − k′)
or code-reduce(k, k′, params)). This reduction deﬁnes some α and β coeﬃcients such that
the bias δ′ after reduction is obtained from the bias δ before the reduction by
log2 δ
′2 = α log2 δ
2 + β
where α, β ∈ R.
We denote by λL the smallest element of L which is at least equal to λ and by λL
the largest element of L which is not larger than λ. In general, we could use a rounding
function RoundL(λ) such that RoundL(λ) is in L and approximates λ.
The reduction steps described in Section 5.2 can be formalized as follows:
• sparse-secret : (k, log2 n) → (k,RoundL(log2 (n− k))) and α = 1, β = 0
• partition-reduce(b): (k, log2 n) → (k − b,RoundL(log2(n− 2b)) and α = 2, β = 0
• xor -reduce(b): (k, log2 n) → (k − b,RoundL(log2
(
n(n−1)
2b+1
)
)) and α = 2, β = 0
• drop-reduce(b): (k, log2 n) → (k − b,RoundL(log2 ( n2b ))) and α = 1, β = 0
• code-reduce(k, k′, params): (k, log2 n) → (k′, log2 n) and α = 1, β = log2 bc2, where
bc is the bias introduced by the covering code reduction using a [k, k′] linear code
deﬁned by params.
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Below, we give the formal deﬁnition of a reduction chain.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Reduction chain). Let
R = {sparse-secret , partition-reduce(b), xor -reduce(b), drop-reduce(b), code-reduce(k, k′, params)}
for k, k′, b ∈ N . A reduction chain is a sequence
(k0, log2 n0)
e1−→ (k1, log2 n1) e2−→ . . . ei−→ (ki, log2 ni),
where the change (kj−1, log2 nj−1) → (kj , log2 nj) is performed by one reduction from R,
for all 0 < j ≤ i.
A chain is simple if it is accepted by the automaton from Figure 5.1 4.
initial state 1 3 4
2 accepting state
WHT
WHT
WHT
WHT
code-reduce
drop-reduce drop-reduce
xor -reduce
drop-reduce
xor -reduce
xor -reduce
sparse-secret
xor -reduce
Figure 5.1: Automaton accepting simple chains
Remark: Restrictions for simple chains are modelled by the automaton in Figure 5.1.
We restrict to simple chains as they are easier to analyze. Indeed, sparse-secret is only
used to raise δs to make code-reduce more eﬀective. And, so far, it is hard to analyze
sequences of code-reduce steps as the ﬁrst one may destroy the uniform and high δs for
the next ones. This is why we exclude multiple code-reduce reductions in a simple chain.
So, we use up to one sparse-secret reduction, always one before code-reduce. And sparse-secret
occurs before δ decreases. For convenience, we will add a state of the automaton to the
vertex in V .
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Exact chain). An exact chain is a simple reduction chain for L = R.
I.e. RoundL is the identity function.
A chain which is not exact is called rounded.
For solving LPN we are interested in those chains that end with a vertex (ki, log2 ni)
which allows to call a WHT solving algorithm to recover the ki-bit secret. We call these
chains valid chains and we deﬁne them below.
4We simplify the automaton by removing any partition-reduce ; xor -reduce is always better than
partition-reduce .
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Deﬁnition 5.4 (Valid reduction chain). Let
(k0, log2 n0)
e1−→ (k1, log2 n1) e2−→ · · · ei−→ (ki, log2 ni)
be a reduction chain with ej = (αj , βj , .). Let δj be the bias corresponding to the vertex
(kj , log2 nj) iteratively deﬁned by δ0 = δ and log2 δ
2
j = αj log2 δ
2
j−1 + βj for j = 1, . . . , i.
We say the chain is a θ-valid reduction chain if ni satisﬁes (5.1) from page 59 for
δ′ = δi and n′ = ni.
The time complexity of a chain (e1, . . . , ei) is simply the sum of the complexity of
each reduction step e1, e2, . . . , ei and WHT. We further deﬁne the max-complexity of
a chain which is the maximum of the complexity of each reduction step and WHT. The
max-complexity is a good approximation of the complexity. Our goal is to ﬁnd a chain
with optimal complexity. What we achieve is that, given a set L, we ﬁnd a rounded
chain with optimal max-complexity up to some given precision.
5.5.1 Towards Finding the Best LPN Reduction Chain
In this subsection, we present the algorithm that helps ﬁnding the optimal valid chains
for solving LPN. As aforementioned, we try to ﬁnd the valid chain with optimal max-
complexity for solving an LPNk,τ instance in our graph G.
The ﬁrst step of the algorithm is to construct the directed graph G = (V,E). We take
the set of vertices V = {1, . . . , k} × L× {1, 2, 3, 4} which indicate the size of the secret,
the logarithmic number of queries and the state in the automaton in Figure 5.1. Each
edge e ∈ E represents a reduction step and is labelled with the following information:
(k1, log2 n1, st)
α,β,t→ (k2, log2 n2, st′) where t is one of the reduction steps and α and β
save information about how the bias is aﬀected by this reduction step.
The graph has O(k · |L|) vertices and each vertex has O(k) edges. So, the size of the
graph is O(k2 · |L|).
Thus, we construct the graph G with all possible reduction steps and from it, we try to
see what is the optimal simple rounded chain in terms of max-complexity. We present in
Algorithm 5.2 the procedure to construct the graphG that contains all possible reduction
steps with a time complexity bounded by 2η (As explained below, Algorithm 5.2 is not
really used).
The procedure of ﬁnding the optimal valid chain is illustrated in Algorithm 5.3. The
procedure of ﬁnding a chain with upper bounded max-complexity is illustrated in Al-
gorithm 5.4.
Algorithm 5.4 receives as input the parameters k and τ for the LPN instance, the
parameter θ which represents the bound on the failure probability in recovering the
secret. Parameter η represents an upper bound for the logarithmic complexity of each
reduction step. Given η, we build the graph G which contains all possible reductions with
time complexity smaller than 2η (Step 4). Note that we do not really call Algorithm 5.2.
Indeed, we do not need to store the edges of the graph. We actually keep a way to
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Algorithm 5.2 Construction of graph G
1: Input: k, τ, L, η
2: Output: graph G = (V,E) containing all the reduction steps that have a complexity
smaller than 2η
3: V = {1, . . . , k} × L× {1, . . . , 4}
4: E is the set of all ((i, η1, st), (j, η2, st
′)) labelled by (α, β, t) such that there is a
st
t−→ st′ transition in the automaton and for
5: t = sparse-secret :
6: for all η : 1 such that lcomp ≤ η do set the edge
7: where i = k, (j, η2) = (i,RoundL(log2(2
η1 − i))), α = 1, β = 0, lcomp =
minx log2(
(2η1−i)i2
log2i−log2(log2i) + i
2, i(2η1 − i) i2x + i3 + i2x+2
x
)
8: end for
9: t = partition-reduce:
10: for all (i, η1, b) such that b ≥ 1 and lcomp ≤ η do set the edge
11: where (j, η2) = (i− b,RoundL(log2 (η1 − 2b))), α = 2, β = 0, lcomp = log2 i+ η1
12: end for
13: t = xor -reduce:
14: for all (i, η1, b) such that b ≥ 1 and lcomp ≤ η do set the edge
15: where (j, η2) = (i − b,RoundL(η1 − 1 + log2 (2
η1−1
2b
))), α = 2, β = 0, lcomp =
log2 i+max(η1, η2)
16: end for
17: t = drop-reduce:
18: for all (i, η1, b) such that b ≥ 1 and lcomp ≤ η do set the edge
19: where (j, η2) = (i− b,RoundL(η1 − b)), α = 1, β = 0, lcomp = log2 b+ η1
20: end for
21: t = code-reduce:
22: for all (i, η1, j) such that j < i and lcomp ≤ η do set the edge
23: where η2 = η1, α = 1, β = log2 bc
2, lcomp = log2 i + η1, bc is the bias from the
optimal [i, j] code
24: end for
enumerate all edges going to a given vertex (in Step 12) by using the rules described in
Algorithm 5.2.
For each vertex, we iteratively deﬁne Δst and Bestst, the best reduction step to reach
a vertex and the value of the corresponding error bias. The best reduction step is the
one that maximizes the bias. We deﬁne these values iteratively until we reach a vertex
from which the WHT solving algorithm succeeds with complexity bounded by 2η . Once
we have reached this vertex, we construct the chain by going backwards, following the
Best pointers.
We easily prove what follows by induction.
Lemma 5.5. At the end of the iteration of Algorithm 5.4 for (j, η2, st
′), Δst
′
j,η2
is the
maximum of log2 δ
2, where δ is the bias obtained by a RoundL-rounded simple chain from
a vertex of form (k, η1, 0) to (j, η2, st
′) with max-complexity bounded by 2η (Δst′j,η2 = −∞
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Algorithm 5.3 Search for a rounded chain with optimal max-complexity
1: Input: k, τ, θ, precision
2: Output: a valid simple rounded chain in which rounding uses a given precision
3: set found = bruteforce  found is the best found algorithm
4: set increment = k
5: set η = k  2η is a bound on the max-complexity
6: repeat
7: set increment ← 12 increment
8: deﬁne L = {0, precision, 2× precision, . . .} ∩ [0, η − increment]
9: run (out, success) = Search(k, τ, θ, L, η − increment) with Algorithm 5.4
10: if success then
11: set found = out
12: set η = η − increment
13: end if
14: until increment ≤ precision
15: output found
if there is no such chain).
Lemma 5.6. If there exists a simple RoundL-rounded chain c ending on state (kj , ηj , stj)
and max-complexity bounded by 2η, there exists one c′ such that Δstii,ηi = log2 δ
2
i at each
step.
Proof. Let c′′ be a simple chain ending on (kj , ηj , stj) with Δ
stj
j,ηj
= log2 δ
2
j .
Let (kj−1, ηj−1, stj−1) be the preceding vertex in c′′. We apply Lemma 5.6 on this vertex
by induction to obtain a chain c′′′. Since the complexity of the last edge does not depend
on the bias and α ≥ 0 in the last edge, we construct the chain c′, by concatenating c′′′
with the last edge of c′′.
Theorem 5.7. Algorithm 5.4 ﬁnds a θ-valid simple RoundL-rounded chain for LPNk,τ
with max-complexity bounded by 2η if there exists one.
Proof. We use Lemma 5.6 and the fact that increasing δ2 keeps constraint (5.1) valid.
If we used L = R, Algorithm 5.4 would always ﬁnd a valid simple chain with bounded
max-complexity when it exists. Instead, we use rounded chains and hope that rounding
still makes us ﬁnd the optimal chain.
So, we build Algorithm 5.3. In this algorithm, we look for the minimal η for which
Algorithm 5.4 returns something by a divide and conquer algorithm. First, we set η
as being in the interval [0, k] where the solution for η = k corresponds to a brute-force
search. Then, we cut the interval in two pieces and see if the lower interval has a solution.
If it does, we iterate in this interval. Otherwise, we iterate in the other interval. We stop
once the amplitude of the interval is lower than the requested precision. The complexity
of Algorithm 5.3 is of log2
k
precision
calls to Algorithm 5.4.
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Algorithm 5.4 Search for a best LPN reduction chain with max-complexity bounded
to η
1: Input: k, τ, θ, L, η
2: Output: a valid simple rounded chain with max-complexity bounded to η
3: δ = 1− 2τ
4: Construct the graph G using Algorithm 5.2 with parameters k, τ, L, η
5: for all η1 ∈ L do
6: set Δ0k,η1 = log2 δ
2, Best0k,η1 = ⊥
7: set Δstk,η1 = −∞, Beststk,η1 = ⊥  Δst stores the best bias for a vertex (k, η1, st)
in a chain, and Bestst is the edge ending to this vertex in this chain
8: end for
9: for j : k downto 1 do  Search for the optimal chain
10: for η2 ∈ L in decreasing order do
11: set Δstj,η2 = 0, Best
st
j,n2 = ⊥ for all st
12: foreach st’ and each edge e to (j, η2, st
′)
13: set (i, η1, st) to the origin of e and α and β as deﬁned by e
14: if αΔsti,η1 + β ≥ Δst
′
j,η2
then set Δst
′
j,η2
= αΔsti,η1 + β, Best
st′
j,n2 = e
15: end if
16: end foreach
17: if η2 > 1−Δst′j,η2 + 2 log2
(
−ϕ−1(1− (1− θ)
1
2j−1 )
)
and j + log2 j ≤ η then
18: Construct the chain c ending by Bestst
′
j,η2 and output (c, true)
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: output (⊥, false)
Theorem 5.8. Algorithm 5.3 ﬁnds a θ-valid simple RoundL-rounded chain for LPNk,τ
with parameter precision, with optimal rounded max-complexity, where the rounding func-
tion approximates log2 up to precision if there exists one.
Proof. Algorithm 5.3 is a divide-and-conquer algorithm to ﬁnd the smallest η such that
Algorithm 5.4 ﬁnds a valid simple RoundL-rounded chain of max-complexity bounded
by 2η .
We can see that the complexity of Algorithm 5.4 is of O (k2 · |L|) iterations as vertices
have k possible values for the secret length and |L| possible values for the logarithmic
number of equations. So, it is linear in the size of the graph. Furthermore, each type of
edge to a ﬁxed vertex has O(k) possible origins. The memory complexity is O (k · |L|),
mainly to store the Δk,η and Bestk,η tables. We also use Algorithm 5.1 which has a
complexity O(k3) but we run it only once during precomputation. Algorithm 5.3 sets
|L| ∼ k
precision
. So, the complexity of Algorithm 5.3 is O
(
k3 + k
3
precision
× log k
precision
)
.
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5.6 Chains with a Guessing Step
In order to further improve our valid chain, we introduce a new reduction step to our
algorithm. As it is done in previous works [GJL14, BL12], we guess part of the bits of
the secret. More precisely, we assume that b bits of the secret have a Hamming weight
smaller or equal to w. The inﬂuence on the whole algorithm is more complicated: it
requires to iterate the WHT step
∑w
i=0
(w
i
)
times. The overall complexity must further
be divided by
∑w
i=0
(w
i
) (
1−δs
2
)i (1+δs
2
)w−i
. Note that this generalized guess-secret step
was used in Guo et al. [GJL14].
We formalize this step as following:
• guess-secret(b, w) guesses that b bits of the secret have a Hamming weight smaller or
equal to w. The b positions are chosen randomly. The number of queries remains
the same, the noise is the same and the size of the secret is reduced by b bits.
Thus, for this step we have
guess-secret(b, w) : k′ = k − b; n′ = n; δ′ = δ; δ′s = δ
Complexity: O(nb) (included in sparse-secret) and
the Walsh transform has to be iterated
∑w
i=0
(
w
i
)
times and
the complexity of the whole algorithm is divided by∑w
i=0
(w
i
) (
1−δs
2
)i (1+δs
2
)w−i
This step may be useful for a sparse secret, i.e. τ is small, as then we reduce the size
of the secret with a very small cost. In order to accommodate this new step, we would
have to add a transition from state 3 to state 3 in the automaton that accepts the simple
chains (See Figure 5.1).
To ﬁnd the optimal chain using guess-secret(b, w), we have to make a loop over all
possible b and all possible w. We run the full search O(k2) times. The total complexity
is thus O
(
k5
precision
× log k
precision
)
.
5.7 Results
We illustrate in this section the results obtained by running Algorithm 5.4 for diﬀerent
LPN instances. They vary from taking k = 32 to k = 768, with the noise levels:
0.05, 0.1, 0.125, 0.2 and 0.25. In Table 5.2, we display the logarithmic time complexity
we found for solving LPN without using guess-secret .5
5Complete results are provided in Appendix A.5 and A.6.
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τ
k
32 48 64 100 256 512 768
0.05 13.911.30.1 14.5
13.0
0.1c 16.0
14.4
0.1c 20.5
18.5
0.1c 36.7
34.4
0.1c 57.8
55.1
0.1c 76.6
74.0
0.1c
0.1 15.012.70.1 18.6
16.4
0.1 21.6
19.4
0.1c 27.6
25.4
0.1c 46.7
44.2
0.1c 73.7
70.9
0.1c 99.0
96.0
0.1c
0.125 15.713.50.1 19.3
17.0
0.1 22.9
20.5
0.1 28.9
26.3
0.1 49.9
47.3
0.1c 78.8
76.2
0.1c 105.9
103.0
0.1c
0.2 17.014.80.1 21.2
19.2
0.1 24.4
22.0
0.1 32.1
29.7
0.1 56.3
53.8
0.1c 89.0
86.4
0.1c 121.0
118.2
0.1c
0.25 18.416.30.1 22.3
20.4
0.1 26.9
24.6
0.1 32.9
30.7
0.1 59.5
56.9
0.1 94.7
92.0
0.1c 127.3
124.6
0.1c
entry of form abc···: a = log2 complexity, b = log2max-complexity,
c = precision; subscript c means that a code-reduce is used
Table 5.2: Logarithmic time complexity on solving LPN without guess-secret
τ
k
32 48 64 100 256 512 768
0.05 11.810.90.1cg13o 13.0
12.5
0.1cg23o 14.4
13.7
0.1cg38o 17.2
16.2
0.1cg75o 30.1
28.0
0.1cg178o 49.6
47.3
1cg417o 68.1
66.0
1cg682o
0.1 12.411.60.1cg23o 15.2
14.2
0.1cg37o 17.7
16.8
0.1cg52o 24.0
22.1
0.1cg77o 46.0
43.5
0.1cg100o 73.7
71.1
1cg2 99.2
96.3
1cg5
0.125 13.312.40.1cg26o 16.5
15.5
0.1cg39o 20.6
18.6
0.1cg36o 27.1
24.8
0.1cg47o 49.9
47.3
0.1c 79.0
76.2
1cg1 106.2
103.4
1cg4
0.2 17.014.80.1o 21.2
19.2
0.1o 24.4
22.0
0.1 32.1
29.7
0.1 56.3
53.8
0.1cg1 89.3
86.8
1cg3 121.1
118.6
1
0.25 18.416.30.1 22.3
20.4
0.1 26.9
24.6
0.1 32.9
30.7
0.1 59.5
56.9
0.1 94.8
92.4
1cg2 127.6
125.0
1cg3
entry of form abc···: a = log2 complexity, b = log2max-complexity, c = precision
subscript c means that a code-reduce is used
subscript o means that a only 1 bit of the secret is found by WHT
subscript gb means that a guess-secret(b, ·) is used
Table 5.3: Logarithmic time complexity on solving LPN with guess-secret
Sequence of chains. If we analyse in more detail one of the chains that we obtained,
e.g. the chain for LPN512,0.125, we can see that it ﬁrst uses a sparse-secret . Afterwards,
the secret is reduced by applying ﬁve times the xor -reduce and one code-reduce at the end
of the chain. With a total complexity of 279.46 and θ < 33% it recovers 64 bits of the
secret. 6
6The detailed results for the full recovery of the secret of this LPN instance are given in Appendix A.7.
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(512, 63.3)
sparse-secret−−−−−−→ (512, 63.3) xor-reduce(59)−−−−−−−−→ (453, 66.6) xor-reduce(65)−−−−−−−−→
(388, 67.2)
xor-reduce(66)−−−−−−−−→ (322, 67.4) xor-reduce(66)−−−−−−−−→ (256, 67.8) xor-reduce(67)−−−−−−−−→
(189, 67.6)
code-reduce−−−−−→ (64, 67.6) WHT−−−→
The code used is a [189, 64] concatenation made of ten random codes: one instance
of a [18, 6] code, ﬁve instances of a [19, 6] code, and four instances of a [19, 7] code.
By manually tuning the number of equations without rounding, we can obtain with
n = 263.299 a complexity of 278.85. This is the value from Table 5.4.
On the guess-secret reduction. Our results show that the guess-secret step does not
bring any signiﬁcant improvement. If we compare Table 5.2 with Table 5.3, we can
see that in few cases the guess step improves the total complexity. For k ≥ 512, some
results are not better than Table 5.2. This is most likely due to the lower precision used
in Table 5.3.
We can see several cases where, at the end of a chain with guess-secret , only one bit
of the secret is recovered by WHT. If only 1 bit of the secret is recovered by non-
bruteforce methods, the next chain for LPNk−1,τ will have to be run several times, given
the guess-secret step used in the chain for LPNk,τ . Thus, it might happen that the ﬁrst
chain does not dominate the total complexity. So, our strategy to use sequences of chains
has to be revised, but most likely, the ﬁnal result will not be better than sequences of
chains without guess-secret . So, we should rather avoid these chains ending with 1 bit
recovery.
There is no case where a guess-secret without a chain ending with 1 bit brings any
improvement.
On using random codes. With our results, we expand the pool of codes that can
be used in the reduction code-reduce: besides perfect codes, we add quasi-perfect codes
and some small random codes that we generated. One could wonder if these results
could be improved further by using a big code, so that we do not split the reduction
among several small codes. The challenge in big codes is to ﬁnd a random code that
introduces a large bias by having a small covering radius while still decreasing the size
of the secret considerably (i.e. a code [k, k − 1,D] might not be interesting for our
algorithm). By selecting codes used in steganography, we can improve further our results:
for LPN512,0.125 from a complexity of 2
78.85 we get a complexity of 278.11 7. The other
results have a similar improvement.
Comparing the results. For practical values we compare our results with the previ-
ous work [GJL14, LF06, ZJW16, BTV16].
7Personal communication with Simona Samardjiska.
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(k, τ) ASIACRYPT’14 [GJL14] EUROCRYPT’16 [ZJW16] our results
(512, 0.125)
286.96(279.9) (proceedings)
281.90(279.7) (presentation) 10
280.09(274.73) 278.85
(532, 0.125) 288.62(281.82) 282.17(276.90) 281.02
(592, 0.125) 297.71(288.07) 289.32(283.84) 287.57
Table 5.4: Time complexity to solve LPN (in bit operations). These complexities are
based on the formulas from Chapter 5.2 with the most favourable covering codes we
constructed from our pool, with adjusted data complexity to reach a failure probability
bounded by 33%. Originally claimed complexities by [GJL14] and [ZJW16] are under
parentheses.
From the work of ASIACRYPT’14 [GJL14] and EUROCRYPT’16 [ZJW16], we have
LPN512,0.125 which can be solved in time complexity of 2
79.9 (with more precise complexity
estimates). The comparison is shown in Table 5.4.8 9
Recall that the previous work on LPN analysed code-reduce only with perfect codes. In
Table 5.4, our computed complexities are based on the real codes that we built with our
bigger pool to have a fair comparison.
We do better, provide concrete codes and we even remove the guess-secret step using a
code in an optimized way. Thus, the results of Algorithm 5.4 improve all the existing
results on solving LPN.
We put in Appendices A.5- A.8 details of our results: the complete list of the chains
we obtain (for Table 5.2 and Table 5.3), an example of complete solving algorithm, and
an analysis of the results from [GJL14] and [ZJW16] to obtain Table 5.4.
8As for [ZJW16], we only reported the results based on LF2 which are better than with LF1, as the
LF(4) operation is incorrect. Details about this were presented in and [BV16a] and Section 3.7.
9Detailed results are provided in Appendix A.8.
10http://des.cse.nsysu.edu.tw/asiacrypt2014/doc/1-1_SolvingLPNUsingCoveringCodes.pdf
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Chapter6
How to Sequentialize Independent
Parallel Attacks
In this chapter, we present a new framework that allows us to improve the complexity of
solving LPN when given only a polynomial number of queries. The same framework can
be adapted to several other problems, e.g. password guessing. The personal contribution
in this chapter is a joint work with Serge Vaudenay that was published in [BV15].
Structure of the Chapter. Section 6.1 introduces the scenario we are working in
and connects it with existing results. Section 6.3 formalizes the problem we solve, i.e.
what is the optimal strategy for an adversary that wants to succeed in guessing a key
from a sequence of independent keys, and presents a few useful results. In Section 6.4,
we characterize the optimal strategies and show that they can be given a special regular
structure. We then apply our results in Section 6.5 with LPN and password recovery.
Finally, in Section 6.6, we study how the strategies are shaped by the distribution of the
keys.
6.1 General Framework and Related Work
We have a framework where we assume that there are an inﬁnite number of independent
keys K1,K2, . . . and that we want to ﬁnd at least one of these keys by trials with minimal
complexity. Each key search can be stopped and resumed. The problem is to ﬁnd the
optimal strategy to run several partial key searches in a sequence. One restriction to
our framework is that we assume a scenario where one can mount several independent
attacks on a single CPU. I.e. one cannot run key searches in parallel.
In this optimization problem, we assume that the distributions Di for each Ki are
known. We denote D = (D1,D2, . . .). We consider the problem of guessing a key Ki,
drawn following distribution Di, which is not necessarily uniform. We assume that we
try all key values exhaustively from the ﬁrst to the last following a ﬁxed ordering (we
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could assume that this ordering follows a decreasing likelihood but this is not necessary).
If we stop the key search on Ki after m trials, the sequence of trials is denoted by
ii · · · i = im. It has a worst-case complexity m and a probability of success which we
denote by PrD(i
m).
Instead of running parallel key searches in sequence, we could consider any other
attack which decomposes into steps of the same complexity and in which each step has
a speciﬁc probability to be the succeeding one. We assume that the ith attack has a
probability PrD(i
m) to succeed withinm steps and that each step has complexity 1. The
fundamental problem is to wonder how to run steps of these attacks in a sequence so
that we minimize the complexity until one attack succeeds. For instance, we could run
attack 1 for up to m steps and decide to give up and try again with attack 2 if it fails for
attack 1, and so on. We denote by s = 1m2m3m · · · this strategy. Unsurprisingly, when
the Di’s are the same, the average complexity of s is the ratio
CD(1
m)
PrD(1m)
where CD(1
m) is
the expected complexity of the strategy 1m which only runs attack 1 for m steps1 and
PrD(1
m) is its probability of success.
Traditionally, when we want to compare single-target attacks with diﬀerent complexity
C and probability of success p, we use as a rule of the thumb to compare the ratio Cp .
Quite often, we have a continuum of attacks C(m) with a number of steps limited to a
variable m and we tune m so that p(m) is a constant such as 12 . Indeed, the curve of
m → C(m)p(m) is often decreasing (so has an L shape) or decreasing then increasing (with a U
shape) and it is optimal to target p(m) = 12 . But sometimes, the curve can be increasing
with a Γ shape. In this case, it is better to run an attack with very low probability of
success and to try again until this succeeds. In some papers, e.g. [HVLN15], we consider
min C(m)p(m) as a complexity metric to compare attacks. Our framework justiﬁes this choice.
LPN falls in the aforementioned scenario of guessing a k-bit biased noise vector by a
simple transformation. Work on breaking cryptosystems with biased keys was also done
in [MS91].
The guessing game that we describe in our framework also matches well the password
guessing scenario where an attacker tries to gain access to a system by hacking an
account of an employee. There exists an extensive work on the cryptanalytic time-
memory tradeoﬀs for password guessing [ABC15, Hel80, Oec03, AC13, NS05, AJO05],
but the game we analyse here requires no pre-computation done by the attacker.
6.2 Our Contribution
We develop a formalism to compare strategies and derive some useful lemmas. We show
that when we can run an inﬁnite number of independent attacks of the same distribution,
an optimal strategy is of the form 1m2m3m · · · and it has complexity
min
m
CD(1
m)
PrD(1m)
1CD(1
m) can be lower than m since there is a probability to succeed before reaching the mth step.
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for some “magic” value m. This justiﬁes the rule of thumb to compare attacks with
diﬀerent probabilities of success.
When the probability that an attack succeeds at each new step decreases (e.g., because
we try possible key values in decreasing order of likelihood), there are two remarkable
extreme cases: m = n (where n is the maximal number of steps) corresponds to the
normal single-target exhaustive search with a complexity equal to the guesswork en-
tropy [Mas94] of the distribution; m = 1 corresponds to trying attacks for a single step
until it works, with complexity 2−H∞ , where H∞ is the min-entropy of the distribution.
When looking at the “magic” value m in terms of the distribution D, we observe that
in many cases there is a phase transition: when D is very close to uniform, we have
m = n. As soon as it becomes slightly biased, we have m = 1. There is no graceful
decrease from m = n to m = 1.
We also treat the case where we have a ﬁnite number |D| of independent attacks to
run. We show that there is an optimal “magic” sequence m1,m2, . . . such that an optimal
strategy has form
1m12m1 · · · |D|m11m22m2 · · · |D|m2 · · ·
The best strategy is ﬁrst to run all attacks for m1 steps in a sequence then to continue
to run them for m2 steps in a sequence, and so on.
Although our results look pretty natural, we show that there are distributions making
the analysis counter-intuitive. Proving these results is actually non trivial.
We apply this formalism to LPN by guessing the noise vector then performing a Gaus-
sian elimination to extract the secret. The optimal m decreases as the probability τ to
have an error in a parity bit decreases from 12 . For τ =
1
2 , the optimal m corresponds
to a normal exhaustive search. For τ < 12 − ln 22k , where k is the length of the secret, the
optimal m is 1: this corresponds to guessing that we have no noise at all. So, there is a
phase transition.
Furthermore, for LPN with τ = k−
1
2 , which is what is used in several cryptographic
constructions, the obtained complexity is poly · e
√
k which is much better than the usual
poly · 2 klog2 k that we obtain for variants of the BKW algorithm [BTV16]. More generally,
we obtain a complexity of poly · e−k ln(1−τ). It is not better than the BKW variants for
constant τ but becomes interesting when τ < ln 2log2 k
.
When the number of samples is limited in the LPN problem with τ = k−
1
2 , we can
still solve it with complexity eO(
√
k(ln k)2) which is better than eO(
k
ln ln k ) with the BKW
variants [Lyu05].
For password search, we tried several empirical distributions of passwords and again
obtained that the optimal m is m = 1. So, the complexity is 2−H∞ .
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(K1,K2,...)
increment ti
A
STEP(i)
1Ki=ti
Figure 6.1: The STEP game
6.3 The STEP Game
In this section, we formalize our framework by addressing the fundamental question of
what is the best strategy to succeed in at least one attack when we can step several
independent attacks. Let D = (D1,D2, . . .) be a tuple of independent distributions. If
it is ﬁnite, |D| denotes the number of distributions.
We formalize our framework as a game where we have a ppt adversary A and an oracle
that has a sequence of keys (K1,K2, . . .) where Ki ← Di. At the beginning, the oracle
assigns the keys according to their distribution. These distributions are known to the
adversary A. The adversary will test each key Ki by exhaustive search following a given
ordering of possible values. We can assume that values are sorted by decreasing order
of likelihood to obtain a minimal complexity but this is not necessary in our analysis.
We only assume a ﬁxed order. So, our framework generalizes to other types of attacks
in which we cannot choose the order of the steps. Each test on Ki corresponds to a step
in the exhaustive search for Ki. In general, we write “i” in a sequence to denote that we
run one new step of the ith attack. The sequence of “i”s deﬁnes a strategy s. It can be
ﬁnite or not. The sequence of steps we follow is thus a sequence of indices. For instance,
im means “run the Ki search for m steps”.
The oracle is an algorithm that has a special command: STEP(i). When queried with
the command STEP(i), the oracle runs one more step of the ith attack ( so, it increments a
counter ti and tests if Ki = ti, assuming that possible key values are numbered from 1).
If this happens, then the adversary wins. The adversary wins as soon as one attack
succeeds (i.e., he guesses one of the keys from the sequence K1,K2, . . . ).
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Distributions). A distribution Di over a set of size n is a sequence of
probabilities Di = (p1, . . . , pn) of sum 1 such that pj ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , n. We assume
without loss of generality that pn 
= 0 (Otherwise, we decrease n). We can equivalently
specify the distribution Di in an incremental way by a sequence Di = [p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n] (denoted
with square brackets) such that
p′j =
pj
pj + · · ·+ pn pj = p
′
j(1− p′1) · · · (1− p′j−1)
for j = 1, . . . , n.
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We have PrD(i
j) = p1 + · · · + pj = 1 − (1 − p′1) · · · (1 − p′j), the probability of the j
ﬁrst values under Di.
When considering the key search, it may be useful to assume that distributions are
sorted by decreasing likelihood. We note that the equivalent condition to pj ≥ pj+1 with
the incremental description is 1
p′j
+ j ≤ 1
p′j+1
+ j + 1, for j = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Strategies). Let D be a sequence of distributions D = (D1, . . . ,D|D|)
(where |D| can be inﬁnite or not). A strategy for D is a sequence s of indices between
1 and |D|. It corresponds to Algorithm 6.1. We let PrD(s) be the probability that the
Algorithm 6.1 Strategy s in the STEP game
1: initialize attacks 1, . . . , |D|
2: for j = 1 to |s| do
3: STEP(sj): run one more step of the attack sj and stop if succeeded
4: end for
5: stop (the algorithm fails)
strategy succeeds and CD(s) be the expected number of STEP when running the algorithm
until it stops. We say that the strategy is full if PrD(s) = 1 and that it is partial otherwise.
For example for s = 11223344 · · · , Algorithm 6.1 tests the ﬁrst two values for each
key.
We deﬁne the distribution that the keys are not among the already tested ones.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Residual distribution). Let D = (D1, . . . ,D|D|) be a sequence of distri-
butions and let s be a strictly partial strategy for D (i.e., PrD(s) < 1). We denote by
“|¬s” the residual distribution in the case where the strategy s does not succeed, i.e., the
event ¬s occurs.
We let #occs(i) denote the number of occurrences of i in s. We have
D|¬s =
(
D1|¬1#occs(1), . . . ,D|D||¬|D|#occs(|D|)
)
where Di|¬iti = [p′i,ti+1, . . . , p′i,ni ] if Di = [p′i,1, . . . , p′i,ni ]. Hence, deﬁning distributions
in the incremental way makes the residual distribution being just a shift of the original
one.
We write PrD(s
′|¬s) = PrD|¬s(s′) and CD(s′|¬s) = CD|¬s(s′).
Next, we prove a list of useful lemmas in order to compute complexities, compare
strategies, etc.
Lemma 6.4 (Success probability). Let s be a strategy for D. The success probability is
given by
Pr
D
(s) = 1−
|D|∏
i=1
Pr
Di
(¬i#occs(i))
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Proof. The failure corresponds to the case where for all i, Ki is not in {1, . . . ,#occs(i)}.
The independence of the Ki implies the result.
Lemma 6.5 (Complexity of concatenated strategies). Let ss′ be a strategy for D ob-
tained by concatenating the sequences s and s′. If PrD(s) = 1, we have PrD(ss′) =
PrD(s) and CD(ss
′) = CD(s). Otherwise, we have
Pr
D
(ss′) = Pr
D
(s) +
(
1− Pr
D
(s)
)
Pr
D
(s′|¬s)
CD(ss
′) = CD(s) +
(
1− Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s
′|¬s) .
Proof. The ﬁrst equation is trivial from the deﬁnition of residual distributions and con-
ditional probabilities.
The preﬁx strategy s succeeds with probability PrD(s). Let c be the complexity of
s conditioned to the event that s succeeds. Clearly, the complexity of ss′ conditioned
to this event is equal to c. The complexity of ss′ conditioned to the opposite event
is equal to |s| + CD(s′|¬s). So, CD(ss′) = PrD(s)c + (1 − PrD(s))(|s| + CD(s′|¬s)).
The complexity of s conditioned to the event that s fails is equal to |s|. So, CD(s) =
PrD(s)c+ (1− PrD(s))|s|. From these two equations, we obtain the result.
Lemma 6.6 (Complexity with incremental distributions). Let Di = [p
′
i,1, . . . , p
′
i,ni
] and
let s be a strategy for D = (D1,D2, . . .). We have
Pr
D
(s) = 1−
|s|∏
t′=1
(1− p′st′ ,#occs1···st′ (st′))
CD(s) =
|s|∑
t=1
t−1∏
t′=1
(1− p′st′ ,#occs1···st′ (st′)) .
Proof. By induction, the probability that the strategy fails on the ﬁrst t − 1 steps is
qt =
∏t−1
t′=1(1− p′st′ ,#occs1···st′ (st′ )). We can express CD(s) =
∑|s|
t=1 qt. So, we can deduce
PrD(s) and CD(s).
Example 6.3.1. For D1 = (p1, . . . , pn) = [p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n] and m ≤ n, due to Lemma 6.6
we have
Pr
D
(1m) = p1 + · · ·+ pm = 1− (1− p′1) · · · (1− p′m)
and
CD(1
m) =
m∑
t=1
t−1∏
j=1
(1− p′j)
=
m∑
t=1
(pt + · · ·+ pn) = p1 + 2p2 + · · · +mpm +mpm+1 + · · ·+mpn .
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The second equality uses the relations from Deﬁnition 6.1.
For the next results, we analyse strategies where the same number of guesses are done
for several keys (e.g. 1m2m · · · ). We want to concatenate an isomorphic copy w of a
strategy v to another strategy u. For this, we make sure that w and u have no index in
common.
Deﬁnition 6.7 (Disjoint copy of a strategy). Two strategies v and w are isomorphic if
there exists an injective mapping ϕ such that wt = ϕ(vt) for all t and Dϕ(i) = Di for
all i. So, CD(v) = CD(w). Let u and v be two strategies for D. Whenever possible,
we deﬁne a new strategy w = newu(v) such that v and w are isomorphic and w has no
index in common with u.
We can deﬁne it by recursion: if w1 = ϕ(v1), . . . , wt−1 = ϕ(vt−1) are already deﬁned
and ϕ(vt) is not, we set it to the smallest index i (if exists) which does not appear in u
nor in w1, . . . , wt−1 and such that Di = Dvt .
For instance, if v = 1m, all Di are equal, and i is the minimal index which does not
appear in u, we have newu(v) = i
m.
Lemma 6.8 (Complexity of a repetition of disjoint copies). Let s be a non-empty strategy
for D. We deﬁne new strategies s+1, s+2, . . ., disjoint copies of s, by recursion as follows:
s+r = newss+1···s+(r−1)(s). We assume that s+1, s+2, . . . , s+(r−1) can be constructed. If
PrD(s) = 0, then
CD(ss+1s+2 · · · s+(r−1)) = r · CD(s).
Otherwise, we have
CD(ss+1s+2 · · · s+(r−1)) =
1− (1− PrD(s))r
PrD(s)
CD(s) .
For r going to ∞, we respectively obtain CD(ss+1s+2 · · · ) = +∞ and
CD(ss+1s+2 · · · ) = CD(s)
PrD(s)
.
For instance, for s = 1m and Di all equal, the disjoint isomorphic copies of s are
s+r = (1 + r)
m. I.e., we run m steps the (1 + r)th attack. So, ss+1s+2 · · · s+(r−1) =
1m2m · · · rm.
Proof. We prove it by induction on r. This is trivial for r = 1. Let s¯r = ss+1s+2 · · · s+r.
If it is true for r − 2, then
CD(s¯r−1) = CD(s¯r−2) + (1− Pr
D
(s¯r−2))CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1−(1−PrD(s))r−1
PrD(s)
CD(s) + (1− PrD(s¯r−2))CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2) if PrD(s) > 0
(r − 1) · CD(s) + (1− PrD(s¯r−2))CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2) if PrD(s) = 0
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Clearly, we have 1−PrD(s¯r−2) = (1−PrD(s))r−1 and CD(s+(r−1)|¬s¯r−2) = CD(s). So,
we obtain the result.
Example 6.3.2. For all Di equal, if we let s = 1
m, we can compute
CD(1
m2m · · · rm) = 1− (1− PrD(1
m))r
PrD(1m)
CD(1
m)
=
1− (pm+1 + · · · + pn)r
p1 + · · ·+ pm (p1 + 2p2 + · · ·+mpm +mpm+1 + · · ·+mpn)
We now consider r = ∞. For an inﬁnite number of i.i.d distributions we have
CD(1
m2m · · · ) = CD(1
m)
PrD(1m)
=
p1 + 2p2 + · · ·+mpm +mpm+1 + · · · +mpn
p1 + · · ·+ pm
=
∑m
i=1 ipi +m(1− p1 + · · · + pm)
p1 + · · · + pm
= Gm +m
(
1
PrDi(1
m)
− 1
)
where Gm = CD1|1m(1
m) and D1|1m = ( p1PrD1(1m) , . . . ,
pm
PrD1 (1
m)). If D1 is ordered, Gm
corresponds to the guesswork entropy of the key with distribution D1|1m.
We can see two extreme cases for s = 1m2m · · · . On one end, we have a strategy of
exhaustively searching the key until it is found, i.e. take m = n. On the other extreme,
we have a strategy where the adversary tests just one key before switching to another
key, i.e. m = 1. For the sequences s = 12 · · · and s = 1n2n · · · , i.e. m = 1 and m = n,
when D1 is ordered by decreasing likelihood, we obtain the following expected complexity:
m = 1 ⇒ CD(12 · · · ) = 1
p1
= 2−H∞(D1)
m = n ⇒ CD(1n2n · · · ) = CD(1n) = Gn,
where H∞(D1) and Gn denote the min-entropy and the guesswork entropy of the distri-
bution D1, respectively.
We now deﬁne a way to compare partial strategies.
Deﬁnition 6.9 (Strategy comparison). We deﬁne
minCD(s) = inf
s′;PrD(ss′)=1
CD(ss
′)
the inﬁmum of CD(ss
′), i.e. the greatest of its lower bounds. We write s ≤D s′ if and
only if minCD(s) ≤ minCD(s′). A strategy s is optimal if minCD(s) = minCD(∅), where
∅ is the empty strategy (i.e. the strategy running no step at all).
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So, s is better than s′ if we can reach lower complexities by starting with s instead of
s′. The partial strategy s is optimal if we can still reach the optimal complexity when
we start by s.
Lemma 6.10 (Best preﬁxes are best strategies). If u and v are permutations of each
other, we have u ≤D v if and only if CD(u) ≤ CD(v).
Proof. Note that PrD(u) = 1 is equivalent to PrD(v) = 1. If PrD(u) = 1, it holds that
minCD(u) = CD(u) and minCD(v) = CD(v). So, the result is trivial in this case. Let us
now assume that PrD(u) < 1 and PrD(v) < 1. For any s
′, by using Lemma 6.5 we have
CD(us
′) = CD(u) +
(
1− Pr
D
(u)
)
CD(s
′|¬u)
So,
inf
s′;PrD(us′)=1
CD(us
′) = CD(u) +
(
1− Pr
D
(u)
)
inf
s′;PrD(us′)=1
CD(s
′|¬u)
The same holds for v. Since u and v are permutations of each other, we have D|¬u =
D|¬v. So, PrD(us′) = PrD(vs′) and CD(s′|¬u) = CD(s′|¬v). Hence, inf CD(s′|¬u) =
inf CD(s
′|¬v). Furthermore, we have PrD(u) = PrD(v). So, minCD(u) ≤ minCD(v) is
equivalent to CD(u) ≤ CD(v).
6.4 Optimal Strategy
The question we address in this chapter is: what is the optimal strategy for the adversary
so that he obtains the best complexity in our STEP formalism? That is, we try to ﬁnd
the optimal sequence s for Algorithm 6.1. At a ﬁrst glance, we may think that a greedy
strategy, where we always make a step which is the most likely to succeed, is an optimal
strategy. We show below that this is wrong. Sometimes, it is better to run a series of
unlikely steps in one given attack because we can then run a much more likely one of
the same attack after these steps are completed. However, criteria to ﬁnd this strategy
are not trivial at all.
The greedy algorithm is based on looking at the i for which the next applicable p′j in
Di is the largest. With our formalism, this deﬁnes as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.11 (Greedy strategy). Let s be a strategy for D. We say that s is greedy
if
Pr
D
(st|¬s1 · · · st−1) = max
i
Pr
D
(i|¬s1 · · · st−1)
for t = 1, . . . , |s|.
The following example shows that the greedy strategy is not always optimal.
87
Example 6.4.1. We take |D| = ∞ and all Di equal to Di = (23 , 736 , 536) = [23 , 712 , 1].
After testing the ﬁrst key, we have D|¬1 = (D′,D2,D3, . . .) with D′ = ( 712 , 512) = [ 712 , 1].
Since 23 >
7
12 , the greedy algorithm would then test a new key and continue testing new
keys. I.e., we would have s = 1234 · · · as a greedy strategy. By applying Lemma 6.5, the
complexity is solution to c = 1 + 13c, i.e., c =
3
2 . However, the one-key strategy s = 111
has complexity
2
3
+ 2
7
36
+ 3
5
36
=
53
36
<
3
2
so the greedy strategy is not the best one.
Remark: The above counterexample works even when |D| is ﬁnite. If we take D =
(D1,D2) with Di = (
2
3 ,
7
36 ,
5
36 ) = [
2
3 ,
7
12 , 1], the greedy approach would test the strategy
s = 1211 that has a complexity of
1 +
1
3
(
1 +
1
3
(
1 +
5
12
· 1
))
=
161
108
.
This is greater than 5336 , which is the complexity of the strategy 111.
Next, we note that we may have no optimal strategy as the following example shows.
Example 6.4.2 (Distribution with no optimal strategy). Let qi be an increasing se-
quence of probabilities which tends towards 1 without reaching it. Let Di = [qi, qi, . . . , qi, 1]
of support n. We have C(in) = 1qi (1 − (1 − qi)n) which tends towards 1 as i grows. So,
1 is the best lower bound of the complexity of full strategies. But there is no full strategy
of complexity 1.
When the number of diﬀerent distributions is ﬁnite, optimal strategies exist.
Lemma 6.12 (Existence of an optimal full strategy). Let D = (D1,D2, . . .) be a sequence
of distributions. We assume that we have in D a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent distributions.
There exists a full strategy s such that CD(s) is minimal.
Proof. Let c = inf CD(s) over all full strategies s. c is well deﬁned. Essentially, we want
to prove that c is reached by one strategy, i.e. that the inﬁmum is a minimum. First, if
c = ∞, all full strategies have inﬁnite complexity, and the result is trivial. So, we now
assume that c < +∞ and we prove the result by a diagonal argument.
We now construct s = s1s2 · · · by recursion. We assume that s1s2 · · · sr is constructed
such that minC(s1s2 · · · sr) = c. We concatenate s1, . . . , sr to im where m is such that
PrD[i
m−1|¬s1 · · · sr] = 0 and PrD[im|¬s1 · · · sr] > 0. The values of i to try are the
ones such that i appears in s1, . . . , sr (we have a ﬁnite number of them), and the ones
which do not appear, but we can try only one for each diﬀerent Di. We take the choice
minimizing minC(s1s2 · · · srim) and set sr+1 = im. So, we construct a strategy s.
If one key Ki is tested until exhaustion, we have PrD(s) = 1. If no key is tested
until exhaustion, there is an inﬁnite number of keys with same distribution Di which are
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tested. If p = PrD[i
m] is the nonzero probability with the smallest m of this distribution,
there is an inﬁnite number of tests which succeed with probability p. So, PrD(s) ≥
1− (1− p)∞ = 1. In all cases, as s has a probability to succeed of 1, s is a full strategy.
What remains to be proven is that CD(s) = c. We now denote by si the ith step of s.
Let qt be the probability that s fails on the ﬁrst t − 1 steps. We have CD(s) =∑|s|
t=1 qt. Let ε > 0. For each r, by construction, there exists a tail strategy v such that
CD(s1 · · · sr−1v) ≤ c + ε. Since qt is also the probability that s1 · · · sr−1v fails on the
ﬁrst t − 1 steps for t ≤ r, we have ∑rt=1 qt ≤ CD(s1 · · · sr−1v) ≤ c + ε. This holds for
all r. So, we have CD(s) ≤ c + ε. Since this holds for all ε > 0, we have CD(s) ≤ c.
Consequently, CD(s) = c: s is an optimal and full strategy.
The following two subsections show what is the structure of an optimal strategy.
6.4.1 Optimal Strategy for an Inﬁnite Number of Distributions
Theorem 6.13. Let D = (D1,D2, . . .) be a sequence of distributions. We assume that
we have in D a ﬁnite number of pairwise diﬀerent distributions but an inﬁnite number
of copies of each of them in D. Then, there exists a sequence of indices i1 < i2 < · · ·
and an integer m such that Di1 = Di2 = · · · and s = im1 im2 · · · is an optimal strategy of
complexity
CD(i
m
1 )
PrD(i
m
1 )
.
This result can be translated in: if we can run independent copies of several algorithms
and that the probability that the ith one succeeds afterm steps is PrD(i
m) with complex-
ity CD(i
m), the best strategy to make at least one algorithm succeed is to run iteratively
some copies of a single algorithm for m steps, for some magic value m. The complexity
is CD(i
m)
PrD(im)
.
To prove the result, we ﬁrst state a useful lemma.
Lemma 6.14 (Is it better to do s or s′ ﬁrst?). If s and s′ are non-empty and have
no index in common (i.e., if st 
= s′t′ for all t and t′), then ss′ ≤D s′s if and only if
CD(s)
PrD(s)
≤ CD(s′)PrD(s′) in [0,+∞], with the convension that
c
p = +∞ for c > 0 and p = 0.
Proof. Due to Lemma 6.5, when PrD(s) < 1 we have
CD(ss
′) = CD(s) +
(
1− Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s
′|¬s) .
Since s′ does not make use of the distributions which are dropped in D|¬s, we have
CD(s
′|¬s) = CD(s′). So,
CD(ss
′) = CD(s) +
(
1− Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s
′) .
This is also clearly the case when PrD(s) = 1. Similarly,
CD(s
′s) = CD(s′) +
(
1− Pr
D
(s′)
)
CD(s) .
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So, CD(ss
′) ≤ CD(s′s) is equivalent to
CD(s) +
(
1− Pr
D
(s)
)
CD(s
′) ≤ CD(s′) +
(
1− Pr
D
(s′)
)
CD(s) .
Hence, this inequality is equivalent to CD(s)PrD(s) ≤
CD(s
′)
PrD(s′)
.
We can now prove Th. 6.13.
Proof of Th. 6.13. Due to Lemma 6.12, we know that optimal full strategies exist. Let
s be one of these. We let i be the index of an arbitrary key which is tested in s. We
can write s = u0i
m1u1i
m2 · · · imrur where i appears in no uj and mj > 0 for all j, and
u1, . . . , ur−1 are non-empty.
Since s is optimal, by permuting imj and either uj−1 or uj , we obtain larger complex-
ities. So, by applying Lemma 6.14, we obtain
CD(i
m1)
PrD(im1)
≤ CD(u1|¬u0)
PrD(u1|¬u0) ≤
CD(i
m2 |¬im1)
PrD(im1 |¬im1) ≤ · · · ≤ CD(ur|¬u0 · · · ur−1)
We now want to replace ur in s by some isomorphic copy of s which is not overlapping
with u0i
m1u1i
m2 · · · imr . Due to the optimality of s, we would deduce
CD(ur|¬u0 · · · ur−1) ≤ CD(s|¬u0 · · · ur−1) = CD(s)
so CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
≤ CD(s) which would imply that the repetition of isomorphic copies of im1
are at least as good as s, so CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
= CD(s) due to the optimality of s. But to replace
ur in s by the isomorphic copy of s, we need to rewrite the original s containing ur by
some isomorphic copy in which indices are left free to implement another isomorphic
copy of s.
For that, we split the sequence (1, 2, 3, . . .) into two subsequences v and v′ which are
non-overlapping (i.e. vt 
= v′t′ for all t and t′), complete (i.e. for every integer j, v
contains j or v′ contains j), and representing each distribution with inﬁnite number of
occurrences (i.e. for all j, there exist inﬁnite sequences t1 < t2 < · · · and t′1 < t′2 < · · ·
such that Dj = Dvt = Dv′t′

for all ). For that, we can just construct v and v′ iteratively:
for each j, if the number of j′ < j such that Dj′ = Dj in v or v′ is the same, we put j
in v, otherwise (we may have only one more instance in v), we put j in v′ (to balance
again). For instance, if all Di are equal, this construction puts all odd j in v and all
even j in v′. Hence, we can deﬁne s′ = newv(s) and s′′ = newv′(s). s′ will thus only use
indices in v′ while s′′ will only use indices in v. Therefore, s′ and s′′ will be isomorphic,
with no index in common. So, CD(s) = CD(s
′) = CD(s′′).
Following the split of s, the strategy s′ can be written s′ = u′0i
′m1u′1i
′m2 · · · i′mru′r with
CD(i
m1)
PrD(im1)
=
CD(i
′m1)
PrD(i′m1)
≤ CD(u′r|¬u′0 · · · u′r−1) = CD(u′r|¬u′0i′m1u′1i′m2 · · · i′mr)
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If we replace u′r in s′ by s′′, since s′ is optimal, we obtain a larger complexity. So,
CD(u
′
0i
′m1u′1i
′m2 · · · i′mru′r) ≤ CD(u′0i′m1u′1i′m2 · · · i′mrs′′)
These two strategies have the preﬁx u′0i
′m1u′1i
′m2 · · · i′mr in common. We can write
their complexities by splitting this common preﬁx using Lemma 6.5. By eliminating the
common terms, we deduce
CD(u
′
r|¬u′0i′m1u′1i′m2 · · · i′mr) ≤ CD(s′′|¬u′0i′m1u′1i′m2 · · · i′mr ) = CD(s′′) = CD(s)
We deduce
CD(i
m1)
PrD(im1)
≤ CD(s)
Let i1 < i2 < · · · be a sequence of keys using the distribution Di. By Lemma 6.8, the
strategy im1 i
m
2 · · · has complexity CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
. As s is optimal, we have CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
≥ CD(s).
Therefore, CD(i
m1 )
PrD(im1 )
= CD(s).
Here are examples of optimal m for diﬀerent distributions.
Example 6.4.3 (Uniform distribution). For the uniform distribution pi =
1
n , with 1 ≤
i ≤ n. We get PrD(1m) = mn and Gm = m+12 . With this, we obtain CD(1m2m · · · ) = n−
m−1
2 . Thus, the value of m that minimizes the complexity is m = n and CD(1
m2m · · · ) =
n−1
2 . The best strategy is to exhaustively search the key until it is found.
Example 6.4.4 (Geometric distribution). For the geometric distribution with parameter
p, we have pi = (1− p)i−1p, with i = 1, 2, . . . or Di = [p, p, . . .]. Due to Lemma 6.5, we
can see that for every inﬁnite strategy s, CD(s) =
1
p .
We give a formula to compute the optimal strategies for distributions obtained by
composing several distributions. The formula is useful when we want to regroup equal
consecutive pj’s in a distribution D1 so that D1 appears as a composition of uniform
distributions.
Lemma 6.15. Let U1, . . . , Uk be independent distributions of support n1, . . . , nk, respect-
ively. Let Ui = (pi,1, . . . , pi,ni). Given a distribution (α1, . . . , αk) of support k, we deﬁne
D1 = α1U1 + α2U2 + . . . + αkUk by D1 = (α1p1,1, . . . , α1p1,n1 , α2p2,1, . . . , αkpk,nk).
Let m =
∑i
j=1 nj . We have
Pr
D1
(1n11n2 · · · 1ni) = α1 + · · ·+ αi
CD1(1
n11n2 · · · 1ni) =
i∑
j=1
αjCUj(1
nj ) +
i∑
j=1
nj
(
1−
j∑
k=1
αk
)
We note that if all Ui are ordered and if αipi,ni ≥ αi+1pi+1,1 for all 1 ≤ i < k, then
D1 is ordered as well.
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We let D = (D1,D1, . . .). If we assume that the Ui are uniform distributions, we can
use the observation following Lemma 6.18 to deduce from Th. 6.13 that the optimal
strategy is 1m2m · · · for m =∑ij=1 nj and i minimizing
minCD(∅) = min
i
⎛
⎝
∑i
j=1 αjCUj (1
nj ) +
∑i
j=1 nj
(
1−∑jk=1 αk)∑i
j=1 αj
⎞
⎠ .
Proof. We prove it by induction on i. It is trivial for i = 0. We assume the result holds
for i− 1. By induction, we have
CD1(1
n1 · · · 1ni) = CD1(1n1 · · · 1ni−1) + (1− Pr
D1
(1n1 · · · 1ni−1))CD1(1ni |¬(1n1 · · · 1ni−1))
=
i−1∑
j=1
αjCUj(1
nj ) +
i−1∑
j=1
nj
(
1−
j∑
k=1
αk
)
+ αiCUi(1
ni) + ni
(
1−
i∑
k=1
αk
)
=
i∑
j=1
αjCUj(1
nj ) +
i∑
j=1
nj
(
1−
j∑
k=1
αk
)
The second equality is obtained from the fact that
CD1(1
ni |¬(1n1 · · · 1ni−1)) = αi
αi + · · ·+ αk (pi,1 + 2pi,2 + . . .+ nipi,ni) + ni
(
αi+1 + · · ·+ αk
αi + · · ·+ αk
)
=
αi
1− PrD1(1n1 · · · 1ni−1)
CUi(1
ni) + ni
(
1− PrD1(1n1 · · · 1ni−1)− αi
1− PrD1(1n1 · · · 1ni−1)
)
We note that Th. 6.13 does not extend if some distribution has a ﬁnite number of
copies as the following example shows.
Example 6.4.5 (Distribution with no optimal strategy of the form im1 i
m
2 · · · ). Let D1 =
[1 − ε, ε, ε, . . . , ε, 1] of support n and D2 = D3 = · · · = [p, . . . , p, 1] for ε < p ≤ 12 and
n large enough. Given a full strategy s, the formula in Lemma 6.6 deﬁnes a sequence
qt(s) = p
′
st,#occs1···st (st)
. We can see that for all full strategies s and s′, if |s| ≤ |s′| and
qt(s) ≥ qt(s′) for t = 1, . . . , |s|, then CD(s) ≤ CD(s′). With this, we can see that s = 12n
is better than all full strategies with length at least n+1. There are only two full strategies
with smaller length: 1n and 2n. We have CD(2
n) = 1−(1−p)
n
p ≈ 1p ≥ 2 as n grows. We
have CD(12
n) = 1 + ε1−(1−p)
n
p ≈ 1 + εp as n grows, so CD(12n) < CD(2n) for n large
enough. We have CD(1
n) = 1+ ε1−(1−ε)
n−1
ε = 2− (1− ε)n−1 ≈ 2 so CD(12n) < CD(1n)
for n large enough. For all strategies of length at least n+1, s = 12n collected the largest
possible p′ values. So, the best strategy is s = 12n. It is better than any strategy of form
im1 i
m
2 · · · .
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6.4.2 Optimal Strategy for a Finite Number of Distributions
When we have a ﬁnite number of distributions, we may have no optimal strategy of the
form given in Th. 6.13. We may have multiple layers of repetition of im as the following
result shows.
Theorem 6.16. Let D1 be a distribution of ﬁnite support n. Let D = (D1,D2, . . . ,D|D|)
be a ﬁnite sequence of length |D| in which D1 = D2 = · · · = D|D|. There exists a sequence
m1, . . . ,mr such that the strategy
s = 1m12m1 · · · |D|m11m22m2 · · · |D|m2 · · · 1mr
is optimal.
For the proof of Theorem 6.16, we need the result of the following lemma.
Lemma 6.17. Let s = uiavjbw be an optimal strategy with n occurrences of each key.
We assume that i 
= j, a < b, u does not end with i, v has no occurrence of either i or j,
and w has equal number of occurrences for i and j. Furthermore, we assume that either
a 
= 0, or v is nonempty and starts with some k such that u does not end with k. Then,
CD(s) = CD(uj
b−aiavjaw).
Proof. We will show below that there exists d > 0 such that a ≤ b − d and CD(s) =
CD(uj
diavjb−dw). Hence, we can rewrite s by replacing u by ujd and b by b− d. Since
d > 0 and a ≤ b−d, we can just apply this rewriting rule enough times until b is lowered
down to a. Hence, we obtain the result.
To ﬁnd d, we ﬁrst write s = u0i
m1u1i
m2 · · · imruriavjbw where i appears in no ut, the
mt are nonzero, and u1, . . . , ur are non-empty. (Note that since a < b, we must have
m1+· · ·+mr > 0 so r ≥ 1.) Let n′ be the equal number of occurrences of i and j in uiavjb.
Let t be the smallest index such that m1+ · · ·+mt > n′−b (for t = 0, the left-hand term
is 0 but n′ ≥ b; for t = r, the left-hand term is n′−a and we know that a < b; so, t exists
and t > 0). We write mt = m
′ + d such that m1 + · · · +mt−1 +m′ = n′ − b. So, d > 0.
Note that b− d = b−mt+m′ = n′−m1− · · ·−mt = mt+1+ · · ·+mr+a. So, b− d ≥ a.
Clearly, d ≤ b. We write s = HidBiavjdT with head H = u0im1u1im2 · · · ut−1im′ , body
B = uti
mt+1 · · · imrur, and tail T = jb−dw. Clearly, H has n′ − b occurrences of i and
HidBiav has n′ − b occurrences of j. Since s is optimal for D, idBiavjd is optimal for
D|¬H. We note that B does not start with i (t is between 1 and r and ut is nonempty
and with no i) and that iav is non-empty and with no j (either a 
= 0 or v is nonempty
and with no j). We split idBiavjd = idx1 · · · x
iay1 · · · y
′jd where two consecutive blocks
in the list id, x1, . . . , x
, i
a, y1, . . . , y
′ , j
d have no key in common. (For a = 0, we can
always split so that x
 and y1 have no key in common by using the ﬁrst term k of v
which is not the last of u: we just take y1 as a block of k’s and x
 as a block with no k.)
We can apply Lemma 6.14 and obtain
CD(i
d|¬in′−b)
PrD(id|¬in′−b) ≤
CD(i
a|¬in′−a)
PrD(ia|¬in′−a) ≤
CD(y1|¬ · · · )
PrD(y1|¬ · · · ) ≤
CD(y
′ |¬ · · · )
PrD(y
′ |¬ · · · ) ≤
CD(j
d|¬jn′−b)
PrD(jd|¬jn′−b)
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Since the ﬁrst and the last terms are equal, all of them are equal. So, we can permute
two consecutive blocks which have no index in common. Hence, we can propagate jd
earlier until it is stepped before ia, since we know there is no other occurrence of j in
the exchanged blocks. We obtain that
CD(Hi
dBiavjdT ) = CD(Hi
dBjdiavT )
as announced.
Lemma 6.17 will be used in two ways.
1. For s = u′jcvjbw with c > 0, b > 0, v with no i or j, and balanced occurrences of
i and j in w, which has the same complexity as s′ = u′jb+cvw (so, to apply the
lemma we deﬁne a = 0, u = u′jc, k = j, and s = u′jci0vjbw; all hypotheses are
veriﬁed except v being non-empty, but the result is trivial for an empty v). This
means that we can regroup jc and jb when they are separated by a v with no i
and followed by a balanced tail w.
2. For s = uiavjbw with 0 < a < b, v with no i or j, and balanced occurrences of
i and j in w, which has the same complexity as s′ = ujb−aiavjaw. This means
that we can balance ia and jb when there are separated by a v with no i or j and
followed by a balanced tail w.
In what follows, we say that a strategy is in a normal form if for all t, i → #occs1···st(i)
is a non-increasing function, i.e. #occs1···st(i) ≥ #occs1···st(i+ 1) for all i. For instance,
1112322133 is normal as the number of STEP(1) is at no time lower than the number of
STEP(2) and the same for the number of STEP(2) and STEP(3).
Since all distributions are the same, all strategies can be rewritten into an equivalent
one in a normal form: for this, for the smallest t such that there exists i such that
#occs1···st(i) < #occs1···st(i + 1), it must be that st = i + 1 and #occs1···st−1(i) =
#occs1···st−1(i + 1). We can permute all values i and i + 1 in the tail stst+1 · · · and
obtain an equivalent strategy on which the function becomes non-increasing at step t
and is unchanged before. By performing enough such rewriting, we obtain an equivalent
strategy in normal form. For instance, 12231332 is not normal. The smallest t is t = 3
when we make a second STEP(2) while we only did a single STEP(1). So, we permute
1 and 2 at this time and obtain 12132331. Then, we have t = 7 and permute 2 and 3
to obtain 12132321. Then, again t = 7 to permute 1 and 2 to obtain 12132312 which is
normal.
We now prove Th. 6.16.
Proof of Th. 6.16. Let s be an optimal strategy. Due to the assumptions, it must be
ﬁnite. We assume w.l.o.g. that s is in normal form. We note that we can always
complete s in a form s2a23a3 · · · so that the ﬁnal strategy has exactly n occurrences
of each i. So, we assume w.l.o.g. that s has equal number of occurrences. We write
s = 1m1x11
m2x2 · · · 1mrxr where the xt’s are non-empty and with no 1 inside.
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As detailed below, we rewrite xr (and push some steps earlier in xr−1) so that we obtain
a permutation of the blocks 2mr , . . . , |D|mr . The rewriting is done by preserving the
probability of success (which is 1) and the complexity (which is the optimal complexity).
Then, we do the same operation in xr−1 and continue until x1. When we are done, each xt
becomes a permutation of the blocks 2mt , . . . , |D|mt . Finally, we normalize the obtained
rewriting of s and obtain the result.
We assume that s has already been rewritten so that for each t′ = t + 1, . . . , r, the
xt′ sub-strategy is a permutation of the blocks 2
mt′ , . . . , |D|mt′ . We explain now how to
rewrite xt. We make a loop for j = 2 to |D|. In the loop, we ﬁrst regroup all blocks of
j’s by using Lemma 6.17 with i = 1: while we can write xt = u
′jcvjbw′ where c > 0,
b > 0, v is non-empty with no j, and w′ has no j, we write u = 1m1x11m2x2 · · · 1mtu′ and
w = w′1mt+1xt+1 · · · 1mrxr, and set a = 0 and i = 1. This rewrites xt = u′jb+cvw′ by
preserving the complexity and making a permutation. When this while loop is complete,
we can only ﬁnd a single block of j’s in xt and write xt = vj
bw′, where v and w′ have no j.
So, we apply again Lemma 6.17 to balance 1mt and jb: we write u = 1m1x11
m2x2 · · · xt−1
and w = w′1mt+1xt+1 · · · 1mrxr, and set a = mt and i = 1. This rewrites 1mtxt to
jb−mt1mtvjmtw′ by preserving the complexity and making a permutation. So, this re-
writes xt to vj
mtw′ and xt−1 to xt−1jb−mt . When the loop of j is complete, xt is a
permutation of the blocks 2mt , . . . , |D|mt .
Interestingly, the sequence m1, . . . ,mr is unchanged from our starting optimal normal
full strategy s. If we rather start from an optimal full strategy s which is not in normal
form, we can still see how to obtain this sequence: for each t, m1 + · · ·+mt is the next
record number of steps for an attack i after the m1 + · · · + mt−1 record. That is the
number of steps for the attack i when s decides to move to another attack.
We provide toy examples below.
Example 6.4.6. We take D = (D1,D2) with D1 = D2 = (
3
5 ,
9
25 ,
1
50 ,
1
50) = [
3
5 ,
18
20 ,
1
2 , 1].
Here are the complexities of some full strategies.
CD(1111) =
146
100
= 1.46
CD(12111) =
792
500
= 1.584
CD(11211) =
732
500
= 1.464
CD(121211) =
7892
5000
= 1.5784
CD(112211) =
7292
5000
= 1.4584
so the last strategy is the best one. Notice that this is also a greedy strategy.
Example 6.4.7. We take D = (D1,D2) with D1 = D2 = (
70
100 ,
20
100 ,
5
100 ,
3
100 ,
1
100 ,
1
100 ) =
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[ 70100 ,
2
3 ,
1
2 ,
3
5 ,
1
2 , 1]. Here are the complexities of some full strategies.
CD(111111) = 1.48
CD(1211111) = 1.44
CD(12121111) = 1.438
CD(121212111) = 1.439
CD(121122111) = 1.444
so s = 12121111 is the best one. For this example, we have that the optimal strategy
requires m1 = 1, m2 = 1 and m3 = 4. It is also greedy.
6.4.3 Finding the Optimal m
We provide here a simple criterion for the optimal m of Th. 6.13.
Lemma 6.18. We let D1 = (p1, . . . , pn) = [p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n] be a distribution and deﬁne
D = (D1,D1, . . .). Let m be such that s = 1
m2m · · · is an optimal strategy based on
Th. 6.13. We have 1p′m
≤ CD(1m2m · · · ) ≤ 1p′m+1 .
Proof. We let s = 2m3m · · · We know that CD(1m+1s) ≥ CD(1ms) since 1ms is optimal.
So,
0 ≤ CD(1m+1s)− CD(1ms)
= (1− Pr
D
(1m))(CD(1s|¬1m)− CD(s))
= (1− Pr
D
(1m))(1 − p′m+1 · CD(s))
from which we deduce 1p′m+1
≥ CD(s). Similarly, we have
0 ≥ CD(1ms)− CD(1m−1s)
= (1− Pr
D
(1m−1))(CD(1s|¬1m−1)− CD(s))
= (1− Pr
D
(1m−1))(1 − p′m · CD(s))
from which we deduce 1p′m
≤ CD(s).
We note that if pm = pm+1, then
p′m+1 =
pm+1
pm+1 + · · · + pn =
pm
pm+1 + · · ·+ pn >
pm
pm + pm+1 + · · ·+ pn = p
′
m
which is impossible (given the result from Lemma 6.18). Consequently, we must have
pm 
= pm+1. So, in distributions when we have sequences of equal probabilities pt, we
can just look at the largest index t in the sequence as a possible candidate for being the
value m.
Lemma 6.18 has an equivalent for Th. 6.16.
96
How to Sequentialize Independent Parallel Attacks
Lemma 6.19. We let D1 = (p1, . . . , pn) = [p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n] be a distribution of support n
and D = (D1,D1, . . . ,D1) of size |D|. Let m1, . . . ,mr be such that
s = 1m1 · · · |D|m11m2 · · · |D|m2 · · · is an optimal strategy based on Th. 6.16. For all t,
we have 1p′mt
≤ CD(1mt )PrD(1mt ) ≤
1
p′mt+1
.
The proof is essentially the same as for Lemma 6.18. We just have to compare the
optimal strategy with
· · · 1mt−1 · · · |D|mt−11mt+12mt · · · |D|mt1mt+1−12mt+1 · · · |D|mt+11mt+2 · · · |D|mt+2 · · ·
and
· · · 1mt−1 · · · |D|mt−11mt−12mt · · · |D|mt1mt+1+12mt+1 · · · |D|mt+11mt+2 · · · |D|mt+2 · · ·
6.5 Applications
We apply our results on two applications: LPN and password guessing.
6.5.1 Solving Sparse LPN
We model the LPN problem in our STEP game. We use the noise bits as the keys the
adversary A is trying to guess.
Recall that in the list of LPN solving algorithms, we have the one that guesses that
the noise is 0 and runs a Gaussian elimination until it ﬁnds the correct solution. This
algorithm works with complexity poly · (1−τ)−k (See Section 3.8.3). So this algorithm is
better than the BKW variants that work with a complexity of poly ·2 klog2 k as soon as τ <
ln 2
log2 k
, and in particular for τ = k−
1
2 which is the case for some applications [Ale03, DP12].
The Gaussian elimination algorithm is reduced to ﬁnding a k-bit noise vector. It
guesses that this vector is 0. If this does not work, the algorithm tries again with new LPN
queries. We can see this as guessing at least one k-bit biased vector Ki which follows the
distribution Di = Ber
k
τ deﬁned by Pr[Ki = v] = τ
HW(v)(1− τ)k−HW(v) in our framework.
The most probable vector is v = 0 which has probability Pr[Ki = 0] = (1 − τ)k. The
above algorithm corresponds to trying K1 = 0 then K2 = 0, ... i.e., the strategy 123 · · ·
in our framework. We can wonder if there is a better 1m2m3m · · · . This is the problem
we study below. We will see that the answer is no: using m = 1 is the best option as
soon as τ is less than 12 − ε for ε = ln 22k which is pretty small.
For instance, for LPN768, 1√
768
we obtain CD(12 · · · ) = 241. I.e., 241 calls to the STEP
command which corresponds to collecting k LPN queries and making a Gaussian elim-
ination to recover the secret based on the assumption that the error bits are all 0. If we
add up the cost of running Gaussian elimination in order to recover the secret, we obtain
a complexity of 270. This outperforms all the BKW variants and proves that LPN768, 1√
768
is not a secure instance for a 80-bit security. Furthermore, this algorithm outperforms
even the covering code algorithm [GJL14].
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Figure 6.2: The change of optimal m for solving LPN100,τ
Di is a composite distribution of uniform ones in the sense deﬁned in Lemma 6.15.
Namely, Di =
∑k
w=0 τ
k(1 − τ)k−wUw where Uw is uniform of support
(
k
w
)
. By The-
orem 6.13, we know that there exists a magic m for which the strategy s = 1m2m · · · is
optimal. The analysis of composite distributions further says that m must be of form
m = Bw =
∑w
i=0
(
k
i
)
for some magic w. Let cm be the complexity of 1
m2m · · · . A value
w = k, i.e. m = n corresponds to the exhaustive search of the noise bits. For w = 0, i.e.
m = 1, the adversary assumes that the noise is 0 every time he receives k queries from
the LPN oracle.
We ﬁrst computed experimentally the optimal m for the LPN100,τ instance where we
take 0 < τ < 12 . The magic m takes the value 1 for a τ which is not close to
1
2 . As
shown on Fig. 6.2, it changes to n = 2100 around the value τ = 0.4965. This boundary
between two diﬀerent strategies corresponds to the value τ = 12 − ln 22k computed in our
analysis below. Interestingly, there is no intermediate optimal m between 1 and n.
For cryptographic parameters, c1 is optimal. The optimal w depends on τ . The
case when τ is lower than 1k is not interesting as it is likely that no error occurs so all
w lead to a complexity which is very close to 1. Conversely, for τ = 12 , the exhaustive
search has a complexity of cn =
1
2(2
k + 1) and w = 0 has a complexity of c1 = 2
k.
Actually, Di is uniform in this case and we know that the optimal m completes batches
of equal consecutive probabilities. So, the optimal strategy is the exhaustive search.
We now show that for τ < 0.16, the best strategy is obtained for w = 0.
Below, we use pBw = τ
w(1− τ)k−w and c1 = (1− τ)−k.
Let wc be a threshold weight and let α = Pr(1
Bwc ). For 0 < w ≤ wc, due to
Lemma 6.18, if cBw is optimal we have
cBw ≥
1
p′Bw
=
PrD(¬1Bw−1)
pBw
≥ PrD(¬1
Bwc )
pBw
=
1− α
pBw
=
1− α(
τ
1−τ
)w c1 ≥ 1− ατ
1−τ
c1 .
For τ < 0.16, we have τ1−τ < 0.20. So, if α ≤ 45 we obtain cBw > c1. This contradicts
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that w is optimal. For wc = τk, the Central Limit Theorem gives us that α ≈ 12 which
is less than 45 . So, no w such that 0 < w ≤ τk is optimal.
Now, for w ≥ wc, we have
cw =
CD(1
Bw)
PrD(1Bw)
≥ CD(1Bw) =
Bw∑
i=1
ipi+Bw Pr
D
(¬1Bw) ≥ Bwc Pr
D
(¬1Bwc ) = (1−α)Bwc
By using the bound Bwc ≥
(
k
wc
)wc
, for wc = τk we have α ≈ 12 and we obtain cw ≥
1
2τ
−τk. We want to compare this to c1 = (1 − τ)−k. We look at the variations of the
function τ → −kτ ln τ − ln 2 + k ln(1 − τ). We can see by derivating twice that for
τ ∈ [0, 12 ], this function increases then decreases. For τ = 0.16, it is positive. For τ = 1k ,
it is also positive. So, for τ ∈ [ 1k , 0.16], we have cBw ≥ c1.
Therefore, for all τ < 0.16, c1 is the best complexity so m = 0 is the magic value.
Experiment shows that this remains true for all τ < 12 − ln 22k . Actually, we can easily see
that c1 becomes lower than
2k+1
2 for τ ≈ 12 − ln 22k . We will discuss this in Section 6.6.
Solving LPN with O(k) queries. We now concentrate on the m = n case to limit
the query complexity to O(k). (In our framework, we need only k queries but we would
practically need more to check that we did ﬁnd the correct value.) So, we estimate
the complexity of the full exhaustive search on one error vector x of k bits for LPN,
i.e., CD(1
n). If pt is the probability that x is the t-th enumerated vector, we have
CD(1
n) =
∑n
t=1 tpt. For t between Bw−1+1 and Bw, the sum of the pt’s is the probability
that we have exactly w errors. So, CD(1
n) ≤ ∑kw=0Bw Pr[w errors]. We approximate
Pr[w errors] to the continuous distribution. So, the Hamming weight has a normal
distribution, with mean kτ and standard deviation σ =
√
kτ(1− τ). We do the same
for Bw ≈ 2k√2π
∫ 2w−k√
k
−∞ e
− v2
2 dv. With the change of variables w = kτ + tσ, we have
CD(1
n) ≤
k∑
w=0
Bw Pr[w errors]
≈ 2
k
2π
∫ +∞
−∞
(∫ 2w−k√
k
−∞
e−
v2
2 dv
)
1
σ
e−
(w−kτ)2
2σ2 dw
=
2k
2π
∫∫
v≤ 2kτ−k+2tσ√
k
e−
t2+v2
2 dv dt
The distance between the origin (t, v) = (0, 0) and the line v = 2kτ−k+2tσ√
k
is
d =
√
k
1− 2τ√
1 + 4τ(1 − τ)
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τ log2(CD(1
n)) log2
(
2k
d
√
2π
e−
d2
2
)
0.1 1350.04 1314.81
0.125 1458.86 1429.33
0.25 1794.57 1788.49
0.4 1966.67 1966.55
Table 6.1: log2(CD(1
n)) vs. log2
(
2k
d
√
2π
e−
d2
2
)
for k = 2000
By rotating the region on which we sum, we obtain
CD(1
n) ≈ 2
k
2π
∫∫
x≥d
e−
x2+y2
2 dx dy =
2k√
2π
∫ +∞
d
e−
x2
2 dx ∼ 2
k
d
√
2π
e−
d2
2
On Fig. 6.3 we can see that this approximation of CD(1
n) is very good for τ = k−
1
2 .
So, the complexity CD(1
n) is asymptotically 2k(1−
1
2 ln 2)+O(
√
k). Interestingly, the dom-
inant part of log2 CD(1
n) is 0.2788× k and does not depend on τ as long as 1k  τ  12 .
Although very good for the low k that we consider, this approximation of CD(1
n) de-
viates, probably because of the imprecise approximation of the Bw’s. Next, we de-
rive a bound which is much higher but asymptotically better (the curves crossing for
k ≈ 50 000). We now use the bound Bw ≤ kw and do the same computation as before.
We have
CD(1
n) ≤
k∑
w=0
kw Pr[w errors]
≈ 1√
2π
∫ +∞
−∞
kkτ+tσe−
t2
2 dt
=
e
1
2
(σ lnk)2+kτ lnk
√
2π
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(t−σ ln k)2
2 dt
= e
1
2
(σ lnk)2+kτ lnk
So, CD(1
n) = e
1
2
√
k(ln k)2+O(
√
k ln k) for τ = k−
1
2 . Recall that Lyubashevsky [Lyu05] has a
complexity of eO(
k
ln ln k ) (See Section 3.9). We obtain a better result that is asymptotically
better and that requires O(k) queries instead of k1+ε. However, this new bound for
CD(1
n) is very loose.
Outside the scenario of a sparse LPN, we display in Figure 6.4 the logarithmic com-
plexity to solve LPN in our STEP game when the noise parameter is constant.
Comparing log2(CD(1
n)) with our approximation, i.e. log2
(
2k
d
√
2π
e−
d2
2
)
, we obtain
the following results which validate our approximations (See Table 6.1).
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Figure 6.3: log2(CD(1
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1
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n)) for constant τ
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6.5.2 Password Recovery
There is numerous information nowadays accounting attacks and leaks of passwords from
diﬀerent famous companies. From these leaks, the community has studied what are the
worst passwords used by the users. Having in mind these statistics, we are interested to
see what is the best strategy of an outsider that tries to get access to a system having
access to a list of users. The goal of the attacker is to hack one account. He can try to
hack several accounts. Within our framework, we compute to see what is the optimal
m for the strategy 1m2m · · · . In this given scenario, the strategy corresponds to making
m guesses for each user until it reaches the end of the list and starting again with new
guesses.
We consider the statistics that we have found for the 10 000 Top Passwords2 and the
one done for the database with passwords in clear from the RockYou hack3. Studies on
the distribution of user’s passwords were also done in [DMR10, WACS10, Bon12, Sch06].
The ﬁrst case-study analyses what are the top 10 000 passwords from a total 6.5 million
username-passwords that leaked. The most frequent passwords are the following:
password p1 = 0.00493
123456 p2 = 0.00400
12345678 p3 = 0.00133
1234 p4 = 0.00089
In the case of the RockYou hack, where 32 million of passwords were leaked, we ﬁnd
that the most frequent passwords and their probability of usage is:
123456 p1 = 0.009085
12345 p2 = 0.002471
123456789 p3 = 0.002400
Password p4 = 0.000194
Moreover, approximately 20% of the users used the most frequent 5 000 passwords.
What these statistics show is that users frequently choose poor and predictable pass-
words. While dictionary attacks are very eﬃcient, we study here the case where the
attacker wants to minimize the number of trials until he gets access to the system, with
no pre-computation done. By using our formulas of computing CD(1
m2m · · · ), we obtain
in both of the above distributions that m = 1 is the optimal one. This means that the
attacker tries for each username the most probable password and in average, after couple
of hundred of users (for the two studies we obtain CD to be about 203 and about 110),
he will manage to access the system. We note that having m = 1 is very nice as for the
typical password guessing scenario, we need to have a small m to avoid complications of
blocking accounts and triggering an alarm that the system is under an attack.
2https://xato.net/passwords/more-top-worst-passwords/#.VNiORvnF-xW
3http://www.imperva.com/docs/WP_Consumer_Password_Worst_Practices.pdf
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6.6 On the Phase Transition
Given the experience of the previous applications, we can see that for “regular” distri-
butions, the optimal m falls from m = n to the minimal m as the bias of the distri-
bution increases. We let n1 be such that p1 = p2 = · · · = pn1 
= pn1+1 and n2 be
such that pn1+1 = · · · = pn1+n2 
= pn1+n2+1. Due to Lemma 6.18, the magic value m
can only be n1, n1 + n2, or more. We study here when the curves of CD(1
n12n1 · · · ),
CD(1
n1+n22n1+n2 · · · ), and CU (1n) = n+12 cross each other.
Lemma 6.20. We consider a composite distribution D1 = αU1 + βU2 + (1− α− β)D′,
where U1 and U2 are uniform of support n1 and n2. For U uniform, we have
CD(1
n12n1 · · · ) ≤ CD(1n1+n22n1+n2 · · · ) ⇐⇒ α− βn1
n2
≥ α
(
α+ β
1− n1/n2
2
)
CD(1
n12n1 · · · ) ≤ CU (1n) ⇐⇒ n/n1 + 1
2
≥ 1
α
Note that for 2−H∞ ≥ 2n , we have αn1 ≥ 2n so the second property is satisﬁed.
As an example, for n1 = n2 = 1, the ﬁrst condition becomes α − β ≥ α2 which is
the case of all the distribution we tried for password recovery. The second condition
becomes 2−H∞ ≥ 2n+1 , which is also always satisﬁed.
For LPN, we have n1 = 1, n2 = k, α = (1− τ)k, and β = n2τ(1− τ)k−1. The ﬁrst and
second conditions become
(1− τ)k ≤ 1− 2τ
1 + k−32 τ
and (1− τ)k ≥ 2
2k + 1
respectively. They are always satisﬁed unless τ is very close to 12 : by letting τ =
1
2 − ε
with ε → 0, the right-hand term of the ﬁrst condition is asymptotically equivalent to
8ε
k+1 and the left-hand term tends towards 2
−k. The balance is thus for τ ≈ 12 − k+18 2−k.
The second condition gives
τ ≤ 1−
(
2k + 1
2
)− 1
k
=
1
2
− ln 2
2k
− o
(
1
k
)
So, we can explain the phase transition in LPNk,τ as follows: if we make τ decrease
from 12 , for each ﬁxed m, the complexity of all possible CD(1
m) smoothly decrease. The
function for m = n1 crosses the one of m = n1 + n2 before it crosses
n+1
2 which is close
to the value of the one for m = n. So, the curve for m = n1 becomes interesting after
having beaten the curve for m = n1 + n2. This proves that we never have a magic m
equal to n1 + n2. Presumably, it is the case for all other curves as well. This explains
the abrupt fall from m = n to m = 1 which we observed on Fig. 6.2.
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Proof. We have
CD(1
n12n1 · · · ) = CD(1
n1)
PrD(1n1)
=
αn1+12 + (1− α)n1
α
and
CD(1
n1+n22n1+n2 · · · ) = CD(1
n1+n2)
PrD(1n1+n2)
=
αn1+12 + β
(
n1 +
n2+1
2
)
+ (1− α− β)(n1 + n2)
α+ β
so
CD(1
n1)
PrD(1n1)
≤ CD(1
n1+n2)
PrD(1n1+n2)
⇐⇒
αn1+12 + (1− α)n1
α
≤ α
n1+1
2 + β
(
n1 +
n2+1
2
)
+ (1− α− β)(n1 + n2)
α+ β
⇐⇒
α− βn1
n2
≥ α
(
α+ β
1− n1/n2
2
)
For the second property, we have
CD(1
n12n1 · · · ) ≤ CU (1n) ⇐⇒ CD(1
n1)
PrD(1n1)
≤ CU (1n)
⇐⇒ α
n1+1
2 + (1− α)n1
α
≤ n+ 1
2
⇐⇒ n/n1 + 1
2
≥ 1
α
Our framework enables the analysis of diﬀerent strategies to sequentialize algorithms
where the objective is to make one succeed as soon as possible.
When the algorithms have the same distribution and are unlimited in number, the
optimal strategy is of form 1m2m · · · for some magic m. As the distribution becomes
biased, we observe a phase transition from the regular single-algorithm run 1n (i.e., m =
n) to the single-step multiple algorithms 123 · · · (i.e., m = 1) which is very abrupt in the
application we considered: LPN and password recovery. Besides the 2 problems we have
studied here, we believe that our results can prove to be useful in other cryptographic
applications.
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Chapter7
Conclusion and Further Work
7.1 Conclusion
This thesis presents an algorithmic study of LPN. In Chapter 3, we gave an overview of
the existing LPN solving algorithms. By formally analysing them we introduced several
improvements. An LPN solving algorithm works in two phases: a reduction and a solving
phase. During the reduction phase, we reduce the size of the secret through several
reduction techniques. The solving phase recovers part of the secret through a solving
technique. We validated our heuristic results with practice in Chapter 4. This allowed
us to asses the security oﬀered by each algorithm and to propose secure parameters to
be used in practice by the LPN based cryptographic primitives.
In Chapter 5, we further improved the complexity of an LPN solving algorithm by
saying how the reduction steps should be organized in order to maximize their use. We
designed an algorithm that receives at input an LPN instance and provides at output the
steps of the algorithm that solves the LPN instance and minimizes the time complexity.
This algorithm allows us to automatize an LPN solving algorithm. It also provides
ﬂexibility as our algorithm could be further adapted and automatized if new reduction
techniques are introduced. The results we obtained bring improvements to the existing
work and to the best of our knowledge we have the best algorithm for solving LPN. A
similar analysis in optimizing the reduction steps is done for LWE [KF15].
In Chapter 6, we provided the STEP framework that allows us to improve the existing
results in the area of solving LPN for the case where the initial number of queries are
limited.
7.2 Future Work
Recall that for the BKW∗ algorithm, we made the assumption that the noise bits are
independent. This assumption is supported by the practical results that show that the
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performance of the algorithm is not aﬀected by it. An interesting theoretical result in
this direction would be to use martingales to prove we do not need the independence in
order to apply the Chernoﬀ bound or the Central Limit Theorem.
The performance of an LPN solving algorithm can be improved in several ways. First,
one could study whether code-reduce reductions applied in cascade can bring improvement
compared to code-reduce applied once. We recall that the distribution of the secret changes
in this case and we did not cover this scenario. Also, one could extend the pool of codes
used by this reduction. We already have indications that this can improve the existing
results. Using a larger code, instead of concatenating several small codes, can give us
a bigger, better bias. Thus, the solving method would require less number of queries.
This can decrease the number of initial queries and the overall performance of a solving
algorithm can be improved.
A new reduction technique can bring another improvement. The introduction of the
code-reduce brought some fresh air in the research area of LPN solving algorithms and there
is no result to indicate that we exhausted all our methods. The algorithm presented in
Chapter 5 can easily incorporate a new technique and show how this new tool can be
optimally used.
For the STEP game, there are several interesting questions that could be analysed.
Our game considers an adversary that runs his attack sequentially and wants to succeed
in just one attack. A more realistic scenario to consider is the one where the adversary
can run several attacks in parallel, e.g. i attacks. Given this, one could check what is
the best strategy and if the complexity of a parallel optimal strategy achieves to be i
times better than a sequential optimal strategy. Also, the goal of the adversary can be
to succeed in j out of n attacks. In this case should the attacker focus on only one attack
at once until he succeeds in j of them or should he apply a diﬀerent strategy?
Our main results in the STEP game considers identical distributions. In the case
where we have several diﬀerent distributions, how to compare them and say which one
is to be preferred? Is a uniform distribution with a small support better than a biased
distribution with a larger support where the ﬁrst candidates have a high probability to
occur?
Final Words. To conclude, we want to emphasize on the importance of assessing the
hardness of problems on which we rely in cryptography. This proves to be crucial in
this moment when NIST is calling for candidates for post-quantum cryptography. While
problems like factorization and discrete logarithm have a long history of cryptanalysis,
some of the post-quantum hard problems lack this. A collaborative eﬀort of the crypto-
graphy community is needed in order to have thorough study of the problems that will
ensure the security of our data in the future.
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AppendixA
Appendix
A.1 LF1 - Full Recovery of the Secret
We provide here an example of the LF1 algorithm, for the LPN512,0.125 instance, where
we recover the full secret. We provide the values of a, b, n and time complexity to show
that indeed the number of queries for the ﬁrst iteration, dominates the number of queries
needed later on. Also, this shows that the time complexity of recovering the ﬁrst block
dominates the total time complexity. For LPN512,0.125, we obtain the following values
(See Table A.1).
The way one can interpret this table is the following: LF1 recovers ﬁrst 74 bits by
taking a = 7 and requiring 276.59 queries. The total complexity of this step, i.e. the
reduction, solving and updating operation, is of 288.57 bit operations. Next, LF1 solves
LPN438,0.125 and continues this process until it recovers the whole secret.
We can easily see that indeed the number of queries and the time complexity of the
ﬁrst block dominate the other values.
A.2 Heuristic Approximation
In our work, we make the following assumption on the failure probability:
E
(
1− (1− ϕ(Z(s)))2k
′−1
)
≈ 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 ,
where s is the secret, of k′ bits, we recover with the Walsh Hadamard Transform (WHT),
ϕ(x) = 12 +
1
2erf(
x√
2
) and erf is the Gauss error function, Z(s) = − δ′(s)√
2−δ′(s)2
√
n′. So, we
consider that the average probability of error is very close to the probability of error,
i.e. E(p(s)) ≈ p, where p = 1 − (1− ϕ(Z))2k
′−1. and Z = − δ′√
2−δ′2
√
n′. The values n′
and δ′ are computed as from our formulae for the biases.
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Table A.1: Full secret recovery for the instance LPN512,0.125
i a b log2 n log2 t
1 7 74 76.59 88.57
2 7 64 66.73 78.50
3 7 55 63.21 74.66
4 6 55 57.32 68.45
5 6 46 48.32 59.19
6 6 39 41.36 51.96
7 6 33 36.51 46.83
8 5 33 35.00 44.90
9 5 27 29.01 38.59
10 5 22 24.26 33.53
11 5 18 21.87 30.79
12 4 18 19.63 28.09
13 4 14 16.06 24.08
14 4 11 14.46 22.07
15 3 11 12.42 19.51
16 3 8 10.68 17.12
17 2 8 9.08 15.02
18 2 4 8.00 12.63
19 1 4 6.73 10.57
In order to validate this assumption, we compare our theory with what we observe
in practice. For this, we take several chains that contain a code reduction (as the
bias introduced by this operation depends on the secret s). The following chains were
analysed:
k=48, tau=0.005, theta=0.33:
(48,5.8)-sparse-(48,2.9)-xor(1)-(47,3.6)-xor(1)-(46,5.1)-xor(2)-(44,7.2)-code
-(1,7.2)-WHT
with the codes [44,1,r]
k=48, tau=0.05, theta=0.33:
(48,6.2100)-sparse-(48,4.70)-xor( 1)-(47,7.35)-xor( 1)-(46,12.69)-code
-(24,12.69)-xor(14)-(10,10.37)-WHT
with the codes [23,12,G][23,12,G]
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k=64, tau=0.05, theta=0.28:
(64,11.30)-sparse-(64,11.3)-code-(10,11.3)-WHT
with the codes [5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r
][7,1,r]
k=64, tau=0.1, theta=0.32:
(64,8.88)-sparse-(64,8.68)- xor( 4)-(60,12.35)-xor(11)-(49,12.70)- xor(11)
-(38,13.40)-code-(23,13.40)-WHT
with the codes [15,11,H][23,12,G]
k=64, tau=0.1, theta = 0.33:
(64,9.3)-sparse-(64,9.1)-xor(4)-(60,13.2)-xor(12)-(48,13.4)-xor(12)-(36,13.8)-
code-(1,13.8)-WHT
with the codes [36,1,r]
k=256, tau=0.2, theta=0.12:
(256,41.94)-sparse-(256,41.94)-xor(37)-(219,45.88)-xor(45)-(174,45.76)-xor(45)
-(129,45.52)-xor(44)-(85,46.04)-code-(45,46.04)-WHT
with the codes [2,1,r][7,4,H][7,4,H][23,12,G][23,12,G][23,12,G]
We obtain the following results:
LPN48,0.05 with the codes [44, 1, r]
• E(p(s)) = 0.4231
• 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 = 0.3220
• 1− (1− ϕ(Z))2k′−1 = 0.310893249450781
• E(δ(s)) = 0.0514
• δ = 0.0573009521884174
• E(Z(s)) = −0.461981714958069
• Z = −0.493326542156718
LPN48,0.05 with the codes [23, 12, G][23, 12, G]
• E(p(s)) = 0.4780
• 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 = 0.0318
• 1− (1− ϕ(Z))2k′−1 = 0.334275183642941
• E(δ(s)) = 0.1298
• δ = 0.129822931628186
• E(Z(s)) = −4.00049008907774
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• Z = −3.35442479599458
LPN64,0.05 with the codes [5, 1, r][5, 1, r][5, 1, r][7, 1, r][7, 1, r][7, 1, r][7, 1, r][7, 1, r][7, 1, r][7, 1, r]
• E(p(s)) = 0.8670
• 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 = 0.074
• 1− (1− ϕ(Z))2k′−1 = 0.282948298443234
• E(δ(s)) = 0.10654
• δ = 0.09580
• E(Z(s)) = −3.79016746911067
• Z = −3.40978448268245
LPN64,0.1 with the codes [15, 11,H][23, 12, G]
• E(p(s)) = 0.5353
• 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 = 0.3274
• 1− (1− ϕ(Z))2k′−1 = 0.335578150280515
• E(δ(s)) = 0.0724
• δ = 0.0724220723200000
• E(Z(s)) = −5.33685553225594
• Z = −5.33137227108397
LPN64,0.1 with the codes [36, 1, r]
• E(p(s)) = 0.4461
• 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 = 0.3159
• 1− (1− ϕ(Z))2k′−1 = 0.316793578967859
• E(δ(s)) = 0.0056
• δ = 0.00564445020331737
• E(Z(s)) = −0.478971239492193
• Z = −0.476684216638090
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LPN256,0.2 with the codes [2, 1, r][7, 4,H][7, 4,H][23, 12, G][23, 12, G][23, 12, G]
• E(p(s)) = 0.7609
• 1− (1− ϕ(E(Z(s))))2k
′−1 = 0.1209
• 1− (1− ϕ(Z))2k′−1 = 0.120943626782345
• E(δ(s)) = 1.2933e − 6
• δ = 1.2933e − 6
• E(Z(s)) = −7.77878914531831
• Z = −7.77878914490038
From this, we conclude that the approximations E(δ(s)) ≈ δ and E(Z(s)) ≈ Z are
correct but that there is a small gap between E(p(s)) and p. The function x → 1 −
(1 − ϕ(x))2k′−1 is convex in the region x ≤ 0 so we rather have E(p(s)) ≥ 1 − (1 −
ϕ(E(Z(s))))2
k′−1.
A.3 Covering Code with a Bias of 0
For a code-reduce we have that bc = E((−1)〈vi−gi,s〉).
For a repetition code [k, 1,D] we have D = k and R = k−12 . Thus, Hw(vi− gi) ≤ R.
When k is odd and the Hw(s) is even we have (−1)〈x,s〉 = (−1)〈x¯,s〉 for any x ∈ {0, 1}k
where x¯ is the complement of x.
Thus,
Evi
(
(−1)〈vi−gi,s〉
)
= Ex
(
(−1)〈x,s〉 | HW(x) ≤ R
)
= Ey
(
(−1)〈y,s〉 | HW(x) > R
)
The second equality holds because R < k2 and because of the aforementioned property.
We also know that Ex((−1)〈x,s〉) = 0 for s 
= 0 as the bits of x are independent. We
deduce that for s 
= 0
Ex((−1)〈x,s〉) = Ex
(
(−1)〈x,s〉|HW(x) ≤ R
)
· Pr[HW(x) ≤ R]+
+ Ex
(
(−1)〈x,s〉|HW(x) > R
)
· Pr[HW(x) > R]
= Ex
(
(−1)〈x,s〉|HW(x) ≤ R
)
· (Pr[HW(x) ≤ R] + Pr[HW(x) > R])
= Ex
(
(−1)〈x,s〉|HW(x) ≤ R
)
= bc
= 0
Thus, bc = 0 for a repetition code [k, 1,D] where k is odd and the Hamming weight
of s is even and s 
= 0.
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A.4 Random Codes
We present below a list of random codes and their bc. The way we generate these codes
is the following: for a [k, k′] code, we generate, step by step, random vectors of size k
until we have k′ independent ones. This will form the generator matrix G. Once we
generate all the 2k
′
codewords, we use our formula to compute the bc. After many trials,
we keep the code with the largest value for bc.
Random Codes for τ = 0.05:
[4, 2] bc = 0.925000000000000
[7, 2] bc = 0.820437500000001
[9, 2] bc = 0.755670312499999
[10, 2] bc = 0.717886796875003
[11, 2] bc = 0.689080273437506
[12, 2] bc = 0.658278378906265
[13, 2] bc = 0.627343367480487
[14, 2] bc = 0.605104670898428
[15, 2] bc = 0.574849437353450
[16, 2] bc = 0.550932480072046
[17, 2] bc = 0.522348102187504
[18, 2] bc = 0.503960971625559
[19, 2] bc = 0.479500628284949
[5, 3] bc = 0.925000000000000
[8, 3] bc = 0.830843750000002
[9, 3] bc = 0.795250000000000
[10, 3] bc = 0.764220312499999
[11, 3] bc = 0.734533281250005
[12, 3] bc = 0.707727851562494
[13, 3] bc = 0.677121250000042
[14, 3] bc = 0.644854535644540
[15, 3] bc = 0.622457954101448
[16, 3] bc = 0.592374557714663
[17, 3] bc = 0.570423946075392
[18, 3] bc = 0.542640210536539
[19, 3] bc = 0.523425509870706
[10, 4] bc = 0.799187499999992
[12, 4] bc = 0.747566406249973
[13, 4] bc = 0.717848281250054
[14, 4] bc = 0.686005234375007
[15, 4] bc = 0.659313910156184
[16, 4] bc = 0.635095716308526
[17, 4] bc = 0.609055215502953
[18, 4] bc = 0.583034990081217
[19, 4] bc = 0.560423084937082
[8, 5] bc = 0.912500000000003
[11, 5] bc = 0.810718749999989
[12, 5] bc = 0.780814062499967
[13, 5] bc = 0.756492578125057
[14, 5] bc = 0.723323867187460
[15, 5] bc = 0.696788447265571
[16, 5] bc = 0.670566863281211
[17, 5] bc = 0.642065001220673
[18, 5] bc = 0.621900535155624
[19, 5] bc = 0.596215895090632
[8, 6] bc = 0.925000000000003
[9, 6] bc = 0.912499999999993
[12, 6] bc = 0.813390624999974
[13, 6] bc = 0.785820312500064
[15, 6] bc = 0.734159374999888
[16, 6] bc = 0.708464716796699
[17, 6] bc = 0.682572705077685
[18, 6] bc = 0.656482291502392
[19, 6] bc = 0.633382513669716
[9, 7] bc = 0.924999999999994
[10, 7] bc = 0.901249999999986
[14, 7] bc = 0.789750781249873
[16, 7] bc = 0.741090429687176
[17, 7] bc = 0.714251874999825
[18, 7] bc = 0.687121879880629
[19, 7] bc = 0.664058937986979
[10, 8] bc = 0.924999999999989
[11, 8] bc = 0.912500000000028
[15, 8] bc = 0.797351562500136
[17, 8] bc = 0.746043945312908
[18, 8] bc = 0.720697158201192
[19, 8] bc = 0.696926562499299
[11, 9] bc = 0.925000000000025
[12, 9] bc = 0.912500000000054
[16, 9] bc = 0.803749999999664
[18, 9] bc = 0.754477929686187
Random Codes for τ = 0.1:
[4, 2] bc = 0.850000000000000
[7, 2] bc = 0.650250000000000
[9, 2] bc = 0.550462500000000
[10, 2] bc = 0.501896250000001
[11, 2] bc = 0.451706624999987
[12, 2] bc = 0.414441562499999
[13, 2] bc = 0.384841406249986
[14, 2] bc = 0.347599265625008
[15, 2] bc = 0.315965939062601
[16, 2] bc = 0.292209785156346
[17, 2] bc = 0.255932410640333
[18, 2] bc = 0.235804919976357
[19, 2] bc = 0.217948973378862
[5, 3] bc = 0.850000000000000
[8, 3] bc = 0.662249999999999
[9, 3] bc = 0.620124999999997
[10, 3] bc = 0.570712499999995
[11, 3] bc = 0.523481249999980
[12, 3] bc = 0.483963124999979
[13, 3] bc = 0.439562812499995
[14, 3] bc = 0.406910531250004
[15, 3] bc = 0.374183078125198
[16, 3] bc = 0.338270570312456
[17, 3] bc = 0.305143173281109
[18, 3] bc = 0.282576971953005
[19, 3] bc = 0.257462926757663
[10, 4] bc = 0.620124999999991
[12, 4] bc = 0.533606249999987
[13, 4] bc = 0.498295625000009
[14, 4] bc = 0.456234062499976
[15, 4] bc = 0.423086156250238
[16, 4] bc = 0.388249140624795
[17, 4] bc = 0.357040026562527
[18, 4] bc = 0.326219003906170
[19, 4] bc = 0.298997873515392
[8, 5] bc = 0.805000000000002
[11, 5] bc = 0.647124999999997
[12, 5] bc = 0.602012500000006
[13, 5] bc = 0.557631250000012
[14, 5] bc = 0.514058124999978
[15, 5] bc = 0.477960312500255
[16, 5] bc = 0.432172781249713
[17, 5] bc = 0.404812453125008
[18, 5] bc = 0.370472807812691
[19, 5] bc = 0.342473907030773
[8, 6] bc = 0.850000000000003
[9, 6] bc = 0.785000000000002
[12, 6] bc = 0.657625000000007
[13, 6] bc = 0.604262500000019
[15, 6] bc = 0.523140625000133
[16, 6] bc = 0.483241562499645
[17, 6] bc = 0.449978906249989
[18, 6] bc = 0.415639015625284
[19, 6] bc = 0.385346414062386
[9, 7] bc = 0.850000000000006
[10, 7] bc = 0.804999999999990
[14, 7] bc = 0.610312500000011
[16, 7] bc = 0.535203124999684
[17, 7] bc = 0.492602812500183
[18, 7] bc = 0.459242031250249
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[19, 7] bc = 0.427382828126207
[10, 8] bc = 0.849999999999990
[11, 8] bc = 0.824999999999974
[15, 8] bc = 0.624562499999774
[17, 8] bc = 0.543265625000525
[18, 8] bc = 0.505529062500634
[19, 8] bc = 0.466630156251362
[11, 9] bc = 0.849999999999978
[12, 9] bc = 0.825000000000046
[16, 9] bc = 0.625812499999804
Random Codes for τ = 0.125:
[4, 2] bc = 0.812500000000000
[7, 2] bc = 0.590820312500000
[9, 2] bc = 0.469238281250000
[10, 2] bc = 0.410583496093750
[11, 2] bc = 0.363045692443848
[12, 2] bc = 0.331746578216553
[13, 2] bc = 0.295313835144043
[14, 2] bc = 0.262624084949493
[15, 2] bc = 0.229796074330807
[16, 2] bc = 0.199777818284929
[17, 2] bc = 0.178411910077557
[18, 2] bc = 0.161525560077280
[19, 2] bc = 0.142899490048876
[5, 3] bc = 0.812500000000000
[8, 3] bc = 0.596679687500000
[9, 3] bc = 0.538574218750000
[10, 3] bc = 0.484985351562500
[11, 3] bc = 0.438781738281250
[12, 3] bc = 0.395263671875000
[13, 3] bc = 0.344362258911133
[14, 3] bc = 0.318330764770508
[15, 3] bc = 0.280164837837219
[16, 3] bc = 0.250766009092331
[17, 3] bc = 0.222185984253883
[18, 3] bc = 0.201188247650862
[19, 3] bc = 0.173051953781396
[10, 4] bc = 0.556884765625000
[12, 4] bc = 0.459289550781250
[13, 4] bc = 0.416761398315430
[14, 4] bc = 0.364337921142578
[15, 4] bc = 0.324589252471924
[16, 4] bc = 0.295842528343201
[17, 4] bc = 0.266516566276550
[18, 4] bc = 0.238161936402321
[19, 4] bc = 0.215231126174331
[8, 5] bc = 0.734375000000000
[11, 5] bc = 0.568603515625000
[12, 5] bc = 0.515930175781250
[13, 5] bc = 0.467575073242188
[14, 5] bc = 0.427307128906250
[15, 5] bc = 0.384399414062500
[16, 5] bc = 0.345722198486328
[17, 5] bc = 0.308802604675293
[18, 5] bc = 0.278767108917236
[19, 5] bc = 0.249812759459019
[8, 6] bc = 0.812500000000000
[9, 6] bc = 0.757812500000000
[12, 6] bc = 0.584716796875000
[13, 6] bc = 0.533325195312500
[15, 6] bc = 0.436737060546875
[16, 6] bc = 0.391594886779785
[17, 6] bc = 0.354474067687988
[18, 6] bc = 0.323782920837402
[19, 6] bc = 0.291754990816116
[9, 7] bc = 0.812500000000000
[10, 7] bc = 0.757812500000000
[14, 7] bc = 0.539184570312500
[16, 7] bc = 0.451797485351562
[17, 7] bc = 0.404412269592285
[18, 7] bc = 0.368431568145752
[19, 7] bc = 0.336303114891052
[10, 8] bc = 0.812500000000000
[11, 8] bc = 0.781250000000000
[15, 8] bc = 0.542846679687500
[17, 8] bc = 0.452558517456055
[18, 8] bc = 0.415075302124023
[19, 8] bc = 0.374835968017578
[11, 9] bc = 0.812500000000000
[12, 9] bc = 0.757812500000000
[16, 9] bc = 0.547607421875000
[18, 9] bc = 0.462966918945312
Random Codes for τ = 0.2:
[4, 2] bc = 0.700000000000000
[7, 2] bc = 0.405500000000000
[9, 2] bc = 0.272749999999999
[10, 2] bc = 0.221980000000003
[11, 2] bc = 0.177584000000003
[12, 2] bc = 0.154187500000002
[13, 2] bc = 0.126058437500001
[14, 2] bc = 0.102578124999976
[15, 2] bc = 0.0806773999999974
[16, 2] bc = 0.0672851875000390
[17, 2] bc = 0.0541784750000697
[18, 2] bc = 0.0430625200001377
[19, 2] bc = 0.0349497860001292
[5, 3] bc = 0.700000000000000
[8, 3] bc = 0.405499999999999
[9, 3] bc = 0.343000000000001
[10, 3] bc = 0.291275000000004
[11, 3] bc = 0.240512500000004
[12, 3] bc = 0.197742500000001
[13, 3] bc = 0.156951999999985
[14, 3] bc = 0.137524624999980
[15, 3] bc = 0.111005200000025
[16, 3] bc = 0.0928898000000887
[17, 3] bc = 0.0767771256251488
[18, 3] bc = 0.0609095375002112
[19, 3] bc = 0.0505532889999707
[10, 4] bc = 0.364750000000007
[12, 4] bc = 0.258325000000002
[13, 4] bc = 0.213679999999971
[14, 4] bc = 0.176458750000002
[15, 4] bc = 0.147204875000059
[16, 4] bc = 0.121787406250114
[17, 4] bc = 0.102391512500167
[18, 4] bc = 0.0842524562500867
[19, 4] bc = 0.0690329674999138
[8, 5] bc = 0.589999999999999
[11, 5] bc = 0.369250000000010
[12, 5] bc = 0.318649999999986
[13, 5] bc = 0.268149999999959
[14, 5] bc = 0.225544999999992
[15, 5] bc = 0.188910625000082
[16, 5] bc = 0.157532562500143
[17, 5] bc = 0.130860062500169
[18, 5] bc = 0.109656978125099
[19, 5] bc = 0.0912561109374092
[8, 6] bc = 0.699999999999998
[9, 6] bc = 0.650000000000002
[12, 6] bc = 0.379749999999974
[13, 6] bc = 0.328624999999967
[15, 6] bc = 0.235025000000079
[16, 6] bc = 0.197588125000182
[17, 6] bc = 0.169437500000210
[18, 6] bc = 0.139357843750180
[19, 6] bc = 0.119218062500138
[9, 7] bc = 0.700000000000003
[10, 7] bc = 0.620000000000010
[14, 7] bc = 0.343999999999986
[16, 7] bc = 0.245225000000221
[17, 7] bc = 0.207013750000245
[18, 7] bc = 0.175233125000239
[19, 7] bc = 0.151714656250229
[10, 8] bc = 0.700000000000010
[11, 8] bc = 0.619999999999996
[15, 8] bc = 0.356000000000120
[17, 8] bc = 0.255875000000282
[18, 8] bc = 0.214251250000277
[19, 8] bc = 0.185132187500286
[11, 9] bc = 0.699999999999990
[12, 9] bc = 0.649999999999956
[16, 9] bc = 0.366875000000244
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Random Codes for τ = 0.25:
[4, 2] bc = 0.625000000000000
[7, 2] bc = 0.292968750000000
[9, 2] bc = 0.184570312500000
[10, 2] bc = 0.143066406250000
[11, 2] bc = 0.107299804687500
[12, 2] bc = 0.0848999023437500
[13, 2] bc = 0.0620727539062500
[14, 2] bc = 0.0496444702148438
[15, 2] bc = 0.0366325378417969
[16, 2] bc = 0.0274744033813477
[17, 2] bc = 0.0209437608718872
[18, 2] bc = 0.0164231657981873
[19, 2] bc = 0.0120856314897537
[5, 3] bc = 0.625000000000000
[8, 3] bc = 0.320312500000000
[9, 3] bc = 0.250000000000000
[10, 3] bc = 0.196289062500000
[11, 3] bc = 0.150146484375000
[12, 3] bc = 0.121704101562500
[13, 3] bc = 0.0912780761718750
[14, 3] bc = 0.0709533691406250
[15, 3] bc = 0.0566749572753906
[16, 3] bc = 0.0420742034912109
[17, 3] bc = 0.0335798263549805
[18, 3] bc = 0.0254254341125488
[19, 3] bc = 0.0197929143905640
[10, 4] bc = 0.263671875000000
[12, 4] bc = 0.168457031250000
[13, 4] bc = 0.129882812500000
[14, 4] bc = 0.101013183593750
[15, 4] bc = 0.0771789550781250
[16, 4] bc = 0.0606994628906250
[17, 4] bc = 0.0467262268066406
[18, 4] bc = 0.0371999740600586
[19, 4] bc = 0.0295500755310059
[8, 5] bc = 0.531250000000000
[11, 5] bc = 0.275390625000000
[12, 5] bc = 0.218750000000000
[13, 5] bc = 0.170166015625000
[14, 5] bc = 0.138671875000000
[15, 5] bc = 0.111480712890625
[16, 5] bc = 0.0867004394531250
[17, 5] bc = 0.0682830810546875
[18, 5] bc = 0.0538368225097656
[19, 5] bc = 0.0424060821533203
[8, 6] bc = 0.625000000000000
[9, 6] bc = 0.500000000000000
[12, 6] bc = 0.292968750000000
[13, 6] bc = 0.230468750000000
[15, 6] bc = 0.147705078125000
[16, 6] bc = 0.118072509765625
[17, 6] bc = 0.0952911376953125
[18, 6] bc = 0.0742111206054688
[19, 6] bc = 0.0585670471191406
[9, 7] bc = 0.625000000000000
[10, 7] bc = 0.531250000000000
[14, 7] bc = 0.240234375000000
[16, 7] bc = 0.154541015625000
[17, 7] bc = 0.119049072265625
[18, 7] bc = 0.0965576171875000
[19, 7] bc = 0.0788497924804688
[10, 8] bc = 0.625000000000000
[11, 8] bc = 0.562500000000000
[15, 8] bc = 0.251953125000000
[17, 8] bc = 0.162719726562500
[18, 8] bc = 0.134338378906250
[19, 8] bc = 0.106536865234375
[11, 9] bc = 0.625000000000000
[12, 9] bc = 0.531250000000000
[16, 9] bc = 0.255859375000000
[18, 9] bc = 0.171264648437500
The random codes used for LPN512,0.125 have the following generator matrices:
[18,6]
G is:
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0)
(0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)
[19,7]
G is:
(0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0)
(0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
(0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
[19,6]
G is:
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
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(1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0)
(1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0)
A.5 Solving LPN without guess-secret
We present below the chains without guess-secret . The codes used in the code-reduce cor-
respond to the perfect and quasi-perfect codes presented in the paper, to which we
add random codes that we generated. The list of random codes can be found in this
document as well.
% below, lsumc and lmaxc are the logarithmic total and max- complexities
% what follows uses precision .1, without guess
k=32 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=11.26 lsumc=13.89:
(32,11.2)-drop(1)-(31,10.2)-drop(4)-(27,6.2)-xor(5)-(22,6.4)-xor(5)-(17,6.8)-
xor(6)-(11,6.6)-xor(5)-(6,7.2)-xor(5)-(1,8.4)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=12.70 lsumc=15.04:
(32,12.7)-drop(1)-(31,11.7)-drop(4)-(27,7.7)-xor(7)-(20,7.4)-xor(6)-(14,7.8)-
xor(6)-(8,8.6)-xor(7)-(1,9.2)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=13.52 lsumc=15.66:
(32,13.3)-drop(1)-(31,12.3)-drop(4)-(27,8.3)-xor(7)-(20,8.6)-xor(7)-(13,9.2)-
xor(8)-(5,9.4)-drop(4)-(1,5.4)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=14.80 lsumc=17.01:
(32,14.8)-drop(1)-(31,13.8)-drop(4)-(27,9.8)-xor(9)-(18,9.6)-xor(8)-(10,10.2)
-xor(8)-(2,11.4)-drop(1)-(1,10.4)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=16.30 lsumc=18.42:
(32,16.3)-drop(1)-(31,15.3)-drop(4)-(27,11.3)-xor(11)-(16,10.6)-xor(8)
-(8,12.2)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=12.94 lsumc=14.52:
(48,5.8)-sparse-(48,2.9)-xor(1)-(47,3.6)-xor(1)-(46,5.1)-xor(2)-(44,7.2)-code
([44,1,r])-(1,7.2)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=16.43 lsumc=18.58:
(48,16)-drop(1)-(47,15)-drop(4)-(43,11)-xor(10)-(33,11)-xor(10)-(23,11)-xor
(10)-(13,11)-xor(9)-(4,12)-drop(3)-(1,9)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=17.00 lsumc=19.29:
(48,16.5)-drop(1)-(47,15.5)-drop(4)-(43,11.5)-xor(11)-(32,11)-xor(9)-(23,12)-
xor(11)-(12,12)-xor(10)-(2,13)-drop(1)-(1,12)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=19.23 lsumc=21.25:
(48,18.8)-drop(1)-(47,17.8)-drop(4)-(43,13.8)-xor(13)-(30,13.6)-xor(12)
-(18,14.2)-xor(13)-(5,14.4)-drop(4)-(1,10.4)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=20.43 lsumc=22.34:
(48,20)-drop(1)-(47,19)-drop(4)-(43,15)-xor(14)-(29,15)-xor(14)-(15,15)-drop
(2)-(13,13)-WHT
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k=64 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=14.43 lsumc=16.04:
(64,6.3)-sparse-(64,3.9)-xor(1)-(63,5.7)-xor(2)-(61,8.4)-code([61,1,r])
-(1,8.4)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=19.38 lsumc=21.58:
(64,9.3)-sparse-(64,9.1)-xor(4)-(60,13.2)-xor(12)-(48,13.4)-xor(12)-(36,13.8)
-code([36,1,r])-(1,13.8)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=20.50 lsumc=22.94:
(64,20.5)-drop(1)-(63,19.5)-drop(5)-(58,14.5)-xor(14)-(44,14)-xor(12)-(32,15)
-xor(14)-(18,15)-xor(13)-(5,16)-drop(4)-(1,12)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=22.00 lsumc=24.42:
(64,22)-drop(1)-(63,21)-drop(5)-(58,16)-xor(15)-(43,16)-xor(15)-(28,16)-xor
(14)-(14,17)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=24.58 lsumc=26.86:
(64,24.5)-drop(1)-(63,23.5)-drop(5)-(58,18.5)-xor(18)-(40,18)-xor(16)-(24,19)
-xor(17)-(7,20)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=18.46 lsumc=20.47:
(100,7.9)-sparse-(100,7.1)-xor(2)-(98,11.2)-xor(10)-(88,11.4)-xor(10)
-(78,11.8)-code([78,1,r])-(1,11.8)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=25.39 lsumc=27.61:
(100,14.9)-sparse-(100,14.9)-xor(11)-(89,17.8)-xor(16)-(73,18.6)-xor(17)
-(56,19.2)-code([18,5,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927])
-(17,19.2)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=26.30 lsumc=28.91:
(100,26.3)-drop(1)-(99,25.3)-drop(6)-(93,19.3)-xor(18)-(75,19.6)-xor(19)
-(56,19.2)-xor(17)-(39,20.4)-xor(19)-(20,20.8)-drop(2)-(18,18.8)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=29.75 lsumc=32.06:
(100,29.1)-drop(1)-(99,28.1)-drop(5)-(94,23.1)-xor(22)-(72,23.2)-xor(22)
-(50,23.4)-xor(22)-(28,23.8)-drop(6)-(22,17.8)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=30.75 lsumc=32.94:
(100,30.1)-drop(1)-(99,29.1)-drop(5)-(94,24.1)-xor(23)-(71,24.2)-xor(23)
-(48,24.4)-xor(23)-(25,24.8)-drop(3)-(22,21.8)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=34.45 lsumc=36.75:
(256,21.8)-sparse-(256,21.8)-xor(17)-(239,25.6)-xor(24)-(215,26.2)-xor(25)
-(190,26.4)-xor(25)-(165,26.8)-code([165,1,r])-(1,26.8)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=44.22 lsumc=46.75:
(256,32.3)-sparse-(256,32.3)-xor(28)-(228,35.6)-xor(34)-(194,36.2)-xor(35)
-(159,36.4)-xor(35)-(124,36.8)-code([11,4,S][18,5,rnd150927][19,5,
rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927
])-(34,36.8)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=47.35 lsumc=49.90:
(256,35.6)-sparse-(256,35.6)-xor(31)-(225,39.2)-xor(38)-(187,39.4)-xor(38)
-(149,39.8)-xor(39)-(110,39.6)-code([15,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926])-(37,39.6)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=53.82 lsumc=56.31:
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(256,42.4)-sparse-(256,42.4)-xor(38)-(218,45.8)-xor(45)-(173,45.6)-xor(44)
-(129,46.2)-xor(45)-(84,46.4)-code([15,7,2BCH][25,15,W][25,15,W][19,7,
rnd150927])-(44,46.4)-drop(1)-(43,45.4)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=56.88 lsumc=59.47:
(256,56.7)-drop(1)-(255,55.7)-drop(7)-(248,48.7)-xor(48)-(200,48.4)-xor(47)
-(153,48.8)-xor(47)-(106,49.6)-xor(59)-(47,39.2)-WHT
k=512 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=55.09 lsumc=57.77:
(512,41.3)-sparse-(512,41.3)-xor(36)-(476,45.6)-xor(44)-(432,46.2)-xor(46)
-(386,45.4)-xor(44)-(342,45.8)-xor(44)-(298,46.6)-code([9,1,r][9,1,r
][11,1,r][11,1,r][11,1,r][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927
][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,
rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927
][19,3,rnd150927])-(44,46.6)-WHT
k=512 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=70.92 lsumc=73.68:
(512,57.4)-sparse-(512,57.4)-xor(52)-(460,61.8)-xor(61)-(399,61.6)-xor(60)
-(339,62.2)-xor(61)-(278,62.4)-xor(61)-(217,62.8)-code([8,2,iGop][19,5,
rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927
][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,
rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927])-(59,62.8)-WHT
k=512 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=76.22 lsumc=78.85:
(512,63.3)-sparse-(512,63.3)-xor(59)-(453,66.6)-xor(65)-(388,67.2)-xor(66)
-(322,67.4)-xor(66)-(256,67.8)-xor(67)-(189,67.6)-code([18,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926
])-(64,67.6)-WHT
k=512 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=86.38 lsumc=89.04:
(512,73.6)-sparse-(512,73.6)-xor(69)-(443,77.2)-xor(76)-(367,77.4)-xor(76)
-(291,77.8)-xor(77)-(214,77.6)-xor(76)-(138,78.2)-code([23,12,G][25,15,W
][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][15,4,rnd150927])-(76,78.2)-drop(2)-(74,76.2)-
WHT
k=512 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=91.97 lsumc=94.66:
(512,79.3)-sparse-(512,79.3)-xor(75)-(437,82.6)-xor(81)-(356,83.2)-xor(82)
-(274,83.4)-xor(82)-(192,83.8)-xor(83)-(109,83.6)-code([31,26,H][16,15,
Chop][31,20,W][31,20,W])-(81,83.6)-drop(1)-(80,82.6)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=74.03 lsumc=76.63:
(768,60)-sparse-(768,60)-xor(55)-(713,64)-xor(63)-(650,64)-xor(63)-(587,64)-
xor(63)-(524,64)-xor(62)-(462,65)-code([11,1,r][11,1,r][19,3,rnd150927
][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,
rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][13,1,r][13,1,r][13,1,r][13,1,r][13,1,r][13,1,r
][13,1,r][13,1,r][13,1,r][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927
][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,
rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927])-(62,65)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=96.04 lsumc=98.97:
(768,82.1)-sparse-(768,82.1)-xor(77)-(691,86.2)-xor(85)-(606,86.4)-xor(85)
-(521,86.8)-xor(86)-(435,86.6)-xor(85)-(350,87.2)-xor(86)-(264,87.4)-code
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([17,5,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,
rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927
][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,
rnd150927])-(83,87.4)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=103.01 lsumc=105.89:
(768,89.1)-sparse-(768,89.1)-xor(84)-(684,93.2)-xor(92)-(592,93.4)-xor(92)
-(500,93.8)-xor(93)-(407,93.6)-xor(92)-(315,94.2)-xor(93)-(222,94.4)-code
([25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][14,3,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926])-(90,94.4)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=118.18 lsumc=121.04:
(768,104.7)-sparse-(768,104.7)-xor(100)-(668,108.4)-xor(107)-(561,108.8)-xor
(108)-(453,108.6)-xor(107)-(346,109.2)-xor(108)-(238,109.4)-xor(108)
-(130,109.8)-code([63,57,H][16,15,Chop][20,13,W][31,20,W])-(105,109.8)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=124.63 lsumc=127.35:
(768,111.3)-sparse-(768,111.3)-xor(107)-(661,114.6)-xor(113)-(548,115.2)-xor
(114)-(434,115.4)-xor(114)-(320,115.8)-xor(115)-(205,115.6)-code([5,1,r
][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W])
-(121,115.6)-drop(9)-(112,106.6)-WHT
A.6 Solving LPN with guess-secret
We present below the chains that use guess-secret .
% below, lsumc and lmaxc are the logarithmic total and max- complexities
% lrep is the logarithmic number of repetitions applied to WHT
% what follows uses precision .1, with guess
k=32 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=10.90 lsumc=11.85 lrep=8.57:
(32,5.1)-sparse-(32,1.2)-guess(13,3)-(19,1.2)-code([19,1,r])-(1,1.2)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=11.65 lsumc=12.41 lrep=8.87:
(32,5.1)-sparse-(32,1.2)-guess(23,2)-(9,1.2)-code([9,1,r])-(1,1.2)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=12.40 lsumc=13.30 lrep=9.96:
(32,5.1)-sparse-(32,1.2)-guess(26,2)-(6,1.2)-code([6,1,r])-(1,1.2)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=14.80 lsumc=17.01 lrep=0.00:
(32,14.8)-drop(1)-(31,13.8)-drop(4)-(27,9.8)-xor(9)-(18,9.6)-xor(8)-(10,10.2)
-xor(8)-(2,11.4)-drop(1)-(1,10.4)-WHT
k=32 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=16.30 lsumc=18.42 lrep=0.00:
(32,16.3)-drop(1)-(31,15.3)-drop(4)-(27,11.3)-xor(11)-(16,10.6)-xor(8)
-(8,12.2)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=12.52 lsumc=13.01 lrep=8.27:
(48,5.7)-sparse-(48,2)-guess(23,2)-(25,2)-code([25,1,r])-(1,2)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=14.25 lsumc=15.23 lrep=11.35:
(48,5.7)-sparse-(48,2)-guess(37,2)-(11,2)-code([11,1,r])-(1,2)-WHT
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k=48 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=15.49 lsumc=16.49 lrep=12.68:
(48,5.7)-sparse-(48,2)-guess(39,2)-(9,2)-code([9,1,r])-(1,2)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=19.23 lsumc=21.25 lrep=0.00:
(48,18.8)-drop(1)-(47,17.8)-drop(4)-(43,13.8)-xor(13)-(30,13.6)-xor(12)
-(18,14.2)-xor(13)-(5,14.4)-drop(4)-(1,10.4)-WHT
k=48 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=20.43 lsumc=22.34 lrep=0.00:
(48,20)-drop(1)-(47,19)-drop(4)-(43,15)-xor(14)-(29,15)-xor(14)-(15,15)-drop
(2)-(13,13)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=13.74 lsumc=14.44 lrep=10.04:
(64,6.1)-sparse-(64,2.2)-guess(38,2)-(26,2.2)-code([26,1,r])-(1,2.2)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=16.76 lsumc=17.71 lrep=13.80:
(64,6.1)-sparse-(64,2.2)-guess(52,2)-(12,2.2)-code([12,1,r])-(1,2.2)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=18.61 lsumc=20.57 lrep=12.07:
(64,6.8)-sparse-(64,5.6)-xor(1)-(63,9.2)-xor(8)-(55,9.4)-guess(36,2)-(19,9.4)
-code([19,4,rnd150926])-(4,9.4)-drop(3)-(1,6.4)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=22.00 lsumc=24.42 lrep=0.00:
(64,22)-drop(1)-(63,21)-drop(5)-(58,16)-xor(15)-(43,16)-xor(15)-(28,16)-xor
(14)-(14,17)-WHT
k=64 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=24.58 lsumc=26.86 lrep=0.00:
(64,24.5)-drop(1)-(63,23.5)-drop(5)-(58,18.5)-xor(18)-(40,18)-xor(16)-(24,19)
-xor(17)-(7,20)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=16.19 lsumc=17.20 lrep=13.37:
(100,6.7)-sparse-(100,2)-guess(75,2)-(25,2)-code([25,1,r])-(1,2)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=22.14 lsumc=24.02 lrep=17.74:
(100,6.9)-sparse-(100,4.3)-xor(1)-(99,6.5)-xor(3)-(96,9)-guess(77,2)-(19,9)-
code([19,6,rnd150927])-(6,9)-drop(5)-(1,4)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=24.80 lsumc=27.14 lrep=16.87:
(100,11.2)-sparse-(100,11.1)-xor(6)-(94,15.2)-xor(14)-(80,15.4)-xor(15)
-(65,14.8)-guess(47,3)-(18,14.8)-code([18,8,rnd150926])-(8,14.8)-drop(7)
-(1,7.8)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=29.75 lsumc=32.06 lrep=0.00:
(100,29.1)-drop(1)-(99,28.1)-drop(5)-(94,23.1)-xor(22)-(72,23.2)-xor(22)
-(50,23.4)-xor(22)-(28,23.8)-drop(6)-(22,17.8)-WHT
k=100 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=30.75 lsumc=32.94 lrep=0.00:
(100,30.1)-drop(1)-(99,29.1)-drop(5)-(94,24.1)-xor(23)-(71,24.2)-xor(23)
-(48,24.4)-xor(23)-(25,24.8)-drop(3)-(22,21.8)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=28.02 lsumc=30.13 lrep=17.28:
(256,8.1)-sparse-(256,4.2)-xor(1)-(255,6.3)-xor(2)-(253,9.6)-xor(8)
-(245,10.2)-guess(178,1)-(67,10.2)-code([67,1,r])-(1,10.2)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=43.49 lsumc=45.99 lrep=27.36:
(256,26)-sparse-(256,26)-xor(21)-(235,30)-xor(29)-(206,30)-xor(29)-(177,30)-
xor(29)-(148,30)-guess(100,4)-(48,30)-code([11,4,S][18,5,rnd150927][19,6,
rnd150927])-(15,30)-drop(14)-(1,16)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=47.35 lsumc=49.90 lrep=0.00:
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(256,35.6)-sparse-(256,35.6)-xor(31)-(225,39.2)-xor(38)-(187,39.4)-xor(38)
-(149,39.8)-xor(39)-(110,39.6)-code([15,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926])-(37,39.6)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=53.82 lsumc=56.34 lrep=1.00:
(256,42.4)-sparse-(256,42.4)-xor(38)-(218,45.8)-xor(45)-(173,45.6)-xor(44)
-(129,46.2)-xor(45)-(84,46.4)-guess(1,1)-(83,46.4)-code([14,6,FP][25,15,W
][25,15,W][19,7,rnd150927])-(43,46.4)-drop(1)-(42,45.4)-WHT
k=256 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=56.88 lsumc=59.47 lrep=0.00:
(256,56.7)-drop(1)-(255,55.7)-drop(7)-(248,48.7)-xor(48)-(200,48.4)-xor(47)
-(153,48.8)-xor(47)-(106,49.6)-xor(59)-(47,39.2)-WHT
% what follows uses precision 1
k=512 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=47.29 lsumc=49.56 lrep=39.23:
(512,10)-sparse-(512,9)-xor(2)-(510,15)-xor(14)-(496,15)-xor(14)-(482,15)-
guess(417,2)-(65,15)-code([13,1,r][14,1,r][19,3,rnd150927][19,3,rnd150927
])-(8,15)-drop(7)-(1,8)-WHT
k=512 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=71.09 lsumc=73.68 lrep=1.60:
(512,58)-sparse-(512,58)-xor(53)-(459,62)-xor(61)-(398,62)-xor(61)-(337,62)-
xor(61)-(276,62)-xor(61)-(215,62)-guess(2,1)-(213,62)-code([5,1,r][18,5,
rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927
][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927][19,5,
rnd150927][19,5,rnd150927])-(58,62)-WHT
k=512 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=76.24 lsumc=78.97 lrep=0.19:
(512,63)-sparse-(512,63)-xor(58)-(454,67)-xor(66)-(388,67)-xor(66)-(322,67)-
xor(66)-(256,67)-xor(65)-(191,68)-guess(1,0)-(190,68)-code([19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926
])-(64,68)-WHT
k=512 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=86.79 lsumc=89.28 lrep=2.16:
(512,74)-sparse-(512,74)-xor(70)-(442,77)-xor(76)-(366,77)-xor(75)-(291,78)-
xor(77)-(214,78)-xor(77)-(137,78)-guess(3,1)-(134,78)-code([25,15,W
][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][9,4,BBD])-(79,78)-drop(6)-(73,72)-
WHT
k=512 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=92.36 lsumc=94.85 lrep=1.68:
(512,79)-sparse-(512,79)-xor(74)-(438,83)-xor(82)-(356,83)-xor(82)-(274,83)-
xor(81)-(193,84)-xor(83)-(110,84)-guess(2,1)-(108,84)-code([15,11,H
][31,26,H][31,20,W][31,20,W])-(77,84)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.050 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=65.98 lsumc=68.15 lrep=58.89:
(768,10)-sparse-(768,8)-xor(1)-(767,14)-xor(12)-(755,15)-xor(14)-(741,15)-
guess(682,2)-(59,15)-code([7,1,r][7,1,r][19,3,rnd150927][7,1,r][19,3,
rnd150927])-(9,15)-drop(8)-(1,7)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.100 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=96.34 lsumc=99.21 lrep=0.76:
(768,82)-sparse-(768,82)-xor(77)-(691,86)-xor(85)-(606,86)-xor(85)-(521,86)-
xor(85)-(436,86)-xor(85)-(351,86)-xor(84)-(267,87)-guess(5,0)-(262,87)-
code([15,5,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927
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][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,
rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927][19,6,rnd150927
][19,6,rnd150927])-(83,87)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=103.42 lsumc=106.18 lrep=2.44:
(768,89)-sparse-(768,89)-xor(84)-(684,93)-xor(92)-(592,93)-xor(91)-(501,94)-
xor(93)-(408,94)-xor(93)-(315,94)-xor(92)-(223,95)-guess(4,1)-(219,95)-
code([25,15,W][25,15,W][18,6,rnd150926][18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,
rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926])-(88,95)-drop(1)-(87,94)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.200 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=118.57 lsumc=121.12 lrep=0.00:
(768,116)-drop(7)-(761,109)-xor(108)-(653,109)-xor(108)-(545,109)-xor(108)
-(437,109)-xor(108)-(329,109)-xor(107)-(222,110)-xor(109)-(113,110)-drop
(7)-(106,103)-WHT
k=768 tau=0.250 theta=0.33 precision=1.00 lmaxc=125.01 lsumc=127.63 lrep=2.25:
(768,111)-sparse-(768,111)-xor(106)-(662,115)-xor(114)-(548,115)-xor(114)
-(434,115)-xor(113)-(321,116)-xor(115)-(206,116)-guess(3,1)-(203,116)-code
([3,1,r][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W
][25,15,W])-(121,116)-drop(11)-(110,105)-WHT
A.7 Solving LPN512,0.125
We present here the chains for a complete recovery of the secret in the case of LPN512,0.125.
Step 1:
k=512 tau=0.125 theta=0.33 precision=0.10 lmaxc=76.22 lsumc=78.85:
(512,63.3)-sparse-(512,63.3)-xor(59)-(453,66.6)-xor(65)-(388,67.2)-xor(66)
-(322,67.4)-xor(66)-(256,67.8)-xor(67)-(189,67.6)-code([18,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926
])-(64,67.6)-WHT
Step 2:
k=448 tau=0.125 theta=0.11 precision=0.10 lmaxc=69.20 lsumc=71.99:
(448,56.6)-sparse-(448,56.6)-xor(52)-(396,60.2)-xor(59)-(337,60.4)-xor(59)
-(278,60.8)-xor(60)-(218,60.6)-xor(59)-(159,61.2)-code([25,15,W][25,15,W
][14,3,rnd150926][19,4,rnd150926][19,4,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926])-(59,61.2)-drop(1)-(58,60.2)-WHT
Step 3:
k=390 tau=0.125 theta=0.04 precision=0.10 lmaxc=62.70 lsumc=65.39:
(390,50.3)-sparse-(390,50.3)-xor(46)-(344,53.6)-xor(52)-(292,54.2)-xor(53)
-(239,54.4)-xor(53)-(186,54.8)-xor(54)-(132,54.6)-code([25,15,W][13,4,
rnd150926][18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926
][19,7,rnd150926])-(51,54.6)-WHT
Step 4:
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k=339 tau=0.125 theta=0.01 precision=0.10 lmaxc=57.06 lsumc=59.78:
(339,44.7)-sparse-(339,44.7)-xor(40)-(299,48.4)-xor(47)-(252,48.8)-xor(48)
-(204,48.6)-xor(47)-(157,49.2)-xor(48)-(109,49.4)-code([3,1,r][25,15,W
][25,15,W][18,5,rnd150926][19,4,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926])-(46,49.4)-WHT
Step 5:
k=293 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=51.81 lsumc=54.52:
(293,39.7)-sparse-(293,39.7)-xor(35)-(258,43.4)-xor(42)-(216,43.8)-xor(43)
-(173,43.6)-xor(42)-(131,44.2)-xor(43)-(88,44.4)-code([25,15,W][25,15,W
][19,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926])-(41,44.4)-WHT
Step 6:
k=252 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=47.00 lsumc=49.61:
(252,34.8)-sparse-(252,34.8)-xor(30)-(222,38.6)-xor(37)-(185,39.2)-xor(38)
-(147,39.4)-xor(38)-(109,39.8)-code([14,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926])-(37,39.8)-WHT
Step 7:
k=215 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=42.36 lsumc=44.86:
(215,30.7)-sparse-(215,30.7)-xor(26)-(189,34.4)-xor(33)-(156,34.8)-xor(34)
-(122,34.6)-xor(33)-(89,35.2)-code([7,1,r][25,15,W][19,6,rnd150926][19,4,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926])-(32,35.2)-WHT
Step 8:
k=183 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=38.35 lsumc=40.76:
(183,27)-sparse-(183,27)-xor(23)-(160,30)-xor(28)-(132,31)-xor(30)-(102,31)-
xor(30)-(72,31)-code([25,15,W][13,4,rnd150926][16,5,rnd150926][18,5,
rnd150926])-(29,31)-WHT
Step 9:
k=154 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=34.38 lsumc=36.94:
(154,23.5)-sparse-(154,23.5)-xor(19)-(135,27)-xor(26)-(109,27)-xor(26)
-(83,27)-xor(25)-(58,28)-code([25,15,W][15,5,rnd150926][18,5,rnd150926])
-(25,28)-WHT
Step 10:
k=129 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=31.34 lsumc=33.82:
(129,20.6)-sparse-(129,20.6)-xor(16)-(113,24.2)-xor(23)-(90,24.4)-xor(23)
-(67,24.8)-xor(24)-(43,24.6)-code([25,15,W][18,7,rnd150926])-(22,24.6)-WHT
Step 11:
k=107 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=27.85 lsumc=30.15:
(107,27)-drop(1)-(106,26)-drop(5)-(101,21)-xor(20)-(81,21)-xor(20)-(61,21)-
xor(20)-(41,21)-xor(19)-(22,22)-drop(2)-(20,20)-WHT
Step 12:
k=87 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=24.54 lsumc=27.05:
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(87,24.1)-drop(1)-(86,23.1)-drop(5)-(81,18.1)-xor(17)-(64,18.2)-xor(17)
-(47,18.4)-xor(17)-(30,18.8)-xor(17)-(13,19.6)-WHT
Step 13:
k=74 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=23.30 lsumc=25.55:
(74,22.9)-drop(1)-(73,21.9)-drop(5)-(68,16.9)-xor(16)-(52,16.8)-xor(15)
-(37,17.6)-xor(21)-(16,13.2)-WHT
Step 14:
k=58 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=19.80 lsumc=22.19:
(58,19.8)-drop(1)-(57,18.8)-drop(5)-(52,13.8)-xor(13)-(39,13.6)-xor(12)
-(27,14.2)-xor(13)-(14,14.4)-drop(1)-(13,13.4)-WHT
Step 15:
k=45 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=17.29 lsumc=19.69:
(45,17)-drop(1)-(44,16)-drop(5)-(39,11)-xor(9)-(30,12)-xor(11)-(19,12)-drop
(1)-(18,11)-xor(8)-(10,13)-WHT
Step 16:
k=35 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=15.97 lsumc=17.96:
(35,15.7)-drop(1)-(34,14.7)-drop(4)-(30,10.7)-xor(10)-(20,10.4)-xor(9)
-(11,10.8)-drop(1)-(10,9.8)-WHT
Step 17:
k=25 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=13.30 lsumc=15.33:
(25,12.9)-drop(1)-(24,11.9)-drop(3)-(21,8.9)-xor(8)-(13,8.8)-xor(7)-(6,9.6)-
WHT
Step 18:
k=19 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=12.21 lsumc=14.30:
(19,11.9)-drop(1)-(18,10.9)-drop(3)-(15,7.9)-xor(9)-(6,5.8)-xor(1)-(5,9.6)-
WHT
Step 19:
k=14 tau=0.125 theta=0.00 precision=0.10 lmaxc=10.93 lsumc=10.93:
(14,4)-sparse-guess(14)
Overall, the complexity of going through all chains is
278.85 + 271.99 + 265.39 + 259.78 + 254.52 + 249.61 + 244.86 + 240.76 + 236.94
+ 233.82 + 230.15 + 227.05 + 225.55 + 222.19 + 219.69 + 217.96 + 215.33
+ 214.30 + 210.93 ≈ 278.86
with a probability of success at least 12 .
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A.8 Chains from [GJL14] and [ZJW16]
In this section, we present the analysis on the results from ASIACRYPT’14 [GJL14] and
EUROCRYPT’16 [ZJW16]. We compute complexities and biases following our formulas,
and always use the largest pool of codes that we had to have the most favorable results.
Sometimes, the number of initial queries is either too small or too large to have a failure
probability close to 33% so we correct it to be able to compare chains. Together with
these chains, we provide the best ones that we found.
In the data below, lcomp denotes the logarithmic complexity in each step of the chain,
lbc2 denotes the logarithmic value of δ2s , lr_all denotes the logarithmic number of ne-
cessary average of repetitions of the overall chain for guessing to succeed, lr_wht denotes
the logarithmic number of repetitions which apply to WHT only, lmaxcomp denotes the
logarithmic max-complexity, ltotcomp denotes the logarithmic total complexity of the
chain. The name of the reduction steps diﬀer a bit: sparse denotes sparse-secret , part de-
notes partition-reduce, xor denotes xor -reduce, guess denotes guess-secret , and code denotes
code-reduce. For each chain, we put the computations for the exact chain instead of the
rounded one. Each reduction step is followed by the indication of the vertex (k, log2 n).
A.8.1 Chains for LPN512,1/8
Here is the chain proposed in [GJL14] (proceedings) with a claimed complexity of 279.9:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^66.3000
sparse-(512,66.30) lcomp=79.245 lbc2=-0.830
part(63)-(449,66.15) lcomp=75.300 lbc2=-1.660
part(63)-(386,65.97) lcomp=74.956 lbc2=-3.320
part(63)-(323,65.78) lcomp=74.565 lbc2=-6.641
part(63)-(260,65.55) lcomp=74.111 lbc2=-13.281
part(63)-(197,65.28) lcomp=73.571 lbc2=-26.562
part(63)-(134,64.94) lcomp=72.900 lbc2=-53.125
guess(10u2)-(124,64.94) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-53.125
code-(64,64.94) lcomp=71.899 lbc2=-65.809
WHT(theta=100.00) lcomp=75.125
lr_all=0.184 lr_wht=5.807
lmaxcomp=81.12
ltotcomp=81.58
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-12.684598566058570684917951628899665523
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[5,1,r][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,12,FP][25,15,W][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^73.2200
sparse-(512,73.22) lcomp=85.769 lbc2=-0.830
part(63)-(449,73.22) lcomp=82.220 lbc2=-1.660
part(63)-(386,73.22) lcomp=82.029 lbc2=-3.320
part(63)-(323,73.22) lcomp=81.810 lbc2=-6.641
part(63)-(260,73.22) lcomp=81.552 lbc2=-13.281
140
part(63)-(197,73.21) lcomp=81.238 lbc2=-26.562
part(63)-(134,73.21) lcomp=80.836 lbc2=-53.125
guess(10u2)-(124,73.21) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-53.125
code-(64,73.21) lcomp=80.167 lbc2=-65.809
WHT(theta=28.00) lcomp=79.300
lr_all=0.184 lr_wht=5.807
lmaxcomp=85.95
ltotcomp=86.96
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-12.684598566058570684917951628899665523
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[5,1,r][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,12,FP][25,15,W][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain presented by [GJL14] (presented at the conference) with a claimed
complexity of 279.7:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^63.7000
sparse-(512,63.70) lcomp=76.467 lbc2=-0.830
xor(62)-(450,64.40) lcomp=73.400 lbc2=-1.660
xor(62)-(388,65.80) lcomp=74.614 lbc2=-3.320
xor(62)-(326,68.60) lcomp=77.200 lbc2=-6.641
xor(62)-(264,74.20) lcomp=82.549 lbc2=-13.281
xor(62)-(202,85.40) lcomp=93.444 lbc2=-26.562
guess(22u2)-(180,85.40) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(60,85.40) lcomp=92.892 lbc2=-58.986
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=91.307
lr_all=1.091 lr_wht=7.989
lmaxcomp=100.39
ltotcomp=100.43
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-32.423925711598927470606260602594044481
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[3,1,r][25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][19,4,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^63.1030
sparse-(512,63.10) lcomp=76.101 lbc2=-0.830
xor(62)-(450,63.21) lcomp=72.206 lbc2=-1.660
xor(62)-(388,63.41) lcomp=72.226 lbc2=-3.320
xor(62)-(326,63.82) lcomp=72.424 lbc2=-6.641
xor(62)-(264,64.65) lcomp=72.997 lbc2=-13.281
xor(62)-(202,66.30) lcomp=74.340 lbc2=-26.562
guess(22u2)-(180,66.30) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(60,66.30) lcomp=73.788 lbc2=-58.986
WHT(theta=26.00) lcomp=72.717
lr_all=1.091 lr_wht=7.989
lmaxcomp=81.80
ltotcomp=81.90
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-32.423925711598927470606260602594044481
used code family: old+QP+rnd
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params=[3,1,r][25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][19,4,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF1 with a claimed complexity of 275.897:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^71.2910
drop( 5)-(507,66.29) lcomp=72.245 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(507,66.29) lcomp=79.225 lbc2=-0.830
part(63)-(444,66.14) lcomp=75.277 lbc2=-1.660
part(63)-(381,65.96) lcomp=74.930 lbc2=-3.320
part(63)-(318,65.76) lcomp=74.535 lbc2=-6.641
part(63)-(255,65.53) lcomp=74.076 lbc2=-13.281
part(63)-(192,65.26) lcomp=73.527 lbc2=-26.562
guess(20u1)-(172,65.26) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(62,65.26) lcomp=72.686 lbc2=-55.531
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=73.371
lr_all=1.905 lr_wht=4.392
lmaxcomp=81.13
ltotcomp=81.79
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-28.968290632587130827717807602787613454
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][14,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^70.5660
drop( 5)-(507,65.57) lcomp=71.520 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(507,65.57) lcomp=78.383 lbc2=-0.830
part(63)-(444,65.30) lcomp=74.552 lbc2=-1.660
part(63)-(381,64.97) lcomp=74.094 lbc2=-3.320
part(63)-(318,64.55) lcomp=73.545 lbc2=-6.641
part(63)-(255,63.94) lcomp=72.860 lbc2=-13.281
part(63)-(192,62.88) lcomp=71.937 lbc2=-26.562
guess(20u1)-(172,62.88) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(62,62.88) lcomp=70.309 lbc2=-55.531
WHT(theta=31.00) lcomp=73.032
lr_all=1.905 lr_wht=4.392
lmaxcomp=80.29
ltotcomp=81.07
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-28.968290632587130827717807602787613454
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][14,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
For comparison, here is the same computation using only perfect codes:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^70.8630
drop( 5)-(507,65.86) lcomp=71.817 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(507,65.86) lcomp=78.578 lbc2=-0.830
part(63)-(444,65.65) lcomp=74.849 lbc2=-1.660
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part(63)-(381,65.40) lcomp=74.444 lbc2=-3.320
part(63)-(318,65.10) lcomp=73.973 lbc2=-6.641
part(63)-(255,64.71) lcomp=73.409 lbc2=-13.281
part(63)-(192,64.19) lcomp=72.706 lbc2=-26.562
guess(20u1)-(172,64.19) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(62,64.19) lcomp=71.612 lbc2=-56.834
WHT(theta=31.00) lcomp=73.169
lr_all=1.905 lr_wht=4.392
lmaxcomp=80.48
ltotcomp=81.27
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-30.272072056802635203237971232374080351
used code family: old
params=[5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][7,1,r
][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][23,12,G][23,12,G][23,12,G][23,12,G]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF2 with a claimed complexity of 274.732:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^69.9870
drop( 5)-(507,64.99) lcomp=70.941 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(507,64.99) lcomp=78.045 lbc2=-0.830
xor(64)-(443,64.97) lcomp=73.973 lbc2=-1.660
xor(64)-(379,64.95) lcomp=73.765 lbc2=-3.320
xor(64)-(315,64.90) lcomp=73.514 lbc2=-6.641
xor(64)-(251,64.79) lcomp=73.195 lbc2=-13.281
xor(64)-(187,64.58) lcomp=72.764 lbc2=-26.562
guess(17u1)-(170,64.58) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(62,64.58) lcomp=71.993 lbc2=-54.892
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=73.232
lr_all=1.497 lr_wht=4.170
lmaxcomp=79.54
ltotcomp=80.45
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-28.329845374218742534238304113938514928
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][13,4,rnd150926][18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^69.9140
drop( 5)-(507,64.91) lcomp=70.868 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(507,64.91) lcomp=77.605 lbc2=-0.830
xor(64)-(443,64.83) lcomp=73.900 lbc2=-1.660
xor(64)-(379,64.66) lcomp=73.619 lbc2=-3.320
xor(64)-(315,64.31) lcomp=73.222 lbc2=-6.641
xor(64)-(251,63.62) lcomp=72.611 lbc2=-13.281
xor(64)-(187,62.25) lcomp=71.596 lbc2=-26.562
guess(17u1)-(170,62.25) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(62,62.25) lcomp=69.657 lbc2=-54.892
WHT(theta=28.00) lcomp=72.990
lr_all=1.497 lr_wht=4.170
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lmaxcomp=79.10
ltotcomp=80.09
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-28.329845374218742534238304113938514928
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][13,4,rnd150926][18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926]
For comparison, here is the same computation using only perfect codes:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^69.9540
drop( 5)-(507,64.95) lcomp=70.908 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(507,64.95) lcomp=78.027 lbc2=-0.830
xor(64)-(443,64.91) lcomp=73.940 lbc2=-1.660
xor(64)-(379,64.82) lcomp=73.699 lbc2=-3.320
xor(64)-(315,64.63) lcomp=73.382 lbc2=-6.641
xor(64)-(251,64.26) lcomp=72.931 lbc2=-13.281
xor(64)-(187,63.53) lcomp=72.236 lbc2=-26.562
guess(17u1)-(170,63.53) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(62,63.53) lcomp=70.937 lbc2=-56.158
WHT(theta=20.00) lcomp=73.090
lr_all=1.497 lr_wht=4.170
lmaxcomp=79.52
ltotcomp=80.37
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-29.595714087454877581434997641085959931
used code family: old
params=[5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r
][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][23,12,G][23,12,G][23,12,G][23,12,G]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF(4) with a claimed complexity of 272.844:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^63.5260
drop(10)-(502,53.53) lcomp=64.525 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(502,53.53) lcomp=66.734 lbc2=-0.830
lf4(156)-(346,53.52) lcomp=115.024 lbc2=-3.320
lf4(156)-(190,53.49) lcomp=114.473 lbc2=-13.281
guess(16u1)-(174,53.49) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-13.281
code-(60,53.49) lcomp=60.934 lbc2=-43.739
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=70.675
lr_all=1.366 lr_wht=4.087
lmaxcomp=116.39
ltotcomp=117.14
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-30.457352130329587529315901036020611109
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][16,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^63.3730
drop(10)-(502,53.37) lcomp=64.372 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(502,53.37) lcomp=66.329 lbc2=-0.830
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lf4(156)-(346,52.91) lcomp=114.718 lbc2=-3.320
lf4(156)-(190,51.04) lcomp=113.249 lbc2=-13.281
guess(16u1)-(174,51.04) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-13.281
code-(60,51.04) lcomp=58.486 lbc2=-43.739
WHT(theta=30.00) lcomp=70.609
lr_all=1.366 lr_wht=4.087
lmaxcomp=116.08
ltotcomp=116.53
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-30.457352130329587529315901036020611109
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][16,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain we obtain by running our algorithm with precision 0.1, after removing
the roundings and adjusting the number of queries:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^63.2990
sparse-(512,63.30) lcomp=76.215 lbc2=-0.830
xor(59)-(453,66.60) lcomp=75.598 lbc2=-1.660
xor(65)-(388,67.20) lcomp=76.019 lbc2=-3.320
xor(66)-(322,67.39) lcomp=75.992 lbc2=-6.641
xor(66)-(256,67.78) lcomp=76.115 lbc2=-13.281
xor(67)-(189,67.57) lcomp=75.784 lbc2=-26.562
code-(64,67.57) lcomp=75.130 lbc2=-60.165
WHT(theta=28.00) lcomp=75.528
lmaxcomp=76.22
ltotcomp=78.84
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-33.602837640638774272597586977976944615
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926
][19,7,rnd150926]
For comparison, here is the same computation using only perfect and quasi-perfect
codes:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^63.3400
sparse-(512,63.34) lcomp=76.240 lbc2=-0.830
xor(59)-(453,66.68) lcomp=75.680 lbc2=-1.660
xor(65)-(388,67.36) lcomp=76.183 lbc2=-3.320
xor(66)-(322,67.72) lcomp=76.320 lbc2=-6.641
xor(66)-(256,68.44) lcomp=76.771 lbc2=-13.281
xor(67)-(189,68.88) lcomp=76.880 lbc2=-26.562
code-(64,68.88) lcomp=76.442 lbc2=-61.459
WHT(theta=18.00) lcomp=76.009
lmaxcomp=76.88
ltotcomp=79.36
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-34.896841882956364951443303534972935944
used code family: old+QP
params=[7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r
][8,2,iGop][11,4,S][25,12,FP][25,12,FP][25,12,FP][25,12,FP]
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For comparison, here is the same computation using only perfect codes:
chain for LPN_{512,0.125} with n=2^63.3490
sparse-(512,63.35) lcomp=76.245 lbc2=-0.830
xor(59)-(453,66.70) lcomp=75.698 lbc2=-1.660
xor(65)-(388,67.40) lcomp=76.219 lbc2=-3.320
xor(66)-(322,67.79) lcomp=76.392 lbc2=-6.641
xor(66)-(256,68.58) lcomp=76.915 lbc2=-13.281
xor(67)-(189,69.17) lcomp=77.168 lbc2=-26.562
code-(64,69.17) lcomp=76.730 lbc2=-61.749
WHT(theta=18.00) lcomp=76.150
lmaxcomp=77.17
ltotcomp=79.51
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-35.186278395343000828324443022088734514
used code family: old
params=[5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][5,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r
][7,1,r][7,1,r][6,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][7,1,r][23,12,G][23,12,G][23,12,G
][23,12,G]
A.8.2 Chains for LPN532,1/8
Here is the chain proposed in [GJL14] with a claimed complexity of 281.82:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^68.0000
sparse-(532,68.00) lcomp=81.153 lbc2=-0.830
part(65)-(467,67.81) lcomp=77.055 lbc2=-1.660
part(65)-(402,67.58) lcomp=76.675 lbc2=-3.320
part(65)-(337,67.32) lcomp=76.236 lbc2=-6.641
part(65)-(272,67.00) lcomp=75.719 lbc2=-13.281
part(65)-(207,66.58) lcomp=75.087 lbc2=-26.562
part(65)-(142,66.00) lcomp=74.278 lbc2=-53.125
guess(12u2)-(130,66.00) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-53.125
code-(66,66.00) lcomp=73.022 lbc2=-66.904
WHT(theta=100.00) lcomp=77.153
lr_all=0.290 lr_wht=6.304
lmaxcomp=83.75
ltotcomp=84.06
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-13.779193042112753687122226810335264979
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][23,12,G][13,4,rnd150926][19,5,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^74.3600
sparse-(532,74.36) lcomp=87.314 lbc2=-0.830
part(65)-(467,74.36) lcomp=83.415 lbc2=-1.660
part(65)-(402,74.36) lcomp=83.225 lbc2=-3.320
part(65)-(337,74.35) lcomp=83.007 lbc2=-6.641
part(65)-(272,74.35) lcomp=82.750 lbc2=-13.281
part(65)-(207,74.35) lcomp=82.439 lbc2=-26.562
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part(65)-(142,74.35) lcomp=82.042 lbc2=-53.125
guess(12u2)-(130,74.35) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-53.125
code-(66,74.35) lcomp=81.369 lbc2=-66.904
WHT(theta=33.00) lcomp=80.549
lr_all=0.290 lr_wht=6.304
lmaxcomp=87.60
ltotcomp=88.62
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-13.779193042112753687122226810335264979
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][23,12,G][13,4,rnd150926][19,5,rnd150926]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF1 with a claimed complexity of 278.182:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^73.5840
drop( 5)-(527,68.58) lcomp=74.538 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(527,68.58) lcomp=81.476 lbc2=-0.830
part(65)-(462,68.46) lcomp=77.626 lbc2=-1.660
part(65)-(397,68.32) lcomp=77.310 lbc2=-3.320
part(65)-(332,68.17) lcomp=76.954 lbc2=-6.641
part(65)-(267,68.00) lcomp=76.544 lbc2=-13.281
part(65)-(202,67.81) lcomp=76.059 lbc2=-26.562
guess(20u1)-(182,67.81) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(64,67.81) lcomp=75.313 lbc2=-57.882
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=75.597
lr_all=1.905 lr_wht=4.392
lmaxcomp=83.38
ltotcomp=84.06
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-31.319243871934051230338929039571812625
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[5,1,r][25,15,W][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^72.6360
drop( 5)-(527,67.64) lcomp=73.590 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(527,67.64) lcomp=80.500 lbc2=-0.830
part(65)-(462,67.38) lcomp=76.678 lbc2=-1.660
part(65)-(397,67.08) lcomp=76.235 lbc2=-3.320
part(65)-(332,66.69) lcomp=75.709 lbc2=-6.641
part(65)-(267,66.15) lcomp=75.060 lbc2=-13.281
part(65)-(202,65.28) lcomp=74.209 lbc2=-26.562
guess(20u1)-(182,65.28) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(64,65.28) lcomp=72.790 lbc2=-57.882
WHT(theta=30.00) lcomp=75.153
lr_all=1.905 lr_wht=4.392
lmaxcomp=82.41
ltotcomp=83.19
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-31.319243871934051230338929039571812625
used code family: old+QP+rnd
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params=[5,1,r][25,15,W][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF2 with a claimed complexity of 276.902:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^73.9830
drop( 7)-(525,66.98) lcomp=74.972 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(525,66.98) lcomp=80.115 lbc2=-0.830
xor(66)-(459,66.97) lcomp=76.019 lbc2=-1.660
xor(66)-(393,66.93) lcomp=75.808 lbc2=-3.320
xor(66)-(327,66.86) lcomp=75.550 lbc2=-6.641
xor(66)-(261,66.73) lcomp=75.217 lbc2=-13.281
xor(66)-(195,66.46) lcomp=74.756 lbc2=-26.562
guess(17u1)-(178,66.46) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(64,66.46) lcomp=73.932 lbc2=-56.630
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=75.293
lr_all=1.497 lr_wht=4.170
lmaxcomp=81.61
ltotcomp=82.53
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-30.067365090154126592900296031961631480
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[3,1,r][25,15,W][18,6,rnd150926][18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^73.9080
drop( 7)-(525,66.91) lcomp=74.897 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(525,66.91) lcomp=79.666 lbc2=-0.830
xor(66)-(459,66.82) lcomp=75.944 lbc2=-1.660
xor(66)-(393,66.63) lcomp=75.658 lbc2=-3.320
xor(66)-(327,66.26) lcomp=75.250 lbc2=-6.641
xor(66)-(261,65.53) lcomp=74.617 lbc2=-13.281
xor(66)-(195,64.06) lcomp=73.556 lbc2=-26.562
guess(17u1)-(178,64.06) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(64,64.06) lcomp=71.532 lbc2=-56.630
WHT(theta=15.00) lcomp=75.069
lr_all=1.497 lr_wht=4.170
lmaxcomp=81.16
ltotcomp=82.17
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-30.067365090154126592900296031961631480
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[3,1,r][25,15,W][18,6,rnd150926][18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF(4) with a claimed complexity of 274.709:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^70.5040
drop(15)-(517,55.50) lcomp=71.504 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(517,55.50) lcomp=68.792 lbc2=-0.830
lf4(162)-(355,55.43) lcomp=119.022 lbc2=-3.320
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lf4(162)-(193,55.14) lcomp=118.334 lbc2=-13.281
guess(13u1)-(180,55.14) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-13.281
code-(61,55.14) lcomp=62.631 lbc2=-45.275
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=71.743
lr_all=0.990 lr_wht=3.807
lmaxcomp=120.01
ltotcomp=120.71
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-31.994004843189402519390178262046306566
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[3,1,r][25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][19,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^70.3460
drop(15)-(517,55.35) lcomp=71.346 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(517,55.35) lcomp=68.278 lbc2=-0.830
lf4(162)-(355,54.80) lcomp=118.706 lbc2=-3.320
lf4(162)-(193,52.61) lcomp=117.070 lbc2=-13.281
guess(13u1)-(180,52.61) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-13.281
code-(61,52.61) lcomp=60.103 lbc2=-45.275
WHT(theta=25.00) lcomp=71.675
lr_all=0.990 lr_wht=3.807
lmaxcomp=119.70
ltotcomp=120.10
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-31.994004843189402519390178262046306566
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[3,1,r][25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][19,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain we obtain by running our algorithm with precision 0.1, after removing
the roundings and adjusting the number of queries:
chain for LPN_{532,0.125} with n=2^65.3000
sparse-(532,65.30) lcomp=78.290 lbc2=-0.830
xor(61)-(471,68.60) lcomp=77.655 lbc2=-1.660
xor(67)-(404,69.20) lcomp=78.080 lbc2=-3.320
xor(68)-(336,69.40) lcomp=78.058 lbc2=-6.641
xor(68)-(268,69.80) lcomp=78.192 lbc2=-13.281
xor(69)-(199,69.60) lcomp=77.866 lbc2=-26.562
code-(67,69.60) lcomp=77.237 lbc2=-62.111
WHT(theta=17.00) lcomp=78.436
lmaxcomp=78.44
ltotcomp=81.02
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-35.548346362647631165140054416118030948
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[3,1,r][25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][19,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926]
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A.8.3 Chains for LPN592,1/8
Here is the chain proposed in [GJL14] with a claimed complexity of 288.07:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^72.7000
sparse-(592,72.70) lcomp=85.748 lbc2=-0.830
part(70)-(522,72.46) lcomp=81.909 lbc2=-1.660
part(70)-(452,72.17) lcomp=81.487 lbc2=-3.320
part(70)-(382,71.81) lcomp=80.989 lbc2=-6.641
part(70)-(312,71.32) lcomp=80.384 lbc2=-13.281
part(70)-(242,70.58) lcomp=79.606 lbc2=-26.562
part(70)-(172,68.99) lcomp=78.502 lbc2=-53.125
guess(35u3)-(137,68.99) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-53.125
code-(64,68.99) lcomp=76.092 lbc2=-69.942
WHT(theta=100.00) lcomp=76.063
lr_all=1.524 lr_wht=12.809
lmaxcomp=90.40
ltotcomp=90.58
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-16.816717432567051155707898232895271319
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[5,1,r][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^77.3910
sparse-(592,77.39) lcomp=90.513 lbc2=-0.830
part(70)-(522,77.38) lcomp=86.600 lbc2=-1.660
part(70)-(452,77.37) lcomp=86.410 lbc2=-3.320
part(70)-(382,77.36) lcomp=86.194 lbc2=-6.641
part(70)-(312,77.36) lcomp=85.942 lbc2=-13.281
part(70)-(242,77.35) lcomp=85.642 lbc2=-26.562
part(70)-(172,77.34) lcomp=85.266 lbc2=-53.125
guess(35u3)-(137,77.34) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-53.125
code-(64,77.34) lcomp=84.437 lbc2=-69.942
WHT(theta=33.00) lcomp=83.344
lr_all=1.524 lr_wht=12.809
lmaxcomp=97.68
ltotcomp=97.71
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-16.816717432567051155707898232895271319
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[5,1,r][25,15,W][25,15,W][25,15,W][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF1 with a claimed complexity of 284.715:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^79.5570
drop( 4)-(588,75.56) lcomp=80.464 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(588,75.56) lcomp=88.675 lbc2=-0.830
part(73)-(515,75.29) lcomp=84.757 lbc2=-1.660
part(73)-(442,74.96) lcomp=84.297 lbc2=-3.320
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part(73)-(369,74.53) lcomp=83.746 lbc2=-6.641
part(73)-(296,73.91) lcomp=83.056 lbc2=-13.281
part(73)-(223,72.82) lcomp=82.124 lbc2=-26.562
guess(16u1)-(207,72.82) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(72,72.82) lcomp=80.517 lbc2=-62.542
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=83.443
lr_all=1.366 lr_wht=4.087
lmaxcomp=90.04
ltotcomp=90.75
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-35.979931993882924904548450029191500372
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[18,6,rnd150926][25,15,W][13,4,rnd150926][18,5,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^79.3610
drop( 4)-(588,75.36) lcomp=80.268 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(588,75.36) lcomp=88.561 lbc2=-0.830
part(73)-(515,75.05) lcomp=84.561 lbc2=-1.660
part(73)-(442,74.65) lcomp=84.057 lbc2=-3.320
part(73)-(369,74.10) lcomp=83.437 lbc2=-6.641
part(73)-(296,73.19) lcomp=82.623 lbc2=-13.281
part(73)-(223,70.14) lcomp=81.395 lbc2=-26.562
guess(16u1)-(207,70.14) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(72,70.14) lcomp=77.829 lbc2=-62.542
WHT(theta=19.00) lcomp=83.334
lr_all=1.366 lr_wht=4.087
lmaxcomp=89.93
ltotcomp=90.62
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-35.979931993882924904548450029191500372
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[18,6,rnd150926][25,15,W][13,4,rnd150926][18,5,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF2 with a claimed complexity of 283.843:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^77.9850
drop( 4)-(588,73.99) lcomp=78.892 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(588,73.98) lcomp=86.931 lbc2=-0.830
xor(73)-(515,73.97) lcomp=83.185 lbc2=-1.660
xor(73)-(442,73.94) lcomp=82.978 lbc2=-3.320
xor(73)-(369,73.88) lcomp=82.728 lbc2=-6.641
xor(73)-(296,73.76) lcomp=82.407 lbc2=-13.281
xor(73)-(223,73.52) lcomp=81.969 lbc2=-26.562
guess(14u1)-(209,73.52) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(72,73.52) lcomp=81.227 lbc2=-63.159
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=83.496
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lr_all=1.112 lr_wht=3.907
lmaxcomp=88.52
ltotcomp=89.46
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-36.596897467910004630929717148293030280
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][13,4,rnd150926][19,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^77.8980
drop( 4)-(588,73.90) lcomp=78.805 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(588,73.90) lcomp=86.873 lbc2=-0.830
xor(73)-(515,73.80) lcomp=83.098 lbc2=-1.660
xor(73)-(442,73.59) lcomp=82.804 lbc2=-3.320
xor(73)-(369,73.18) lcomp=82.380 lbc2=-6.641
xor(73)-(296,72.37) lcomp=81.711 lbc2=-13.281
xor(73)-(223,70.74) lcomp=80.577 lbc2=-26.562
guess(14u1)-(209,70.74) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-26.562
code-(72,70.74) lcomp=78.443 lbc2=-63.159
WHT(theta=30.00) lcomp=83.351
lr_all=1.112 lr_wht=3.907
lmaxcomp=88.37
ltotcomp=89.32
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-36.596897467910004630929717148293030280
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[25,15,W][13,4,rnd150926][19,5,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain from [ZJW16] based on LF(4) with a claimed complexity of 281.963:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^78.5130
drop(18)-(574,60.51) lcomp=79.513 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(574,60.51) lcomp=73.677 lbc2=-0.830
lf4(177)-(397,60.47) lcomp=129.191 lbc2=-3.320
lf4(177)-(220,60.28) lcomp=128.567 lbc2=-13.281
guess(16u1)-(204,60.28) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-13.281
code-(68,60.28) lcomp=67.956 lbc2=-50.044
WHT(theta=0.00) lcomp=79.025
lr_all=1.366 lr_wht=4.087
lmaxcomp=130.56
ltotcomp=131.28
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-36.762390670153894058017705531513633529
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[19,5,rnd150926][8,2,iGop][25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the corrected one to reach θ = 33%:
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chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^78.3410
drop(18)-(574,60.34) lcomp=79.341 lbc2=-0.830
sparse-(574,60.34) lcomp=73.561 lbc2=-0.830
lf4(177)-(397,59.78) lcomp=128.847 lbc2=-3.320
lf4(177)-(220,57.53) lcomp=127.191 lbc2=-13.281
guess(16u1)-(204,57.53) lcomp=0.000 lbc2=-13.281
code-(68,57.53) lcomp=65.204 lbc2=-50.044
WHT(theta=33.00) lcomp=78.959
lr_all=1.366 lr_wht=4.087
lmaxcomp=130.21
ltotcomp=130.61
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-36.762390670153894058017705531513633529
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[19,5,rnd150926][8,2,iGop][25,15,W][19,4,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926]
Here is the chain we obtain by running our algorithm with precision 0.1, after removing
the roundings and adjusting the number of queries:
chain for LPN_{592,0.125} with n=2^71.6910
sparse-(592,71.69) lcomp=84.735 lbc2=-0.830
xor(67)-(525,75.38) lcomp=84.591 lbc2=-1.660
xor(74)-(451,75.76) lcomp=84.800 lbc2=-3.320
xor(75)-(376,75.53) lcomp=84.581 lbc2=-6.641
xor(74)-(302,76.06) lcomp=84.611 lbc2=-13.281
xor(75)-(227,76.11) lcomp=84.350 lbc2=-26.562
code-(73,76.11) lcomp=83.939 lbc2=-68.504
WHT(theta=22.00) lcomp=84.751
lmaxcomp=84.80
ltotcomp=87.57
for the used code, log_2 bc^2 =-41.941549516941019516761621630448187382
used code family: old+QP+rnd
params=[18,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,
rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926
][19,6,rnd150926][19,6,rnd150926][19,7,rnd150926]
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2016 Anita Borg Scholarship
2014 Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award
EPFL, Switzerland
2012 Fellowship from the doctoral school in Computer and Com-
munication Science
EPFL, Switzerland
2010-2012 Excellency Scholarship
EPFL, Switzerland
2009,2008 Faculty Annual Diploma for Academic Performance
- 1st prize
UAIC, Romania
Teaching
– Supervised nine students for research and implementation-oriented pro-
jects.
– Teaching Assistant for Cryptography and Security, Advanced Cryptography,
Student Seminar: Security Protocols and Applications, Initiation a` la program-
mation en C++, Initiation a` la programmation en Java, Programmation Oriente´e
Syste`me (C/Unix/Perl ).
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Languages
Romanian (native), English (ﬂuent), French (good)
Technical Skills
• Programming Languages : Python, C, C++, Java
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